Forest conservation for communities and carbon: the economics of community forest management in the Bale Mountains Eco-Region, Ethiopia by Watson, Charlene
1 
Forest conservation for communities and carbon: the 
economics of community forest management in the 
Bale Mountains Eco-Region, Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Charlene Watson 
May 2013 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
London School of Economics and Political Science  
2 
Declaration of work 
 
This thesis is the result of my own work except where specifically indicated in the 
text and acknowledgements. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent.  
 
Photos are the authors own, as are the figures generated. I warrant that this 
authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party.  
 
 
 
May 2013 
  
3 
Abstract 
 
Forest conservation based on payments anchored to opportunity costs (OCs) is 
receiving increasing attention, including for international financial transfers for 
reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+). REDD+ emerged 
as a payment for environmental service (PES) approach in which conditional 
payments are made for demonstrable greenhouse gas emission reductions against 
a business-as-usual baseline. Quantitative assessments of the OCs incurred by 
forest users of these reductions are lacking. Existing studies are coarse, obscure the 
heterogeneity of OCs and do not consider how OCs may change over time. 
 
An integrated assessment of OCs and carbon benefits under a proposed 
community forest management (CFM) intervention linked to REDD+ is undertaken 
in Ethiopia. The OCs of land for the intervention are estimated through household 
survey and market valuation. Scenarios explore how OCs are likely to change over 
the intervention given qualitative conservation goals and available land-use 
change information. The feasibility of OCs payment as a tool for REDD+ is 
assessed by combining cost with emission reductions estimates generated from 
direct tree measurements. Households’ environmental attitudes, perceptions and 
intention to cooperate with the intervention, estimated by a voluntary contribution 
to improve forest management, are then investigated. 
 
Mean OCs of forest conservation are US$334/ha, but highly heterogeneous. 
Plausible futures of agricultural improvement, forest product commercialisation, 
and degradation of land uses suggest total OCs could approach US$441 million 
over a 20-year project. Applying carbon stock estimates of 231tC/ha±52 in moist 
and 132tC/ha±73 in dry forest, REDD+ revenues may not meet annual cumulative 
OCs, although more nuanced conservation planning could reduce OCs. Despite 
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OCs all households intend to cooperate in the intervention, with mean contribution 
of US$11±4/year/household. The expected incomes of households under the Bale 
REDD+ Project intervention however, were high and expectation management is 
necessary. Recommendations are made for REDD+ intervention design in Ethiopia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
 
Climate regulation is a non-material, non-extractive, environmental service that 
historically was non-marketed. Now recognised as a global public good, GHG 
emission reductions are now traded. Both regulated and unregulated carbon 
markets have grown substantially over the last five years and in 2010, carbon 
markets were worth US$142 billion (World Bank, 2011). Forests play an important 
role in climate change mitigation and deforestation is responsible for 17% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions annually (Stern, 2007, VCS, 2007). Reduced emissions 
from deforestation and degradation, forest conservation, sustainable management 
of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks; henceforth referred to as 
REDD+, presents a substantial climate change mitigation opportunity (McCarl and 
Schneider, 2001, Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003, IPCC, 2006). International 
financial transfers for REDD+ are growing; forest carbon markets traded an 
estimated US$178 million in 2010 (Diaz et al., 2011). REDD+ is also operates 
outside of carbon market mechanisms, and substantial public money is going to 
support REDD+ activities (Watson and Nakhooda, 2012).  
 
Where it operates at a local-level, REDD+ might be considered a payment for 
environmental service (PES) scheme whereby the environmental service of carbon 
dioxide emission reductions are sold, through a voluntary transaction, and 
payment is conditional upon the provision of that service (Wunder, 2005). Others 
ways to finance REDD+ exist, but a well-functioning PES can help deliver the 
environmental integrity, or effectiveness, of a REDD+ mechanism that relies on 
real, permanent and verifiable emission reductions (UNDP, 2009). Accounting for 
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emission reductions from forest activities, however, involves substantial 
uncertainty (Brown and Lugo, 1992, Monni et al., 2007, Grainger, 2008, Larocque et 
al., 2008). This is particularly true for forest carbon stocks where uncertainty arises 
from complexity in forest ecosystems, sampling errors and from the choice of 
model parameters, and is compounded by uncertain carbon market variables such 
as carbon price, project preparation costs and transaction costs.  
 
Despite the uncertainty it entails, the application of documented biome-average 
forest carbon stocks has become commonplace for emission reductions accounting 
(Brown and Gaston, 1995, Gibbs et al., 2007). Biome averages are simple and quick 
to apply without resource and logistical constraints, but biome averaged data 
rarely captures the full heterogeneity of the forest landscape (Houghton and et al., 
2001, Bradford et al., 2010). Few studies have considered the discrepancy between 
the application of such simple default data and more complex forest carbon 
accounting methods. The discrepancy can be large, but there is no consensus on its 
direction (Smith, 2003, Brown et al., 2007). For REDD+ to be effective, policy-
makers need to better understand the uncertainties of emission reductions 
accounting. Over-estimation of emission reductions can lead to large sums of 
finance being miss-directed for no climate benefit, while underestimation can 
result in lost opportunities for climate change mitigation and for the local 
realisation of economic incentives. 
  
There is growing support for REDD+ to be delivered through community forest 
management (CFM) (Klooster and Masera, 2000, Murdiyarso and Skutsch, 2006, 
Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Hayes and Persha, 2010). In part this stems from 
findings that CFM can lead to emissions reductions where forest use becomes 
more sustainable (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009, Skutsch and Ba, 2010). It has also 
been shown that community monitoring, reporting and verification of emission 
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reductions can be less costly that equivalent costs of professionals or central forest 
departments (Somanathan et al., 2009, Palmer Fry, 2011). Under CFM, a common 
property regime is established where members of a well-defined group of people 
establish collective regulations for resource use, membership, monitoring, and 
sanctioning procedures (Arnold, 2001, Baland and Platteau, 2003). To deliver 
emission reductions those participating in REDD+ must have sufficient incentives 
to do so. It has been proposed that an estimate of the private opportunity costs 
(OCs) of forest conservation – the foregone benefits of alternative land uses – could 
be used to anchor the level of payment needed to achieve the desired level of forest 
conservation for REDD+ (Pirard, 2008, Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008, Pagiola and 
Bosquet, 2009, White and Minang, 2011). These OCs should be embodied within 
the payment that stakeholder, who become the providers of ecosystem services, 
are willing to accept (Ferraro, 2008). 
 
Studies of the OCs of forest conservation are typically based on the OCs of 
foregone agricultural production (e.g. Chomitz et al., 2005, Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 2006, Börner et al., 2009). However, under CFM wider restrictions on 
resource use experienced by households may mean that the forgone revenues from 
timber and non-timber forest products (NTFP) will also be relevant costs to 
consider (Karky and Skutsch, 2010, Fisher et al., 2011). Studies of the OCs of 
REDD+ have also largely been undertaken at broad-scales which do not translate 
well to on-the-ground design of payment incentives (e.g. Grieg-Gran, 2006, Grieg-
Gran, 2008). In particular, these broad-scale studies of the OCs of REDD+ do not 
sufficiently appreciate the heterogeneity in the OCs of forest users which result 
from differences in the economic reliance of households on forests (Vedeld et al., 
2004).  
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REDD+ OC studies have also largely excluded forests under community 
management or that are common pool resources. This is largely attributed to the 
unclear rights to land, trees or carbon under such property rights regimes, or 
because forest use is illegal (e.g. Grieg-Gran, 2006, Börner and Wunder, 2008). 
Where the costs of REDD+ via CFM have been considered, the mechanism to 
deliver emission reductions becomes more ‘PES-like’; where the incentives 
provided for service provision lack conditionality on the delivery of the service 
provision (Nepstad et al., 2007, Peskett et al., 2008, Skutsch et al., 2011, Goldman-
Benner et al., 2012). This contrasts the REDD+ literature that talks of direct, output 
based payments that are strongly additional to the business-as-usual (BAU) 
baseline and conditional on continued service provision (see Santilli et al., 2005, 
Parker et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009). More research into the form, magnitude and 
heterogeneity of OCs of REDD+ via CFM is necessary where communities become 
legal providers of the environmental service generated through REDD+ via CFM. 
These OC estimates can inform the design of a REDD+ via CFM conservation 
intervention to encourage enrolment in the local-level PES scheme, maintain 
conditionality and additionality and reduce the displacement of emission 
reductions due to inadequate incentives. 
 
At the core of conservation interventions are also concerns for the persistence of a 
resource system into the future. Of the few studies of the OCs of conservation, 
however, most report OCs for a single year or assume OCs are constant over time 
subject only to discounting (Chomitz et al., 2005, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, 
Börner et al., 2009). Where resource use is unsustainable this assumption of 
constant OCs are unlikely to hold (Pearce and Markandya, 1987, Ferraro, 2002). 
The OCs of REDD+ are a function of the drivers of land-use change and so will be 
influenced by changing income from direct human activities such as agricultural 
production. Conservation interventions also aim to alter economic incentives that 
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will impact on OCs, for example, through the commercialisation of forest products 
(Brandon and Wells, 1992). The OCs of forest conservation over time are, however, 
hard to predict. There is often a lack of information on trends in the productivity of 
land uses and a lack of explicit goals and quantitative operational targets in 
conservation (Margules and Pressey, 2000). Being able to overcome the OCs of 
local forest stakeholders over time will be necessary for the longevity of the 
conservation intervention and the permanence of emission reductions from 
REDD+. Generating a better understanding of possible futures of OC is therefore 
necessary for more appropriate intervention and incentive design. 
 
While PES uses a payment incentive to alter land use behaviours, CFM relies more 
on the overall impact on a household’s payoffs that result from a change in the 
property rights regime, reputation, trust and reciprocity (Ostrom, 2000, Castillo 
and Saysel, 2005, Agrawal, 2003). Behaviours rely on the underlying values that 
individuals hold, themselves driven by motivation and belief systems (Kotchen 
and Reiling, 2000). An understanding of the attitudes and perceptions of 
participants of conservation interventions can go some way to explore these values 
and beliefs. A number of studies show that knowledge and perception of the 
resource base condition, of perceived environmental responsibilities, and of 
perceived legitimacy of the intervention are important for conservation success 
(Zanetell and Knuth, 2004, Davies and Hodge, 2006, Nkonya et al., 2008, Adams et 
al., 2003). However, none have explored how an ex-ante study of attitudes and 
perceptions can contribute to incentive design to encourage cooperation. The 
ongoing cooperation of local stakeholders in REDD+ activities will be critical for 
the longevity, or permanence of emission reductions (see Sedjo and Marland, 
2003). On common property regimes, cooperation on a common pool resource can 
beget more cooperation and self-restraint in forest use brings more significant 
benefits when followed by sufficiently large number of users (Baland and Platteau, 
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1996, Castillo and Saysel, 2005). Greater cooperation, or conservation effort, under 
CFM can therefore increase REDD+ revenues. An understanding of local 
stakeholder’s attitudes towards forest management and the use of the resource 
base will, therefore, allow better consideration of socio-cultural factors for 
cooperation that go beyond payment incentives that PES theory highlights. 
 
A country associated with drought and poverty, forests do not immediately come 
to mind when images of Ethiopia are evoked. But the largely rural population is 
highly dependent on the forest resource base: across the country forest income is 
estimated to be around a third of total household income (Mamo et al., 2007, 
Babulo et al., 2009, Tesfaye et al., 2011). Sustainable forest management has been 
hindered by political instability and a focus on increasing food production and 
security (Teketay et al., 2010). Poor governance, uncertain land tenure, and a 
rapidly growing population means that Ethiopia is experiencing forest losses 
amounting to 140,000 hectares each year (WBISPP, 2005). With high levels of 
poverty characterising Ethiopia, forest conservation that also allows households to 
meet their livelihood needs is urgent (WDI, 2011).  
 
CFM is being scaled up across the country with a view to meet livelihood needs 
and to conserve the remaining natural forest areas. In the Bale Mountains Eco-
Region (BME) deforestation rates are more than four times the country-wide 
average (Dupuy, 2009, Teshome et al., 2011). The BME is not a WWF eco-region, 
however, it is referred to in this thesis as an eco-region so as to be consistent with 
the Bale REDD+ Project implementers at the case study site as well as the national 
use of the term to refer to this area. The Bale REDD+ Project has been proposed 
and initiated by the Government of Ethiopia (Oromia Regional Government, 
Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Food Security and Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Commission) and NGOs FARM-Africa and SOS 
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Sahel Ethiopia: the Bale REDD+ Project implementers. The project area covers 
900,000 ha including dry and moist tropical forest which is currently being lost at 
4% annually. In order to reduce deforestation over a 20 year period, CFM will be 
implemented alongside promotion of fuel-efficient stoves and biomass briquettes 
and plans are underway to plant woodlots and manage fire outbreaks. Increasing 
agricultural production and the value of NTFP will also occur as part of the 
project. While CFM and REDD+ can both be undertaken as separate policy 
interventions, in the BME these are considered together: the Bale REDD+ Project 
undertakes REDD+ via CFM. Thus emission reductions do not have to be 
additional to that achieved through CFM, but rather are those generated by CFM.   
 
Some do not consider Ethiopia to be a ‘key country’ for REDD+. Efforts to establish 
REDD+ projects and activities have focussed on countries where forest areas are 
more substantial and the carbon contained within the forests is very high. This 
includes Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where the 
majority of international finance to support REDD+ development has been 
channelled (Climate Funds Update, 2011). Establishing REDD+ in Ethiopia, 
therefore, may not contribute significantly to reducing emissions from 
deforestation assessed at an international scale. Ethiopia may not receive as 
substantial financial transfers as other tropical forested nations under an 
international REDD+ mechanism established by climate change negotiations. 
REDD+ does, however, contribute to internalising the externality of climate 
regulation. It could provide a source of finance that changes the economic 
incentives to make forest conservation more economically viable and it necessitates 
the discussion and review of property rights regimes in forested areas. It could also 
provide much needed finance that can help promote forest conservation in a 
country with limited public budgets for forest conservation. It is for these reasons, 
in addition to the potential climate benefits, that a discussion about REDD+ in 
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Ethiopia is justified. With CFM being pursued in a number of national REDD+ 
strategies in East Africa, including Ethiopia, the BME REDD+ project could prove 
exemplary for the how REDD+ via CFM might function on-the-ground (FCPF, 
2011). 
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
In this thesis, I aim to increase the understanding of how REDD+ can be 
implemented through CFM as a local-level PES scheme in a developing country. 
This thesis addresses a number of identified gaps in the literature on the 
uncertainty of forest carbon stock accounting, the OCs of REDD+ via CFM, the OCs 
of forest conservation over time, and community-level PES. A proposed REDD+ 
via CFM forest conservation intervention in the Bale Mountains of Ethiopia 
provides an ideal case study to explore how information on the OCs of land, the 
uncertainty in OCs over time, and household’s attitudes and perceptions can 
inform the on-the-ground design of a REDD+ via CFM intervention. 
 
The specific research objectives of this thesis are: 
 
• To estimate the forest carbon stock in the BME; 
• To evaluate the discrepancy between simple and complex forest carbon 
accounting methods and the implications for the environmental integrity of 
a REDD+ mechanism;  
• To estimate the OCs of a proposed shift from an open access forest 
management regime to forest conservation via CFM; 
• To explore changes in the OCs of forest conservation over time in light of 
uncertainty in the conservation intervention objectives and paucity of data 
on future productivity of land uses;  
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• To establish if potential REDD+ revenues can overcome the OCs of forest 
conservation over time; and 
• To investigate the attitudes and perceptions of forest management in the 
BME and consider households’ intentions to cooperate in the proposed 
intervention through a voluntary contribution to the community group. 
 
1.3. Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is structured as follows and is also represented in Figure 1: 
 
Chapter 2 places this research in context of the existing literature on PES and 
REDD+ via CFM. Identifying the gaps in the literature, it highlights the need and 
timeliness of research into the implementation of REDD+ via CFM.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the case-study site in the BME in Ethiopia and reviews forest 
policy and management both past and present. A detailed description of the 
proposed forest conservation intervention at the case-study site is also given 
including the likely rules of CFM.   
 
Chapter 4 provides the conceptual framework and the methods employed in this 
analysis of forest conservation for carbon and communities. 
 
Chapter 5 estimates the carbon stock of forest at the case-study site and explores 
the uncertainty of forest carbon stock estimates and the resulting environmental 
integrity of emission reductions. It also estimates the potential REDD+ revenue 
that a project in the BME could generate. Chapter 5 adds to knowledge though the 
collection of primary data and estimation of forest carbon stocks in the BME. It 
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builds on limited literature on the implications of forest carbon accounting method 
discrepancies for the environmental integrity of REDD+.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates household income from the forest resource base and from 
cultivated land to allow the estimation of the OCs of avoided deforestation under a 
CFM regime. Chapter 6 adds to the limited literature on the OCs of forest 
conservation, in particular the OCs of REDD+ via CFM, as well as to the limited 
discussion of PES at the community-level. 
 
Chapter 7 considers three futures through scenario modelling, exploring the OCs 
of land over the life-span of the proposed conservation intervention. It also 
assesses whether REDD+ revenues are sufficient to overcome the estimated OCs. 
Chapter 7 contributes to knowledge by applying scenario modelling in 
conservation planning. This Chapter also contributes to the limited literature on 
the OCs of conservation over time.  
 
Chapter 8 examines the attitudes and perceptions of the local communities 
towards forest management. It also elicits their expectations of, and intention to 
cooperate in the proposed REDD+ via CFM forest conservation intervention. 
Chapter 8 adds to knowledge by eliciting environmental attitudes and perceptions 
of a CFM intervention ex-ante, and illustrating how this information can be used 
for intervention design.  
 
Chapter 9 highlights the key findings of this thesis and how they may influence 
policy formulation at the case-study site, as well as making recommendations for 
future research.  
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Figure 1. Schematic of thesis structure 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Each year, 13 million hectares of forest are lost globally to expanding agriculture, 
infrastructure and wood extraction (Geist and Lambin, 2001, FAO, 2006). A store of 
carbon, this forest loss is responsible for around 12 to 20% global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (FAO, 2006, Stern, 2007). A mechanism that reduces emissions 
from deforestation and degradation, REDD+ presents a substantial climate change 
mitigation opportunity (McCarl and Schneider, 2001, Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 
2003, IPCC, 2006). REDD+ goes some way to address market and policy failures in 
forest management that have historically undervalued or excluded from the 
market, forest products and services. As initially conceived, financial transfers to 
those who conserved and generated climate change mitigation potential through 
forestry activities, therefore, go some way to internalise positive environmental 
externalities such that non-marketed costs or benefits are reflected in the profits 
received by forest stakeholders (Richards, 1999). 
 
Not requiring technological innovation of the scale required in many other sectors 
and with much of deforestation thought only marginally profitable (Boucher, 2008, 
Minang et al., 2008), REDD+ has been promoted as a cost-effective climate change 
mitigation option (Nabuurs et al., 2007, Bellassen and Gitz, 2008). The 2008 Eliasch 
review found that the inclusion of emissions abatement through the forest sector 
could greatly reduce the total estimated cost of halving global carbon emissions 
from 1990 levels, as compared to the forest sectors exclusion. These cost reductions 
were estimated as much as 50% in 2030 and 40% in 2050 (Eliasch, 2008).  
 
25 
REDD+ can be generated from more established ways to protect forests; protected 
areas, sustainable logging, integrated conservation and development projects, 
modifying plans for infrastructure such as road building, or through recognition of 
rights (Rudel et al., 2005, Chomitz, 2007, Nepstad et al., 2007, Boucher, 2008). 
REDD+ could also be funded in a number of different ways and not all of these 
would require payment to reach local forest stakeholders. Strassburg et al. (2009) 
illustrate that the costs of REDD+ in developing countries may be met by selling 
emission reductions in national, regional or global carbon markets that can raise 
substantial amounts of money; or from intermediate market-linked systems, not 
purchased as offsets or linked or market prices; or through official development 
assistance and other public funds. Such international public funds for REDD+ have 
been more flexible, allowing countries to prepare the enabling environment for the 
scaling up of REDD+ in addition to delivering actual emission reductions (Watson 
and Nakhooda, 2012). Advantages of each source of finance differs (Boucher 2008). 
With negotiations failing to make progress on aspects of climate finance as well as 
REDD+ finance, in the immediate future there will be a combination of sources of 
finance for REDD+. Similarly, most existing and planned REDD+ projects combine 
a number of policies, actions and measures (PAMs) to deliver REDD+. The 
proposed Bale REDD+ Project under scrutiny in this thesis, for example, combines 
CFM with, woodlots, fuel-efficient stoves, and biomass briquettes to reduce 
fuelwood needs, support for agricultural intensification to reduce needs for 
expanding agricultural land, and support for the development of NTFP and a ‘Bale 
Wild’ branding to increase the local value of products such as forest coffee and 
honey (see Chapter 3).   
 
While an international REDD+ mechanism is likely to operate through national-
level institutions in the future, the effectiveness at a country level will rely on 
successful local-level forest conservation (Hayes and Persha, 2010). Although it is 
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acknowledge that some PAMs for REDD+ may not require finance to reach local 
forest stakeholders, for example, through national forest tenure reform and 
strengthening of enforcement against illegal logging practices, however, there has 
been much attention paid to ensuring that benefit-sharing does reach such levels 
(Costenbader, 2011, Peskett, 2011, Hoang et al., 2013). This thesis adopts an 
approach where, at local-level, REDD+ might be regarded as a PES scheme where a 
well-defined environmental service is bought by at least one buyer, from at least 
one provider, through a voluntary transaction and conditional upon the provision 
of that service (Wunder, 2005). Local-level REDD+ should, therefore, operate 
where the willingness-to-pay for a service exceeds a provider’s opportunity costs 
(OCs) of alternative, or foregone, land uses and practices that generate emission 
reductions (Pirard, 2008, Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008, Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009, 
White and Minang, 2011). The ability to incentivise such forest conservation 
depends on REDD+ revenues to a project, themselves dependent on the emission 
reductions that are generated from forest conservation activities (Santilli et al., 
2005, Parker et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009).  
 
Efforts have been made to ensure real, permanent and verifiable emission 
reductions are generated from REDD+ (eg. Brown et al., 2007, UNDP, 2009). A 
requirement of the payment is that emission reductions are additional; they would 
not have occurred in the absence of the intervention (Asquith et al., 2002, 
Rodríguez Zúñiga, 2003, Rojas and Aylward, 2003). The delivery of additional 
emission reductions requires that only those who threaten forest cover should be 
paid, despite any discontent this sparks for existing good forest stewards (Wunder, 
2005). Cost-efficiency requires that those providing the environmental service 
should only be paid their costs, thus payments would ideally be differentiated 
between forest stakeholders. The longevity of emission reductions is also 
important. Where REDD+ gains are not permanent, no overall emission reductions 
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will be made thus challenging the environmental integrity of a REDD+ mechanism 
(Marland et al., 2001, Sedjo and Marland, 2003).  
 
There have been a number of calls for REDD+ to be delivered via community forest 
management (CFM) (Klooster and Masera, 2000, Murdiyarso and Skutsch, 2006, 
Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Hayes and Persha, 2010). Of course, this is one of 
many policies, actions and measures that can lead to REDD+. The establishment of 
protected areas, reduced impact logging and agro-forestry, for example, can also 
generate emission reductions (Watson, 2012). CFM inherently addresses the 
livelihood needs of communities, however, as it is implemented where centralised, 
state management is recognised as ineffective at sustainable forest management 
and/or where benefits are not distributed equitably (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009). 
Necessarily understanding and addressing local livelihood needs such as biomass 
energy, CFM as a way to implement REDD+ may therefore reduce the risks and 
associated costs of dealing with the displacement of REDD+ outside of the project 
area as opposed to the generation of a protected area, or greater law enforcement 
as a main tool to reduce forest loss and decline. Where the agents of deforestation 
shift their activities or meet demands for the same products from other locations, 
such displacement is termed primary leakage (Aukland et al., 2002, Smith and 
Scherr, 2003).  
 
The costs of monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) emission reductions and 
community enforcement of regulations required by REDD+ can also be lower 
where provided by communities than equivalent labour and administration 
provided by professionals and central forest departments (Somanathan et al., 2009, 
Skutsch and Ba, 2010). REDD+ via CFM, therefore, could be competitive, or more 
cost-effective, than alternative, mechanisms to deliver emission reductions 
28 
(Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009, Karky and Skutsch, 2010, Danielsen et al., 2011, 
Palmer Fry, 2011). 
 
REDD+ via CFM may also increase participation in PES, particularly for the poor 
who are less likely to hold private titles to land to contract in individual-based PES 
schemes (Miranda et al., 2003, Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Kosoy et al., 2007). Such a 
community-level PES can also reduce barriers to participation such as high upfront 
investments, such as for tree seedlings for private land, or transaction costs, such 
as negotiating payments, that the poor may be less able to meet if they were acting 
individually (Gong et al., 2010). Revenues for REDD+ via CFM could strengthen 
the incentives to cooperate in forest conservation (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009). 
Addressing a market failure that drives deforestation, the recognition of the 
international value of carbon storage in addition to the local values driving 
improved community-level forest management, would help local forest 
stakeholders international the previously non-market benefit of climate change 
mitigation. Klooster and Masera (2000) suggest that carbon mitigation could also 
leverage finance for the local investments needed to build local CFM capacity and 
knowledge.  
 
There has been little consideration, however, of how REDD+ via CFM will operate 
on-the-ground. REDD+ necessitates a change in forest area, management regime 
and access for those local to the conservation intervention. Rural communities 
often depend heavily on natural resources for their livelihoods (Forsyth et al., 1998, 
Bishop, 1999). The changes in livelihood strategies and opportunities that this 
implies are unlikely to be identical between households local to conservation 
interventions. Cost information can contribute towards a better understanding; 
leading to more effective conservation interventions (Polasky et al., 2001, Polasky 
et al., 2005, Naidoo et al., 2006, Naidoo and Iwamura, 2007, Carwardine et al., 
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2008). Studies into the OCs of forest conservation, however, remain infrequent. 
Experience of PES in developing countries indicates that environmental service 
provision is often hard to attribute, payments are largely uniform and input-based 
with indirect and in-kind incentives, especially where PES operates at a 
community-level (Sommerville et al., 2009, Southgate et al., 2009, Skutsch et al., 
2011).  
 
PES in practice, therefore, largely does not appreciate the on-the-ground 
heterogeneity in the OCs of forest conservation. Furthermore, few studies have 
considered how the OCs of conservation change over time. This is despite the fact 
that conservation interventions are put in place largely due to concerns about the 
ecological and social sustainability of a resource system now and into the future 
(Pearce and Markandya, 1987, Ferraro, 2002). PES in practice appears less 
conditional on service delivery, less additional to the baseline, and payments may 
not fully overcome OCs and sufficiently incentivise ongoing service provision.  
 
The PES literature has also afforded little attention to environmental services 
generated under a common property regime, as would be the case for REDD+ via 
CFM (Muradian et al., 2010). A considerable body of research has demonstrated 
that individuals can collaborate to manage a common pool resource more 
sustainably than in the absence of cooperation (Ostrom, 1990, Bromley, 1992, 
Bardhan, 1993, Baland and Platteau, 1996). The mechanisms and incentives for 
cooperation in common property regimes rely on positive incentives and penalties, 
as well as social norms and codes of conduct (Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom, 2000, Castillo 
and Saysel, 2005). Social and cultural norms include preferences for altruism, 
reciprocity, inequity aversion, reputation, trust and conformity with the wider 
community (Velez et al., 2009). These may influence the payoffs of a REDD+ via 
CFM conservation intervention, defined as the balance of costs and the benefits, 
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both perceived and experienced, by the resource appropriators. PES, however, 
largely ignores the logic of collective action under which individuals may be 
willing to sacrifice private benefits or private consumption to raise public benefit 
provision so long as it is reciprocated (Vatn, 2010, Vicary, 2011).  
 
Skutsch et al. (2011) address the core difference in incentives between REDD+ and 
CFM in detail. They consider output-based payments to communities not likely to 
be appropriate under CFM and suggest more manageable input-based incentives 
should be considered such as employing communities in MRV activities, or 
through alternative income generating activities. The incentives become more 
‘PES-like’ and so do not fulfil all the criteria of the classic PES definition (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002, Wunder, 2008). As is found in other studies that consider 
REDD+ via CFM, there is a move away from the conditionality of the payment on 
delivery of the emission reductions generated (Nepstad et al., 2007, Peskett et al., 
2008). Thus REDD+ via CFM to date appears removed from the performance, or 
output-based REDD+ payments commonly discussed (see Santilli et al., 2005, 
Parker et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009). 
 
2.2. The carbon benefits of forest conservation: REDD+ revenues 
 
Finance delivered through a REDD+ mechanism has the potential to bring a 
greater and more sustainable source of finance to conserve environmental services 
than often exists now (Landell-Mills, 2002, Pagiola et al., 2005a). It has garnered 
much attention as forest conservation in developing countries is often 
underfunded, and this is particularly true in Africa. Independent of whether 
REDD+ is financed through carbon markets or public funds (as discussed in 
Section 4.2.1), recognising and realising the value of climate regulation could 
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attract more international and domestic finance over a longer period of time if 
carbon remains preserved within tree biomass.  
 
The shift to such market-based instruments for conservation follows a shift in 
conservation towards meeting the basic needs, food and livelihood security of local 
stakeholders. Itself based on a growing understanding of the relationship between 
people and the environment-resource system (Arnold, 2001). Programmes for both 
conservation and development have emerged that attempt to diversify livelihoods 
to reduce pressure on forest resource systems, to commercialise and increase prices 
of forest products to increase the economic value of standing forest, and that pay 
stakeholders for the provision of an environmental service (Brandon and Wells, 
1992). REDD+, however, goes further than integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) by attempting to address market and policy failures 
which undervalue or exclude from the market forest products and services, or that 
make other land uses more profitable (see also Wunder, 2012). REDD+ goes some 
way to internalise positive environmental externalities such that non-marketed 
costs or benefits are reflected in the profits received by forest stakeholders 
(Richards, 1999). For REDD+ to function as a local-level PES scheme, revenues 
from the sale of emission reductions must overcome the costs of forest 
conservation experienced by the local forest stakeholders. 
 
In order to estimate the REDD+ revenues that can be generated by an intervention 
that avoids deforestation, information on forest carbon stocks, area change and 
market variables is necessary. Advances are being made in the technology and 
accessibility of remote sensing imagery for the measurement of forest area and 
forest area change and it is being increasingly used to infer forest biomass and so 
forest carbon stocks (Achard et al., 2004, Mayaux et al., 2005, DeFries et al., 2007, 
Ramankutty et al., 2007, Baccini et al., 2008, Goetz et al., 2009, Bucki et al., 2012). 
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Appropriate methods to establish the past and predicted rates of forest change in 
order to calculate the emission reductions resulting from an intervention also 
continue to be developed (Angelsen, 2008, Olander et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009, 
Griscom et al., 2009, Huettner et al., 2009, Estrada, 2011). Although forest carbon 
stock estimation is being studied, relatively less attention has been paid to 
reducing uncertainty in this field with regard to REDD+ interventions. 
 
The scale of forest ecosystems and complexity of interactions between 
environmental services within forest ecosystems means that there is more 
uncertainty in carbon accounting than in any other climate change mitigation 
sector (Peltoniemi et al., 2006, Larocque et al., 2008). Many developing countries 
also suffer from a lack of data on key forest variables and parameters, and/or 
resources or capacity to undertake forest carbon stock inventories (Brown et al., 
1989, Smith and Heath, 2001, Andersson et al., 2009, Romijn et al., 2012).  
 
The high uncertainty in carbon accounting is partly to blame for the absence of 
forestry in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (Fogel, 2005). It has also 
resulted in limited eligibility, strict definitions, accounting rules and caps for land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) in national emissions accounting – 
required by developed country signatories to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Article 4 of the 
UNFCCC, Article 3 of Kyoto Protocol). There is also very little guidance for 
REDD+ implementation in the texts of the United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change; only paragraphs 72 to 74 really comment on activities that countries might 
need to consider when implementing REDD+.  
 
The choice of method to estimate forest carbon stocks is often governed by 
financial, time, data and capacity constraints. Recognising these trade-offs, the 
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Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) present three approaches for 
estimating carbon stocks and emissions (IPCC, 2006). Tier 1 is based on default 
assumptions and default values for carbon stocks. Tier 2 employs more country-
specific carbon stock information and requires activity data disaggregated to 
smaller scales. Tier 3 uses advanced estimation approaches that involve complex 
models and highly disaggregated data (Böttcher et al., 2009).  
 
The application of Tier 1 biome and regional forest carbon averages to estimate 
emission reductions has become widespread where data on forest carbon stock is 
not available locally (Brown and Gaston, 1995, Gibbs et al., 2007). These biome 
averaged data are able to capture broad ecological variables influencing carbon 
stocks, such as temperature and rainfall (Chave et al., 2004, GOFC-GOLD, 2008), 
but they obscure substantial forest heterogeneity (Houghton and et al., 2001, 
Bradford et al., 2010). Moving from Tier 1 to Tier 3 the costs and the accuracy of 
emission estimates increases; discrepancies between these Tiers can be large. 
Brown et al. (2007) found that Tier 1 accounting overestimated carbon density as 
much as 33% in Mexican temperate forest and underestimated density as much as 
44% in African rainforest. Smith (2003) found a three-fold difference in a single 
hectare of Zambian wilderness.  
 
Few studies have considered the impact of this uncertainty for the environmental 
integrity of REDD+ which relies on real, permanent and verifiable emission 
reductions (UNDP, 2009). Grassi et al. (2008) introduce uncertainty in accounting 
for emission reductions from REDD+ and its implications. They explore how 
concepts and methodological tools can help deal with these uncertainties and 
promote the adoption of the conservativeness principle whereby the risk of 
overestimation of emission reduction is minimised. They then link this back to 
discussions of emission reduction accounting under the UNFCCC. Kerr et al. (2004) 
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translate errors in estimating carbon stocks into environmental integrity of credits 
for avoided deforestation. In their estimation of carbon storage in Costa Rica, they 
show that errors in emission reductions could be large, but also vary by forest 
type. Pelletier et al. (2010) use more complex modelling over time, with five carbon 
stock estimates for Panamanian forests in land conversion and transition models, 
finding 144% difference in emission reductions resulted from highest to lowest.  
 
It can be seen that the application of broad forest carbon assumptions over large 
spatial scales has substantial implications. Over-estimation can lead to large sums 
of finance being misdirected for no climate benefit, thus threatening the 
environmental effectiveness of a REDD+ mechanism. Underestimation can result in 
lost opportunities for climate change mitigation and for the local realisation of 
economic incentives. 
 
2.3. The opportunity costs of forest conservation 
2.3.1. Forest income and the opportunity cost of forest conservation 
 
In developing countries, rural communities and households can depend heavily on 
natural resources for their livelihoods: the capabilities, assets and activities 
required for a means of living (Forsyth et al., 1998, Bishop, 1999). Standing forests, 
in particular, provide domestic material goods and energy, enable trade and 
economic activity, and are a source of both food and medicines (Vedeld et al., 
2004). At a household level, research into the heterogeneity of forest reliance is 
primarily undertaken with a sustainable livelihoods focus which refers to the 
assets, the activities and the access to these that determine the living gained by a 
household (see reviews of Godoy and Lubowski, 1992, Lampietti and Dixon, 1995, 
Ellis, 2000, Vedeld et al., 2004). Market-based valuation of household production is 
employed to value non-timber forest product (NTFP) use and to determine the 
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relative reliance of households on forests as a livelihood-generating resource (e.g. 
Dercon, 1998, Shackleton and Campbell, 2001, Dovie et al., 2005).  
 
The reliance of households on forests for their livelihoods is influenced by access to 
and control over forest resources (Wollenberg et al., 2000, Angelsen and Wunder, 
2003). Rural poverty and forests are also found to coincide, often with forest use 
varying according to changes in the resource base, prices and alternative income 
opportunities (Neumann and Hirsch, 2000, Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). Forest-
poverty links, however, are complicated. There are cause-effect issues: forest 
reliance due to lack of resources and alternatives differs from opportunity-driven 
forest reliance for valuable cash products (Adhikari, 2005). The forests are also 
comprised of a multitude of goods that are utilised in different ways by different 
groups; high value timber extraction, for example, is likely to serve a different 
livelihood function than NTFPs. Therefore poverty does not necessarily lead to 
deforestation, although it may in some cases. Studies into forest-poverty links are 
on-going, for example by the Poverty Environment Network instigated by the 
Centre for International Forestry Research (PEN-CIFOR, 2011). What is clear from 
the literature is that households’ forest income and resulting reliance on forests is 
highly heterogeneous even within a small geographical area (Godoy and 
Lubowski, 1992, Byron and Arnold, 1999, Cavendish, 2000, Coomes et al., 2004, 
Dovie et al., 2005). In a meta-study of 54 cases over 17 countries, Vedeld et al. (2004) 
find mean household forest income to be US$678 per year, but with a range from 
US$1.3 to US$3,460. 
 
With differing incentives for deforestation, or degradation leading to deforestation, 
there will also be divergence in the OCs of the land for forest conservation; the 
foregone benefits of an alternative investment, activity or use of the resource. 
Although the assessment of conservation costs is increasingly being recognised as 
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important strategically in conservation efforts (Polasky et al., 2005, Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 2006, Börner et al., 2009), the literature on the OCs of conservation 
interventions is sparse. Existing conservation cost assessments have been 
dominated by management costs (Balmford et al., 2003, Frazee et al., 2003, Moore 
et al., 2004). They are also focused in developed countries (Ando et al., 1998, 
Polasky et al., 2001, Carwardine et al., 2008) as there it can be assumed that under 
perfect market conditions land prices will represent the discounted stream of 
income from the highest-value use (Bishop, 1999).  
 
In many developing countries land tenure is uncertain, however, and land markets 
absent or data incomplete thus OCs cannot be established through land markets 
(Balmford et al., 2000, Balmford et al., 2003, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, 
Waggoner, 2009). Although in Brazil, where land prices do exist, Chomitz et al. 
(2005) applied the hedonic method to estimate the OCs of maintaining forest cover 
in the Brazilian Atlantic Forest. They found forested land prices 70% below those 
of cleared land, clearly demonstrating the economic incentives opposing 
conservation. 
 
Where hedonic methods cannot be applied, OCs can instead be calculated through 
the comparison of the productivity of alternative land uses. Norton-Griffiths and 
Southey (1995) estimated the OCs of biodiversity conservation in Kenya at US$203 
million a year by comparing the potential net returns from agriculture and 
livestock production within parks, reserves and forests with net returns from 
tourism, forestry and other conservation activities. The net revenues of US$42 
million from wildlife tourism and forestry were inadequate to overcome these OCs 
of land use. Public willingness-to-pay and external finance are therefore critical for 
Kenyan biodiversity conservation. Also in Kenya, Börner et al. (2009) estimated the 
OCs of forest conservation through household surveys, at US$129-201/ha annually 
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(applying an exchange rate of US$0.804:€1 based on the 2005 year of data collection 
and reported foregone revenues of €160-250/ha). They go on to demonstrate that 
this OC information could be used to design appropriate extraction fees to restrict 
resource extraction with minimal negative welfare impacts. Fisher et al. (2011) 
include both OCs of agricultural production and charcoal production within 53 
districts in Tanzania finding net present value of between US$663 and US$1456/ha 
for agricultural production, and US$358 and US$502/ha for charcoal production. 
 
The finer the scale at which OCs studies are undertaken the better able they are to 
quantify heterogeneity. In addition to household demographics, heterogeneity in 
OCs depends on environmental endowments such as climate regime and soil 
fertility, which affect land uses (Merry et al., 2002, Smith and Scherr, 2003, Nepstad 
et al., 2007). In Paraguay, for example, Naidoo and Adamowicz (2006) disassociate 
land use types and find net economic benefits of US$257/ha associated with 
smallholder agriculture but much higher values of cattle ranching and soybean 
farming at US$375/ha and US$1347/ha, respectively.  
 
Estimates of land productivity can be used to create maps illustrating where OCs 
will be greatest. These maps could then be applied in conservation planning (e.g. 
Chomitz et al., 2005, Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006, Carwardine et al., 2010). Small-
scale OCs studies also identify distributional issues for conservation policy. Where 
variation in OCs is large, the integrity of an intervention could be eroded where it 
conflicts with local subsistence demands, or if it is not politically or socially 
acceptable due to exacerbation of existing inequalities in wealth, income or access 
to resources (Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996). Assessing OCs quantitatively and 
using the results in intervention design can, therefore, bring greater acceptance, 
longevity and impact for forest conservation (Chomitz et al., 2005, Adams et al., 
2010).  
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2.3.2. PES in practice 
 
The full process of PES scheme design and benefit sharing is rarely documented 
and Engel et al. (2008) note that best practice is largely confined to the grey 
literature. However, the existing PES literature shows that while theory 
appreciates heterogeneity in OCs, PES in practice largely does not. Payments are 
typically uniform across local stakeholders rather than differentiated (Engel et al., 
2008, Southgate et al., 2009, Gross-Camp et al., 2012). Such uniform payments 
across the providers of environmental services are more transparent, easy to 
implement and give an impression of fairness for local stakeholders (Alix-Garcia et 
al., 2005, Pagiola and Platais, 2007, Southgate et al., 2009). But while uniform 
payments can generate surplus to the land owners with OCs lower than payment 
levels, and so increase incentives for participation in PES, they also reduce the 
efficiency of the intervention as payments are made that do not lead to changes in 
land uses (Pascual et al., 2010). Alternative payment modes exist (see Engel et al., 
2008, Ferraro, 2008, Wünscher et al., 2008). For example, where information is 
available on local stakeholders OCs, differentiated payments can be included in 
contract design or through auctions or bidding systems for PES contracts (Gong et 
al., 2010). The application of auctions and differentiated payment, however, is 
often prohibited by the high transaction costs of such payment methods through 
data and administrative needs.  
 
Due to complex land use and environmental service linkages, PES are also 
typically input-based; where land-use change is assumed to produce the 
environmental service rather than actual service itself (Skutsch et al., 2011). Indirect 
payments, as opposed to cash, have also been made including goods or services, 
such as clinics, schools, public transport and infrastructure (Asquith et al., 2008, 
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Bennett, 2008). Such in-kind payments lead to fewer questions on the reinvestment 
of payments; cash may well lead to short-term spending on intermediary needs, 
for example, alcohol and luxury goods rather than on longer-term investments 
(Wunder, 2005, Lee and Mahanty, 2009). Both input-based and in-kind payments, 
however, reduce conditionality of the payment on the environmental service 
provision. The upfront nature of some in-kind payments also introduces a risk of 
whether they will sufficiently incentivise on-going service provision and they are 
considered irreversible in many cases as they are hard to withdraw (Sommerville 
et al., 2010). It may also introduce ethical issues such as in withholding 
community-level in-kind benefits, for example clinics, for non-participants or if 
contract provisions are not met. It also becomes harder for households to judge 
whether benefits from in-kind payments sufficiently overcome their costs. Given 
that providers benefit differently from the use of the common good, those with 
high OCs are likely to perceive low net benefit (Gong et al., 2010, Pascual et al., 
2010, Sommerville et al., 2010).  
 
In the Wunder (2005) definition of PES, providers should voluntarily enter into 
environmental service contracts. Alternative definitions of PES have been 
proposed, but overall they agree that the decision to accept a payment at the level 
of the transaction of the stakeholder, should be voluntary (see e.g. Sommerville et 
al., 2009). Economic logic would therefore predict that when offered a payment 
below OCs the PES scheme would not be entered into (Engel et al., 2008). 
However, there is evidence that in some PES schemes OCs have not been met 
(Corbera et al., 2007b). This may be a result of local stakeholders lacking 
information on the market value of services they supply or the experience to truly 
evaluate the contracts they are offered (Peskett and Harkin, 2007, Kosoy et al., 
2008). Non-use values of standing forest are also not often factored into OC 
estimates and may also play a role in decision making. Gardner et al. (2001) found 
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in Cameroon that despite the low income generation potential of forests locals 
were highly motivated to manage the forest for conservation in light of non-
marketed forest values.  
 
Furthermore, in order to opt out, stakeholders must also be free from external 
pressure and coercion to enter a PES scheme which is not always the case (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005, Pagiola et al., 2005a, Robertson and Wunder, 2005, Bennett, 2008). 
The payment contract will also pay a role in overcoming OCs, defining details such 
as the timing of payments, length of contracts, upfront investments required and 
sellers’ private risk and time preferences (Ferraro, 2008). A function of the drivers 
of land-use change, future OCs will be influenced by changing profits to direct 
human activities such as agriculture and wood extraction, and affected by 
infrastructure development. OCs will also be impacted by the underlying drivers 
of deforestation, including; demographic, economic, technological, policy and 
institutional, and cultural causes (Geist and Lambin, 2002).  
 
Few studies quantify how OCs of conservation might change over time. Most 
report OCs for a single year or assume that OCs are constant over time subject only 
to discounting (Börner et al., 2009, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Chomitz et al., 
2005). An exception, Ferraro (2002) considered the OCs of the establishment of a 
national park in Madagascar. Without establishment of the park, Ferraro predicted 
that the flow of benefits would first increase as locals extracted resources. As these 
resources became degraded, however, benefits would then decline. If in contrast, 
the national park was established, Ferraro predicted that the benefits of 
exploitation were zero but, in the zone surrounding the national park, benefit 
flows would decrease more rapidly by virtue of a more limited area of access. 
While sensitivity analysis of the parameter assumptions substantially changed the 
estimates of total OCs, this study was useful in highlighting the impacts of 
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unsustainable resource use on the total OCs of conservation. Pearce and 
Markandya (1987) also make this point in their assessment of the social OCs of 
natural resource management. They identified externalities resulting from reduced 
tree cover which could, for example, result in soil erosion, reduction in soil fertility 
and sedimentation, all of which all are likely to reduce agricultural yields and 
hence OCs over time. They concluded that where the resource use is unsustainable 
and where complete exhaustion of the resource base is possible, the calculation of 
the OCs of conservation requires information on future patterns of exploitation as 
well as the future development and supply of substitutes for these resources. 
 
2.4. REDD+ via CFM 
2.4.1. Community forest management 
 
Many forests are common pool resources which are resource systems that are 
sufficiently large as to make it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from obtaining subtractable benefits from their use (Ostrom, 1990). In 
the absence of well-defined property rights, an individual actor will appropriate 
resource units from a common pool resource without consideration of the social 
cost to others. Particularly in the tropics and developing countries, policy failures 
such as unclear land tenure, poor governance and lack of law enforcement often 
lead to de facto open access regimes on forested land (Davies and Richards, 1999, 
Richards, 2008). The tragedy of the commons is predicted to result from this 
extraction of non-excludable and rival goods by individuals and the negative 
externalities of their use (Hardin, 1968).  
 
Such an outcome, however, is not inevitable and a considerable body of research 
has demonstrated that individuals can collaborate to manage a common pool 
resource more sustainably (Ostrom, 1990, Bromley, 1992, Bardhan, 1993, Baland 
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and Platteau, 1996). Where users of a common pool resource are able to 
collaborate, the forest resource becomes excludable. Under such a common 
property regime, a well-defined group of people establish collective regulations for 
resource use, membership, monitoring and sanctioning procedures (Arnold, 2001, 
Baland and Platteau, 2003). This is the theoretical underpinning of CFM which 
creates the mechanisms and incentives such that community institutions are able to 
conserve forests at the same time as meeting livelihood needs (see Ostrom, 1990, 
Bromley, 1992, Baland and Platteau, 1996, Arnold, 2001). 
 
The success of CFM in practice is largely demonstrated through case-studies. 
Literature, however, focusses on differing aspects of what might be considered a 
successful CFM programme and case studies equally note instances where CFM 
has led to uncertain livelihood and forest management outcomes. Case-studies 
from Nepal, where community forestry has operated since the 1980s, indicate that 
forest product collection rates have increased over the course of a CFM 
interventions, although livestock ownership decreased; the poor receive lower 
forest benefits than the rich and were less likely to participate in decision-making; 
and benefit appropriation largely depended on wealth, education and household 
status (Adhikari et al., 2004, Adhikari and Lovett, 2006, Adhikari et al., 2007, 
Adhikari and Di Falco, 2009).  
 
CFM is now widely adopted across East and Southern Africa (Wily, 2010). In East 
Africa, experiences in Tanzania dominate where CFM took off in the 1990s. Case 
studies show that CFM can deliver improved forest outcomes in Tanzania 
(Blomley et al., 2008, Lund and Treue, 2008), but there has also been criticism of a 
lack of integration of CFM into existing local institutions (Blomley and Ramadhani, 
2006) and in the equity of benefit distribution (Meshack et al., 2006, Persha and 
Blomley, 2009). Experience in Ethiopia is also mixed, while studies note positive 
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impact on forest condition (Gobeze et al., 2009), others point to low participation 
due to low returns for locals that has led to conflict (Getahun et al., 2007).  Wily 
(2010) emphasises the strength of the CFM approach in Africa is the recognition 
and empowerment of local communities as resource owner-managers, despite the 
uncertain forest, livelihood and governance outcomes of CFM.  
 
2.4.2. Implementing REDD+ via CFM 
 
Property rights are a foremost issue in PES, where property rights can be defined 
as the bundle of entitlements defining the owner’s rights, privileges and limitations 
for the use of a resource (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). Eligibility for PES schemes 
often depends on an individual’s right to change land use, ability to protect the 
service from others, and right to transfer rights (Corbera et al., 2009). Where 
property rights are weak it is more complex to determine who to pay, to enforce 
contracts, elite capture is more likely and there is likely to be weak law 
enforcement (Wunder, 2007, Engel and Palmer, 2008, Clements et al., 2010). The 
literature on PES has, therefore, largely focussed on contracts between individuals 
with clear legal control over environmental service provision.  
 
REDD+ via CFM, however, would not operate through private land owners. The 
devolution of rights and management responsibility provides forest communities 
with greater long-run incentives to become good stewards of the forest resource 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, Petersen and Sandhövel, 2001). REDD+ OCs studies 
have often deliberately excluded community forests. On common pool resource 
where forest use and deforestation is forbidden by statutory law, it has been 
suggested that the OCs of land may be an inappropriate measure for assessment of 
the feasibility of REDD+ policy as either illegal behaviours would be rewarded or 
emission reductions may not be additional (Börner and Wunder, 2008). It is for this 
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reason that Wünscher et al. (2008), in their calculation of OCs of forest 
conservation, assume natural forest produces no household income. It has been 
suggested, where forest use is illegal, that costs incurred by the government of 
improving laws and law enforcement may therefore be considered more relevant 
in planning interventions than the requirement to overcome the OCs of forest users 
(Börner and Wunder, 2008, Busch et al., 2009, Gregersen et al., 2010).  
 
A CFM intervention, however, recognises communities as forest management 
agents. The communities, therefore, legally become environmental service 
providers. The assertion that OCs will set the level of payment for land use 
managers to avoid deforestation may, therefore, only hold as a result of a 
conservation intervention implementation. Where environmental services are 
generated under a common property regime, however, attributing service 
provision to an individual is complex. All members of CFM groups have legitimate 
claim to payment as forest use rights are given to the community. But, not all 
households would deforest in the BAU baseline. Furthermore, more than one 
household can contribute to forest conservation on a single hectare as forest use on 
overlaps. Not only is it unclear which household incurred the costs of 
environmental service provision, the lack of attribution can also introduce free-
riding and moral hazard in community-level PES; where the actions of one person 
are unobservable and so cheating is a distinct possibility (Hanley et al., 2006). Elite 
capture of community-level payments is another possibility, and well documented 
in the community based natural resource management literature (e.g. Fritzen, 2007, 
Platteau, 2004). 
 
Transaction costs incurred by local forest stakeholders should also be considered 
for REDD+ under CFM. Transaction costs may include; arranging, bargaining, 
monitoring and enforcing agreements (North, 1990). For CFM in particular, 
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meetings to negotiate forest areas and byelaws, in addition to ongoing monitoring 
and enforcement of schemes can be high for some individuals. Meshack et al. 
(2006), found poorer households took on greater transaction costs relative to their 
forest product benefits in Tanzania. In Nepal, richer households bore almost twice 
as much absolute transaction costs as poorer households in terms of the number of 
days contributed to CFM meetings, although costs were still a higher percentage of 
resource appropriation in poorer households (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). With 
varying definition, each individual experiencing different costs, and hard to 
separate from production decisions, transaction costs are hard to estimate, 
however (Benham and Benham, 2000).  
 
In the few instances where REDD+ via CFM has been considered, incentives 
become more ‘PES-like’ (Wunder, 2008). Peskett et al. (2008) suggest that while 
direct payments for REDD+ might be provided where rights are clearly 
established, a mixture of these and indirect benefit distribution mechanisms are 
preferable for REDD+ under rights regimes such as CFM. They suggest broader 
development projects such as improving schools and social services might be 
employed as incentives for REDD+. Skutsch et al. (2011) consider three types of 
payment mode for REDD+ via CFM; output-based, input-based and OCs-based. 
They conclude that output- or OCs-based payments to communities are not likely 
to be appropriate under CFM due to high transaction costs of establishing and 
distributing such differentiated payments. They suggest more manageable input-
based incentives should be considered such as employing communities in MRV 
activities, or through alternative income-generating activities. These are predicted 
to have greater predictability of benefits, a greater focus on co-benefits rather than 
economic efficiency and less collusion and strategic manipulation.  
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Nepstad et al. (2007) in their assessment of costs of REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon 
propose a Public Forest Stewardship Fund for avoided deforestation on ‘social’ 
forest reserves comprising 26% of the forests, including; indigenous lands, 
extractive reserves, and sustainable development reserves. They suggest direct 
payments to households, although payments are uniform and set to half the 
minimum salary (equating to US$1200 per year) and not linked to the delivery of 
emission reductions. Suggestions for the delivery of incentives for REDD+ via 
CFM, therefore, are more input-based, indirect or uniform all of which decrease 
conditionality and, thus, the efficiency that PES was initially proposed to deliver 
(Simpson and Sedjo, 1996, Ferraro and Simpson, 2002, Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). 
 
2.4.3. Cooperation on a common pool resource 
 
Historically CFM implementation has not offered communities payments, but the 
change in the property rights regime, leading to increases empowerment and 
improved governance mechanisms, is assumed to shift incentives sufficiently to 
deliver desired resource management outcomes (Agrawal, 2003). Collective action 
on a common pool resource has been shown to be influenced not only by incomes 
from direct extraction, but also through the impact of reputation, trust and 
reciprocity on households’ payoffs (Ostrom, 2000, Castillo and Saysel, 2005). 
Collaboration on a common pool resource largely means that resource 
appropriators extract less than private incentives would dictate, but are willing to 
incur these costs for longer term sustainability on the understanding of reciprocity 
and cooperation of others (Heckathorn, 1993, Seabright, 1993). Game theory and 
experiments also indicate that as individual effort increases, the total group effort 
increases and incentives for free-riding decline (Fischbacher et al., 2001, Castillo 
and Saysel, 2005).  
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Research from a large body of case studies on common pool resources has 
converged on a set of variables that enhance the likelihood of cooperation. These 
can be divided into the attributes of the resource and the attributes of the 
appropriators. In the first instance, collaboration is enabled by: the feasible 
improvement in the resource as a result of collaboration; reliable and valid 
indicators of condition; predictability of resource units; and, a sufficiently small 
spatial extent that knowledge of boundaries and microenvironments are known by 
the appropriators. In the second instance, collaboration of appropriators is enabled 
by: dependency on the resource base for a major portion of their livelihood; a 
common understanding of how use affects that of others; a discount rate that 
allows future benefits to be achieved from the resource; similarly affected interests 
of appropriators despite economic and political asset heterogeneity; trust and 
reciprocity; autonomy to determine access and harvest rules from external 
authorities; and, local leadership and organisational experience (see Baland and 
Platteau, 1996, Agrawal, 2001). The enabling factors of cooperation all impact upon 
the balance of costs and the benefits, or the payoffs, both perceived and 
experienced by the resource appropriators (Matta and Alavalapati, 2006). The 
payoff determine whether households will cooperate in collective resource 
management (Ostrom, 1990, Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). 
 
PES so far has failed to consider the logic of collective action (Kosoy et al., 2008, 
Muradian et al., 2010). Kosoy et al. (2008) is a rare study of willingness to 
participate in PES that accounts for rules, institutions, values and interactions 
between actors and, it considers PES on a common-property regime. Analysing 
Mexican communities receiving payments for biodiversity and carbon under the 
government initiated Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services 
Programme, they find that procedural rules and management impact on 
participation, but also note that collective motivation can be distinctly different 
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from individual preferences. Estimates of the OCs of REDD+ commonly assume 
households act as self-interested profit maximisers that act independently of their 
impacts on others (e.g. Busch et al., 2009). They may, therefore, overestimate the 
payment required to incentivise forest conservation.  
 
Fisher et al. (2010) notes that PES in developing countries often operate under 
conditions much like a common pool resource; with unclear property rights, poor 
monitoring capacity and information asymmetry. The transfer of formal land 
tenure to local land managers has been used as a PES incentive in South-East Asia 
under the Rewarding the Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) project 
(van Noordwijk et al., 2004). The importance of social capital and social 
empowerment is also shown to be important in PES. Gong et al. (2010) show that 
areas of low uptake of a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forest project in 
China, are those in which social capital is also low due to its impact on the ability 
to enforce contracts through social structures. It is clear that the lessons and 
incentives for cooperation in common pool resource management are important 
for PES design and implementation.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the growing support for REDD+ via CFM, it is unclear how REDD+ as a 
local-level PES could be implemented on-the-ground. PES in practice has so far 
failed to appreciate the heterogeneity of OCs of land and there has been little 
consideration of how OCs will change over time. There has also been limited 
consideration of how PES will operate on a common property regime, in particular 
how financial incentives of a PES scheme will be impacted by the non-financial 
incentives so far provided under CFM. Ongoing discussions to ensure that finance 
for emission reductions through REDD+ is direct, conditional, additional, and 
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permanent, contrast the proposals for REDD+ via CFM implementation, and 
indeed PES in practice, which become more indirect and less conditional on 
emission reduction delivery. If current levels of public and private interest in forest 
conservation through REDD+, and REDD+ via CFM, are to be maintained and 
expectations are to be met, this divergence in discourse and practice needs to be 
addressed. 
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Chapter 3: Case study site  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Sustainable forest management in Ethiopia has been hindered by political 
instability and a country-wide focus on increasing food production and security. In 
2005, the Woody Biomass Inventory and Strategic Planning Project (WBISPP) 
reported that 13 million ha of forest remained in Ethiopia covering 12% of 
Ethiopia’s land mass. Country-wide forest losses of 140,000 hectares each year are 
driven by conversion to agriculture, and unsustainable forest management, 
underpinned by poor governance, uncertain land tenure and a rapidly growing 
population. High levels of poverty characterise the country, 78% of Ethiopia’s 
population live on less than US$ 2 per day and GDP per capita was reported as 
US$221 in 2010 (WDI, 2011). Forest conservation that can also meet livelihood and 
development needs in Ethiopia is therefore necessary. 
 
In the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME), deforestation rates are four times the 
country-wide average. A forest conservation intervention, referred to in this thesis 
as the Bale REDD+ Project, is underway to devolve management responsibilities to 
communities while also generating emission reductions through avoided 
deforestation. The Bale REDD+ Project that achieves REDD+ via CFM could be 
exemplary for the proposed scaling up of CFM across the country, as well as for a 
growing number of REDD+ projects in development in Ethiopia. This Chapter 
introduces the history of forest policy in Ethiopia and the proposed forest 
conservation intervention in the BME on which this thesis is based. 
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3.2. Forest Management in Ethiopia 
3.2.1. Ethiopia in context 
 
Ethiopia is divided into nine administrative regional states: Afar, Amhara, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, Oromia, Somali, the Southern Nations 
Nationalities and Peoples Region, and Tigray. Ethiopia’s administrative regional 
states are subdivided into zones of which there are a total of 68. The most recent 
census reports Ethiopia’s population at 74 million across a land area of 1,221,900 
km2. Ethiopia is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second most populous nation with 84% of 
the population living in rural areas (International Monetary Fund, 2007).  
 
In 2010, a new economic plan for Ethiopia was proposed that focusses on 
infrastructure, industrialisation, large-scale commercial farming, boosting the role 
of small private enterprises, and improving economic governance (EIU, 2010). This 
presents possible risks of land grabs and big commercial farms may threaten the 
retention of forested areas. Since 2000, a loss of 140,000 ha of forest annually, or 
1.1% has been reported (WBISPP, 2005). Recent exploration of the main drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation in Ethiopia identify the small scale conversion 
to agriculture, large scale conversion to agriculture, and unsustainable forest 
management (R-PP, 2011).  
 
Any forest conservation efforts in Ethiopia must be managed alongside 
development plans. The country ranks low, at 174 of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index in 2011. With key links between human wellbeing and the 
maintenance of ecosystem goods and services being made in Ethiopia’s recent 
environmental policy, the renewed positive attitude to natural resource 
conservation, and an emerging participatory approach to management, could 
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prove profoundly helpful for meeting both development and poverty reduction 
goals. 
 
3.2.2. Forest management: past to present 
 
Ethiopia’s forests were historically under traditional management practices 
throughout the 19th Century. The Gada system, for example, divided society into 
age classes, the peak of which males entered the Gada council for a period of eight 
years. These elders were responsible for day-to-day jurisdiction as well as 
reiteration and introduction of the locally agreed rules and norms of resource use 
(Wakijira et al., in press).  
 
In the 20th Century, under Menelik resource management was centralised and in 
the 1940s, Emperor Haile Selassie privatised land. This limited people’s access to 
forests and eroded traditional forest management practices as elders’ functions 
were to promote central policies rather than maintain and adapt local informal 
institutions. To protect Ethiopia’s biological diversity, however, the Ethiopian 
Wildlife Conservation Organisation was founded in 1964 to form a network of 
protected areas.  
 
Overthrowing Haile Selassie in 1975, the Derg socialist military regime, or 
Provisional Military Administrative Council, came into power. Forest management 
was further centralised but land ownership was nationalised (Mekonnen, 2000). 
This made all forest use prohibited, further eroding local institutions for forest 
management (Wakijira et al., in press). Village organisations were formed that 
brought together the general assembly of household heads in the village and 
formed an executive committee and judicial tribunal. Again, these were in place to 
implement directives, decisions and orders that came from higher officials and 
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central government, rather than to continue local resource management 
institutions. By this time the traditional management systems in Ethiopia had been 
eroded.  
 
The central government did form state owned Forest Priority Areas, National 
Parks, Game Reserves, Sanctuaries and Controlled Hunting Areas. However, these 
were poorly implemented. Forest Priority Areas established by the government 
were largely nominal and forests were perceived to be for exploitation rather than 
protection. Of 58 Forest Priority Areas only 48 were demarcated, 5 inventoried, 4 
had management plans, and none were legally constituted (or gazetted) (Teketay 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, only two of the nine National Parks and three wildlife 
sanctuaries have ever been gazetted.  
 
Encroachment into forest areas for informal and uncoordinated resource use has 
been experienced across Ethiopia as a result (Macqueen, 2008). Rebel force 
occupation of the forests and the protracted civil war and political instability in 
Ethiopia also contributed to the degradation of many forest areas. Displaced 
communities were known to settle in a number of Ethiopia’s neglected National 
Parks.  
 
The defeat of the Derg in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) ended political suppression and initiated extensive economic 
reform within Ethiopia. The economic reform was largely focused towards poverty 
alleviation through efforts to increase the productivity and efficiency of agriculture 
(Abrar et al., 2004). With countrywide issues of food security and land scarcity, 
there was, and still remains, clear justification for policies encouraging agricultural 
intensification in Ethiopia (Byerlee et al., 2007, Diao and Pratt, 2007). Agricultural 
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output contributes 50% of GDP and 90% of output arises from smallholder farming 
on micro-holdings (Shiferaw and Holden, 1999, Shiferaw and Holden, 2000).  
 
The success of agricultural intensification efforts so far, however, is questionable. 
The ongoing public investment and provision of technology for agricultural 
intensification has not led to higher or more sustainable cereal yields, reduced food 
aid dependency, improved food security or lower prices for staple crops (Byerlee 
et al., 2007, Spielman et al., 2010). Grain production in Ethiopia did grow by 74% 
between 1989/90 and 2003/04, but cultivated area increased by 51% (Gebreselassie, 
2006). These productivity gains, therefore, have been attributed to the expansion of 
agricultural land rather than successful agricultural intensification (Byerlee et al., 
2007, Diao and Pratt, 2007).  
 
The continued investment in agricultural intensification may have come at a cost to 
natural forests, however. With no dedicated central government forest ministry, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is responsible for the 
formulation of forest resource relevant policies, laws and for the provision of 
technical support to the Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development in each of 
Ethiopia’s regional states. At the local-level, Agricultural and Development Agents 
have focussed on their responsibilities for agricultural development activities and 
given less attention to natural forest conservation. The substantial annual forest 
losses and the unsustainable exploitation of Ethiopia’s forests threaten the 
livelihood security of the rural population. The WBISPP indicated that 70% of 
woredas consume wood products faster than they can be replaced (WBISPP, 2005). 
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s population is growing rapidly at 2.6% (FDRE, 2008). 
 
Federal government’s current attitude to forest conservation and natural resource 
management has been more promising since sever forest fires of 2000 (Wakijira et 
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al., in press). Several environmental initiatives have been adopted. In 2005, a new 
Wildlife Development Conservation and Utilisation Policy and Strategy was 
accepted, uniting previously unrelated policies for wildlife, biodiversity and 
environmental protection. It also highlights key links between human wellbeing 
and the maintenance of ecosystem goods and services; it supports environmental 
valuation approaches as well as PES. 
 
In 2007, the government issued a proclamation for Forest Development, 
Conservation and Utilisation (542/2007). This proclamation divides forest into state 
and private ownership, but under both, makes provision to engage communities in 
forest management (Moges et al., 2010). It is under the guidance of this federal 
policy and proclamation, in combination with the Environment Policy of Ethiopia 
and the Conservation Strategies of Ethiopia, that regional states then administer 
Ethiopia’s forest resources.  
 
3.2.3. Community forest management in Ethiopia 
 
The deforestation and degradation of Ethiopia’s forests is exacerbated by total 
government ownership of land: the common property of the state and the people, 
land shall not be subject to sale or exchange (Amente and Tadesse, 2004). This has 
prevented a mass rural-urban migration, where infrastructure is not sufficient to 
support an influx of people. But the uncertainty of tenure has generated 
disincentives for the rural population to maintain ecosystem quality or for farmers 
to invest in productivity improvements. The state forest authorities also lack 
resources to sustainably manage the forests (Amente and Tadesse, 2004). Thus 
while forests are legally owned by the government, they are utilised by local 
communities with a lack of law enforcement and many of Ethiopia’s forests have 
characteristics of an open access regime on a common pool resource. 
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Although issues of property and use rights of land and forests remain, there is 
strong support for CFM across Ethiopia. CFM involves the legal transfer of forest 
use rights from the government to community-based organisations (CBOs) - the 
small groups of households that sign forest use agreements – enabled by and 
dependent upon a negotiated Forest Management Agreement outlining forest 
management plans and the implementation of sustainable forest management 
practices.  
 
The policy and legal framework of CFM in Ethiopia is driven predominantly by 
the 2007 proclamation for Forest Development, Conservation and Utilisation 
(542/2007), the Environment Policy of Ethiopia and the Conservation Strategies of 
Ethiopia also play a role. Of course, CFM is not the only forest conservation 
measure that Ethiopia is pursuing. The protected area system is still in existence 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is currently implementing 
a national level Protected Area System Plan (PASP).  
 
The CFM approach in Ethiopia has been employed for more than a decade in both 
Oromia and the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region. Efforts have 
been largely driven and supported by NGOs: FARM Africa with SOS Sahel, and 
the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ). CFM is now supported at the national 
level and a country-wide CFM programme is being scaled-up. This requires 
substantial finance, some of which is being provided by the European 
Development Fund (R-PP, 2011). In 2009, the Strengthening Sustainable 
Livelihoods and Forest Management Programme was commenced in four regional 
states of Ethiopia with a vision to see government authorities incorporating CFM 
in annual plans, budgets and management structures (SSLFM, 2010).  
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CFM is supported in Ethiopia despite weak evidence on its long-term 
effectiveness. In 2001, FARM-Africa worked to implement CFM in Bonga Priority 
State Forest of the Kafa zone of the SNNPR. A moist tropical forest, 
implementation of CFM appears to have positive impacts on the state of the forest 
and living conditions within the project lifetime, but continuation of CFM appears 
threatened by weak government support for the scheme after the NGO support 
was terminated (Gobeze et al., 2009).  
 
In Oromia, three CFM areas exist in the forests of Chilimo, Borena and Adaba-
Dodola. Chilimo, in the West Shewa zone of Oromia, is a highland montane forest 
where FARM Africa initiated a pilot CFM project in 1996, although it was not until 
2004 that the first forest user group was established. It is believed that CFM has 
improved people-forest relationships with reduced deforestation, increased 
regeneration and the empowerment of locals. However, in a largely qualitative 
exploration of the intervention, Kassa et al. (2009) suggest that the technical, 
managerial and administrative capacity of the CBOs need to be strengthened and 
efforts to diversify livelihood options are still needed to reduce human pressures 
on the forest. In Borena, CFM implementation has proved more challenging. A 
lowland Juniper forest in the Borena and Guji zones of Oromia, where livelihoods 
are more pastoral, forest based enterprises are producing low returns for farmers 
and land conflicts have arisen (Getahun et al., 2007).  
 
The Integrated Forest Management Project Adaba-Dodola, a project of both the 
government of Ethiopia and GIZ, was implemented by the Oromia Rural Land and 
Natural Resources Administration Authority in June 1995. Located within the 
BME, plans to scale up CFM across the region will build on the lessons learnt in 
Adaba-Dodola. The goal of the project was to establish Forest Dwellers 
Associations, or Waldaa Jiraatotaa Bosonaa (WAJIB) in Oromo, where members 
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protect the forest and carry out management activities and restrict their expansion 
of farm plots in return for rights to live in the forest and generate forest-based 
benefits. Forest blocks constituted 300 to 500 ha and not more than 30 households, 
based on a forest carrying capacity of 12 ha per household established from 
previous CFM experience (Kubsa and Tadesse, 2002, SUN-Dodola, 2005). A 
functioning WAJIB consists of a general assembly, an executive committee and 
various other committees elected by members. Each WAJIB group has its own by-
laws (internal regulations), that govern use, protection, rights and responsibilities 
of each household within the forest block. The forest administration is providing 
mostly technical advice on the development and sustainable utilisation of forests. 
Positive impacts of this CFM effort, to date, have been the improved forest 
condition and management. Rural livelihoods and social welfare are also reported 
to have improved, although not quantitatively (Kubsa and Tadesse, 2002, Tesfaye 
et al., 2011). 
 
In spite of a lack of evidence in Ethiopia and more broadly in Africa, CFM 
approaches have been adopted across East and Southern Africa (Wily, 2000). In 
Tanzania, for example, the 1998 Forest Policy made a commitment to bring more 
forest and woodlands into village forest reserves. In 2010 it was reported that since 
2005 more than 500 village forest reserves were declared by communities from 
communal lands (Wily, 2010). Also in her 2010 review, Wily notes that such 
management approaches are sufficiently widespread in Africa to be recognised as 
a route to securing and sustaining forests. The review also indicates how the 
concept has evolved to recognise that forest management is a matter of governance 
and, increasingly targeted at the grassroots level, the empowerment of local 
communities as owner-managers through devolution of responsibilities has been 
important.  
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3.2.4. Forestry Carbon in Ethiopia 
 
Efforts to establish REDD+ projects and activities have often focussed on countries 
where forest areas are more substantial and the carbon contained within the forests 
is very high. This includes Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo where the majority of international finance to support REDD+ development 
has been channelled (Climate Funds Update 2012). Establishing REDD+ in 
Ethiopia, therefore, may not contribute significantly to reducing emissions from 
deforestation assessed at an international scale. Ethiopia may not receive as 
substantial financial transfers as other tropical forested nations under an 
international REDD+ mechanism established by climate change negotiations. 
REDD+ does, however, contribute to internalising the externality of climate 
regulation. It could provide a source of finance that changes the economic 
incentives to make forest conservation more economically viable and it necessitates 
the discussion and review of property rights regimes in forested areas. 
 
Signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and the Kyoto Protocol, political and public awareness of climate 
change issues is increasing rapidly in Ethiopia. This can be partly attributed to the 
presence of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi at the United Nations Climate talks and 
national media campaigns up until his death in 2012.  
 
Ethiopia’s growing interest in REDD+ also stems from a number of organisations, 
NGOs in particular, which have begun to explore the potential for such forest 
carbon projects. The Humbo Community-Based Natural Regeneration Project, 
developed by World Vision Ethiopia and Australia, was the first forest carbon 
project in Ethiopia. An afforestation/reforestation project covering 2,728 ha in the 
southwest of Ethiopia, the project aim was to restore indigenous forest species to 
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the land. In 2009, the Humbo project was registered under the CDM of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the World Bank Bio Carbon Fund has purchased the emission 
reductions generated by the project (FCPF, 2011). Following the success of this 
project, four further CDM projects are under development (R-PP, 2011). The 
development of avoided deforestation and degradation activities in Ethiopia has 
also taken off, although no REDD+ projects are yet certified and generating 
emission reductions for sale. NGOs instrumental in driving REDD+ in Ethiopia 
include Farm Africa, SOS-Sahel, World Vision Australia, and Save the Children 
US.  
 
Ethiopia is also a member country of the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF). A multilateral REDD+ initiative, the FCPF builds capacity for 
REDD+ and tests a programme of incentive based payments through grants to its 
37 member countries (FCPF, 2011). In 2011, a revised Readiness Preparation 
Proposal (R-PP) outlining a national REDD+ strategy for Ethiopia was formulated. 
Financing to implement the R-PP was estimated at US$12,495,000 with a timeline 
of completion in 2014. During the R-PP preparation a number of workshops and 
consultations were carried out. In-country capacity is building for REDD+ and 
activities of the RPP are already in progress. In November 2012, US$ 3,400,000 was 
approved for the R-PP.  
 
With REDD+ activities in their infancy, the legal and institutional setting in 
Ethiopia is uncertain. The Environmental Protection Authority of Ethiopia is 
currently chairing the REDD+ process in Ethiopia with a REDD+ steering 
committee and REDD+ technical working group also established. The 
Environmental Protection Authority will hand over to a federal agency dedicated 
to forestry once it is created. Plans exist to develop regional steering committees 
and technical at REDD+ sites. More on the legal and institutional setting of REDD+ 
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in Ethiopia is expected as the R-PP grant progresses through its three phases, with 
the preparatory phases spanning the next four years. 
  
Ethiopia can stand to learn from other countries in the region and their experiences 
with REDD+. The drivers of deforestation in Ethiopia are similar to those in other 
East African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In all of these 
countries efforts are underway to build national REDD+ capacity and REDD+ 
projects. Tanzania in particular, with 40% forest cover, has commanded a lot of 
attention and US$ 131 million has been approved for REDD+ activities through 
dedicated public climate funds (Climate Funds Update, 2012).  
 
In Ethiopia’s national REDD+ strategy, it is acknowledged that substantial work is 
to be done. In particular, a national forest inventory with a view to determine 
carbon stocks and a deforestation baseline is required. To date detailed 
measurement on Ethiopia’s vegetation coverage, and changes in this cover over 
time, are largely inadequate with conflicting information and no regular 
inventories (Teketay et al., 2010).  
 
With 100% publically owned forest, REDD+ in Ethiopia will require clarification of 
forest use and carbon rights and substantial engagement and participation of the 
84% of the population that resides in rural areas. Governance is also important for 
investors and Ethiopia ranks low in the World Bank Governance Indicators.  For 
political stability and absence of violence Ethiopia has a score of -1.71 in 2010, 
where country scores range between -2.5 to 2.5 and higher values correspond to 
better governance. For government effectiveness Ethiopia ranks -0.35, for rule of 
law -0.76, and for control of corruption -0.70 (WGI, 2010).  
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Without a national level forestry institution, designing and managing REDD+ 
financial structures and benefit sharing mechanisms may also prove challenging. 
Although the R-PP does mention that a body that bypasses ‘normal administrative 
budgetary functions’ will be established that can ensure dispersal of REDD+ funds to 
the local-level (R-PP, 2011). Ethiopia’s R-PP also highlights the excessive 
expectations that exist for REDD+ activities to address issues of deforestation and 
forest degradation as well as reducing poverty in the country. Ethiopia’s R-PP, 
however, is highly supportive of pursuing REDD+ through community forestry. It 
is integral as a source of funding for community forestry as well as community 
forestry as a way to reduce deforestation.  
 
3.3. The Bale Mountains Eco-Region 
3.3.1. The south eastern Ethiopian highlands 
 
The BME forms part of the Bale-Arsi massif in the south eastern Ethiopian 
Highlands (Figure 2). Although it is named an eco-region by local implementers, 
the BME is not a WWF eco-region, which is defined as a large unit of land or water 
containing a geographically distinct assemblage of species, natural communities 
and environmental conditions. It is referred to in this thesis as an eco-region, 
however, to be consistent with the Bale REDD+ Project implementers at the case 
study site as well as the national use of the term to refer to this area.  
 
The BME falls within the Oromia regional state, the most populous province in 
Ethiopia with a population of 27,029,760 in 2007 (FDRE, 2008). 70% of Ethiopia’s 
remaining forest is in Oromia (Macqueen, 2008). The Bale zone is found between 
50˚22'-80˚08'N and 38˚41-40˚44'E. Zones are further divided into woredas, or 
districts, that are managed by a local government of which there are around 550. 
The BME within the Bale zone, covers 2,217,600 ha over fourteen woredas: Adaba, 
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Agarfa, Berbere, Dinsho, Dodola, Gasera, Goba, Gololcha, Goro, Harenna Bulluk, 
Kokosa, Mena, Nensebo and Sinana. These woredas are composed of kebeles, or 
villages, which are the smallest local government unit (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of Ethiopia and the Bale Mountains Eco-Region.  
Located in Oromia regional state, the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME) lies 400km south east of 
Addis Ababa, the capital of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia a land-locked nation in the 
horn of Africa bordered by Eritrea to the north, Somalia and Kenya to the south and Sudan to the 
west. Source: author generated 
 
3.3.2. Ecological context 
 
The annual temperature of the Bale zone is 17.5˚C ranging from 10˚C to 25˚C, with 
annual rainfall of 875mm experienced in one long season between June and 
October, and one short rainy season between March and May (Yimer et al., 2006). 
This range obscures the substantial topographic variation which characterises the 
vegetation in the BME (Figure 3). Distinctive endemic flora and fauna of the Bale 
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Mountains result from its isolation from the bulk of the Ethiopian highlands and 
its topography and climatic history (Hillman, 1986, Yalden and Largen, 1992). 
 
The afro-alpine plateau of the central area of the BME reaches more than 4000 
metres above sea level (masl). Containing Erica, Giant lobelia (Lobelia rinchopatelum) 
and Helichrysum, this is the largest remaining area of Afroalpine habitat on the 
African continent (BMNP, 2007). South of the plateau the altitude falls rapidly with 
moist tropical forest between 2600 masl and 1500 masl. The moist forest is 
characterised by Hagenia abyssinica and wild coffee (Coffea arabica). Lions and 
African wild dogs are also still found in this forest which is the second largest 
stand of moist tropical forest in Ethiopia. North of the plateau habitats comprise of 
dry forest, woodlands, grasslands and wetlands, largely between 2500 masl and 
3500 masl. The dry forests contain high-value commercial species such as Juniperus 
procera and Podocarpus falcatus as well as Prunus africanus, a threatened species. The 
lower altitude land of the south east of the BME, below 1500 masl, is dominated by 
acacia woodland (Teshome et al., 2011, UNIQUE, 2008).  
 
The BME is part of one of 34 global biodiversity hotspots which contain more than 
1,500 species of vascular plants as endemics and it has to have lost at least 70% of 
its original habitat; it falls within the Eastern Afro-Montane biodiversity hotspot 
(Myers et al., 2000, Conservation International, 2012). This ranges from Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen to Zimbabwe, taking in a number of mountain ranges. The 
habitats of the BME host a rare and endemic species including the Ethiopian wolf 
(Canis simensis), Mountain Nyala (Tragelaphus buxtoni), and the Giant mole rat 
(Tachyoryctes macrocephalus). This ecological importance was acknowledged by the 
establishment of the Bale Mountains National Park (BMNP) in 1971, which lies at 
the heart of the BME. The (proposed) BMNP is stated to be one of the most 
important conservation areas in Ethiopia (FDRE, 2005). The 220,000 ha park was 
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actively managed until 1991 but resources within the park boundary, particularly 
forests, are currently being used unsustainably. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Forests of the Bale Mountains Eco-Region.  
The woredas, or districts, of the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME) vary widely in their forest cover, 
with forest divided into broad categories of moist forest, woodland and dry forest. The (proposed) 
Bale Mountains National Park lies at the centre of the BME, and the three survey locations are 
distributed across the BME. Source: author generated  
 
 
3.3.3. Forest use in the Bale Mountains 
 
The dominant livelihood strategy in the BME, as in wider Ethiopia, is small-scale 
farming using traditional technologies for low input, low output rain-fed mixed 
farming (World Bank, 2007, Rosell, 2011). Households cultivate crops on distinct 
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land plots. Most commonly cultivated are cereal crops including Maize, Teff, 
Wheat, Barley, and Sorghum. Households also engage in livestock rearing for meat 
and milk products, manure, draught power, transport and skins. Livestock also 
play a role in marriage, dispute settlement and ritual performances (BMDC, 2003). 
Rural households gather many products from the forest and where valued can 
make up a significant portions of their income.  
 
Under a total environmental value framework, the forest produces a variety of 
direct, indirect, option and non-use values (Pearce and Warford, 1993). Direct use 
values that more tangibly contribute to household income include: NTFP such as 
honey, coffee, medicinal plants and fuelwood; timber and construction products; 
recreation; and livestock grazing lands. Tesfaye et al. (2011) estimated such forest 
incomes contribute to 34% of per capita income in the BME. This aligns with other 
research on forest income reliance such as Babulo et al. (2009) who find households 
derive 27% of income from forests in northern Ethiopia, and Mamo et al. (2007) 
who find 39% of incomes are derived from forest in central Ethiopia. A lack of 
employment opportunities restricts the diversification of livelihoods in the BME, 
thus crops, forest and livestock are the three main livelihood sources. 
 
Indirect use values accruing to households include carbon sequestration and 
watershed protection. The Bale Mountains have been described as a water tower 
and the hydrological system supplies water to an estimated 12 million people in 
the lowlands of south eastern Ethiopia, northern Kenya and Somalia (BMNP, 
2007). Option values include pharmaceuticals and the genetic library of 
biodiversity. Arabica coffee, for example, has its origin in Ethiopia where it occurs 
naturally and so the diverse gene pools of wild coffee populations have potential 
options for new coffee varieties (Schmitt et al., 2009). Non-use values include 
cultural values placed on forests, values held for endemic species, and landscape 
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beauty. Burial sites, for example, exist in the forest and deforestation is regulated 
in these small areas by local communities.  
 
The forest use in the BME, however, is unsustainable as across wider Ethiopia. 
There is rapid deforestation to procure land for crops and livestock grazing and to 
meet livelihood needs through timber and firewood extraction (BERSMP, 2006, 
BMNP, 2007). The lack of human and financial resources, political interest and 
technical knowledge, combined with population growth and immigration to the 
area also contribute to forest losses (BMNP, 2007). Between 2001 and 2009 the 
average annual deforestation rate in the BME exceeded the countrywide rate of 
forest loss. Average deforestation rates in the BME were 3.44%, ranging from 1 to 
8% (Dupuy, 2009). There is evidence that this rate is accelerating, particularly in 
the moist forest of the (s) BMNP where deforestation rates have increased from 
1.64% in 1973-2000 to 15.0% between 2000 and 2006 (Teshome et al., 2011). 
 
3.4. The ‘Bale REDD+ Project’: REDD+ via Community Forest Management in 
the Bale Mountains 
 
3.4.1. Project outline 
 
To address the decline in forest area, the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise 
(OFWE) are implementing CFM across all forests of the BME. The intention is to 
generate REDD+ as a result of CFM implementation. While CFM and REDD+ can 
both be undertaken as separate policy interventions, in the BME these are therefore 
considered together: the Bale REDD+ Project undertakes REDD+ via CFM. Thus 
emission reductions do not have to be additional to that achieved through CFM, 
but rather are those generated by CFM.  
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Covering more than 900,000 ha, the proposed Bale REDD+ Project area consists of 
the dry and moist tropical forest as well as the southern woodlands of the BME. In 
2008, a report on carbon finance in the BME was undertaken by external forestry 
consultants identifying good opportunities for REDD+. The Bale REDD+ Project 
builds on this pre-feasibility study and aims to gradually reduce deforestation 
below the BAU baseline of 4% per annum to 1% by project-year 20. In order to 
achieve these emission reductions, CFM will create a common property regime in 
the BME.  
 
Under the Bale REDD+ Project, households in the BME will experience a change in 
forest access from a de facto open access regime to a de jure common property 
regime. To do so, a set of identifiable forest users who hold the resource and that 
can exclude others and regulate use will be formed as a CBO group. It is proposed, 
that forest blocks of 300 to 500 hectares are allocated to not more than 30 member 
households. Entry into the CBO groups will be controlled. Eligibility for 
membership relies only on the fact that you live in the Kebele, and entry is 
voluntary. In order for user groups to be a legal entity under Ethiopian law there is 
a nominal registration fee in the region of ETB5. These groups will be created 
without assessment of the carrying capacity of the forest, but will rely on adaptive 
management to revise the management plan every three years to ensure forest use 
becomes more sustainable over time.  
 
The rights and duties of households under CFM will be formalised in contracts 
signed between CBOs and the forest agency. Rights of the CBO include settlement 
and grazing, maintaining existing farm plots and using forest products for 
consumption and sale. Thus while they will be given use rights – in contrast to the 
status quo where forest use is not allowed – they will not be given land rights.  
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Aside from the secured use rights, the exact conditions and managerial 
responsibilities of communities will be defined in a participatory manner with the 
communities in question. These byelaws agreed by the communities are likely to 
include restrictions on further settlement and agricultural expansion and for initial 
forest cover to be maintained. Fuelwood use will also be determined in the 
byelaws; for example, where CFM has progressed in the region the number of days 
per week that dead wood can be collected for fuel is now limited. Periodic forest 
cover assessments and settlement censuses will therefore be agreed by the CBO 
and Forest Agency. The Forest Agency is expected to safeguard CBO groups 
against free-riders and enforce sanctions in the case of non-compliance.  
 
The specific roles of CBO members will also be determined under the byelaws, but 
members will be required to work free of charge. This will mean that households 
incur transaction costs of CFM. Transaction costs of CFM include through 
meetings, such as for the arrangement and negotiation of forest areas and byelaws, 
as well as monitoring and enforcement. This has and is occurring in the 
community to manage other communal resources. For example, Oromo 
pastoralists use mineral springs (horas) for their livestock (cattle, sheep and goats) 
as they are perceived to enhance fat, fertility and resistance to diseases of livestock. 
Horas are maintained by the communities that use them most frequently for free, 
this includes establishing and maintaining fencing as well as cleaning of excess 
mud (Chiodi and Pinard, 2011).  
 
The core CBO committee will meet regularly and will be required to patrol the 
forest in crucial times, such as harvesting season for forest coffee. Where byelaws 
are broken, individuals must appear in front of the elders committee to be 
sanctioned. Only repeat and serious offenders will be sent to Woreda level for 
sanctioning. Pro-poor provision can also be designed by the CBO group 
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themselves. There is past experience of such provisions in the traditional forest 
management systems in the Bale Region. For example, under the Gada system 
contributions of forest coffee beans from the moist forests were collected and 
redistributed to families unable to collect their own as a result of illness, physical 
disability or old age (Wakijira et al., in press).  
 
BERSMP are also undertaking efforts to sustainably increase agricultural 
production, establish woodlots, promote fuel-efficient stoves and biomass 
briquettes, improve forest fire management, and add value to forest products 
(BERSMP, 2006). Measures that substitute for fuelwood demand are critical in 
order to address the drivers of deforestation in the BME. Progress towards the 
establishment of woodlots led by OFWE has been progressing slowly, however. 
Such woodlots are unlikely to take less than 3 years to be established, and there is 
uncertainty over community contributions, such as labour, will be required. There 
has been more success with energy efficiency measures; with fuel-efficient stove 
distribution widespread. BERSMP is also supporting home planting in backyards 
and group woodlots to try to meet needs and buffer plantations are under 
consideration. 
 
The Bale REDD+ Project is still in early stages with regards to REDD+ 
development; a Project Design Document is underway. As a result, no further 
decisions have been taken on the shares of carbon revenues to stakeholders, 
including communities. To date, the costs of REDD+ project development and 
capacity building for REDD+ have been absorbed by BERSMP. A trust fund 
handling monetary aspects of the ERPA supervised by a board including NGO, 
CBO and state institution members has been proposed (UNIQUE, 2008). 
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3.4.2. Bale REDD+ Project implementers 
 
The roll-out and scaling up of CFM across the BME is supported by the Bale Eco-
Region Sustainable Management Programme (BERSMP). Initiated in 2007, 
BERSMP is an operational partnership between the Government of Ethiopia 
(Oromia Regional Government, Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
and the Food Security and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission) 
and NGOs FARM-Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia. It is these organisations that are 
referred to as the Bale REDD+ Project implementers in this thesis.  
 
BERSMP has a distinct goal to mutually and sustainably enhance the unique 
biodiversity and ecological processes of the BME and the social and economic 
wellbeing of the communities dependent on the natural resources. Six programme 
outputs to achieve this are: an Eco-Region plan, building government and 
community capacity for sustainable natural resource management; functional and 
sustainable natural resource management and conservation systems, incorporating 
environment and community needs; diversification of community natural resource 
based livelihoods; sustainable financing mechanisms that benefit government and 
communities; and, improved legal, policy and regulatory frameworks (BERSMP, 
2006).  
 
OFWE, a semi-autonomous agency of the Oromia government, was created in 2007 
under the decentralisation of forest management to the regions of Ethiopia. Its 
function is to coordinate the eight forest enterprises of Oromia. The BME falls 
under the jurisdiction of two forest enterprises; the Bale Forest Enterprise and the 
Arsi Forest Enterprise. Although they remain government agencies, the forest 
enterprises are run and organised like private sector businesses. Revenues and 
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profits, largely from plantations, are earmarked for reinvestment into local-level 
development (Macqueen, 2008).  
 
3.4.3. Project legal and institutional framework 
 
The regional states of Ethiopia develop their own forest regulations under the 
guidance of federal proclamations (see Section 3.2.2). Oromia, where the BME is 
located, has become a leader for forest policy and conservation strategy (R-PP, 
2011). Oromia’s Forestry Proclamation (72/2003) was the first to legally recognise 
the ownership and participation of communities in forest management. It 
therefore, goes beyond the federal Forest Development, Conservation and 
Utilisation Proclamation (542/2007) which recognises both private and state 
ownership of forests, by separating out community forestry as a distinct form of 
ownership. The legal basis for REDD+ at the case study site, as in wider Ethiopia is 
yet to be determined.  
 
Under the CFM arrangements CBOs will be given forest use rights, but not land 
rights which remain in the ownership of the state. OFWE will likely remain the 
legal owner of the emission reductions generated from REDD+ and therefore will 
act as the lead contractor in Emission Reductions Purchase Agreements (ERPAs). 
OFWE would then sign contracts with CBOs under the proposed carbon finance 
scheme, and the Forest Enterprises (Bale and Arsi) would act as executive entities 
for implementation and monitoring of REDD+ implementation.  
 
CFM necessitates interplay between formal institutions and traditional, customary 
rules. The tradition Oromo cultural and political system, the Gada, is an age-set 
democratic political institution. Oldest rules refer to the limited time periods when 
grazing was allowed in the forest (determined annually according to rainfall 
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patterns). The forest coffee harvest period also had strict limits and sanctions 
imposed for breaking these included social exclusion and deprivation from social 
support (Wakijira et al., in press). Although traditional forest management has been 
in decline (see Section 3.2.2), there is strong institutional memory in the Bale 
Mountains and many remember the Gada’s management of the forest as it relates 
to livestock grazing, beekeeping and forest coffee harvesting. It remains to be seen, 
however, if such institutional memory will aid the implementation of CFM in the 
BME.  
 
3.5. Survey locations 
 
Three survey locations were selected within the BME for household surveys and 
forest carbon stock assessments. The survey locations fall in three woredas and are 
henceforth referred to as: Agarfa, Goro and Delo Mena (Figure 3; Figure 4). 
Travelling by truck, public bus, horse and foot, survey locations were chosen on 
the basis of logistical feasibility, but also to represent the three major forest types 
found in the BME: dry forest, moist forest and woodland.  
 
Initial fieldwork plans had proposed multiple survey locations in each forest type. 
Delays in research permissions and transport difficulties, however, restricted 
surveys to only three locations and reduced the sample size. The presence of three 
survey locations in three forest types means that the effects cannot be separated 
from other location differences for example in demography or infrastructure. 
Secondary data were also gathered at each location to provide contextual 
information to aid the interpretation of the findings (Table 1). These were sourced 
from village officials, key informants, focus groups as well as Bale REDD+ Project 
implementers at the case study site.  
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The Agarfa woreda borders with the Arsi zone of Ethiopia. The woreda is bounded 
by the Genale river and the Wabe Shabele river with numerous tributaries of these 
river basins flowing through the region. Within the Agarfa woreda the dominant 
forest type is dry forest with more than 35,000 ha. Altitude varies between 1000 
and 3000 masl and mean annual temperatures are 17.5 degrees Celsius. Tree 
species found in the dry forest include Juniperus procera and Podocarpus falcatus. The 
Agricultural and Rural Development Office estimates 11.5% of Agarfa’s land is 
covered by natural forest and less than 1% with manmade forest, or plantations.  
 
Table 1. Survey location general characteristics 
 
Characteristic Description 
Survey location 
All BME 
#1 #2 #3 
Woreda  
The name of the district in 
which the survey village is 
found 
Agarfa Goro 
Delo 
Mena 
- 
Kebele The name of the surveyed 
village(s) 
Dera 
Honsho/ 
Galema 
Hebano 
Walta’i 
Mana 
Irba 
- 
 
Population The total population  7703 1529 4465 1,307,078 
Households The number of households  1149 255 1170 217,846 
HH surveyed The number of household 
surveys undertaken 
87 50 98 235 
Proportion of 
HH surveyed 
The proportion of total 
village households surveyed 
8% 20% 8% 0.1% 
Forest type  Forest category  Dry forest 
Woodla
nd 
Moist 
forest 
(all) 
Forest area The area of forest  35,107 5,938 10,673 923,593 
      
 
 
The Agricultural and Rural Development Office indicates that 86% of Agarfa’s 
population is rural, with a high proportion of young and few old people resulting 
in high population growth. The BERSMP estimate population density of 65 to 83 
people per km2. The economic base is rain-fed agriculture including traditional and 
small-scale cattle rearing. Close to 30% of the total land area of the woreda is 
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agricultural land, and a further 30% is grazing land. There is a dirt road that 
connects Agarfa to the main all weather road that runs from Robe, the 
administrative centre of the BME with Awassa, in turn linking to Addis Ababa, the 
capital. Agarfa is approximately 30 km from Robe, the district centre. However, the 
form of transport within Agarfa is mainly traditional use of pack animals and 
humans, for fuelwood loads for example. The total population of the two survey 
kebeles in Agarfa – Dera Honsho and Galema Hebano – is an estimated 7703, 
consisting of 1149 households. 
 
Goro woreda has mean annual temperatures of 27 degrees Celsius, but reaching up 
to 35 degrees Celsius, with annual rainfall of 1900mm. Woodland covers 5,938 
hectares and is dominated by acacia. BERSMP estimate that this covers 23% of the 
total woreda area. Land use is largely cultivated and dominant livelihood is 
agriculture, including livestock rearing; 39% of the woreda’s area is under 
agricultural production and 3% is grazing land. An estimated 93% of the 
population of Goro is rural. Population density is estimated by the Agricultural 
and Rural Development Office at between 24 and 49 people per km2. Goro lies 
about 60km from Robe, the administrative centre of the BME. As in other survey 
sites, the predominant transport form is pack animal. The population of Walta’i 
Mana is an estimated 1529 and 255 households. 
 
Mean annual temperatures in the Delo Mena woreda are 29.5 degrees Celsius and 
mean annual rainfall is 700mm. Moist forest covering 10,673ha characterises Delo 
Mena with Hagenia abyssinica and Coffea arabica characterising the forest: the 
name of the district comes from the combination of Oromo words Dalaa and Buna 
which mean “a core place of coffee”. It is estimated by the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Office that 65% of the woreda’s area is under forest cover.  
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The Agriculture and Rural Development office estimates Delo Mena’s population 
density of between 11 and 19 people per km2. Most inhabitants are engaged in 
agriculture, with 86% of the population rural. This is despite domination of forest 
cover in the woreda; only 3% is under crop production and 21% is grazing land. As 
the elevation declines in the woreda, the livestock populations increase with the 
rising temperatures. Delo Mena is 125km from Robe, the district centre of the BME. 
An all-weather road connects Delo Mena to Robe, however, it can be a very long 
journey despite the short distance in the wet season. The Irba kebele in which 
surveys were undertaken in Delo Mena has an estimated 4465 people across 1170 
households. 
 
Across all sites there is limited access to modern energy sources. In the urban parts 
of BME fire-wood, charcoal, kerosene and electricity are major sources of energy, 
while in rural areas fire-wood, dung, crop residue, charcoal and occasionally 
kerosene are used. Each survey site has its own market days in which produce is 
traded informally for cash. Sometimes goods are also taken to regional markets by 
pack animal to be traded in the larger towns of Robe and Goba. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
A history of political instability and a drive towards agricultural intensification has 
side-lined forest conservation in Ethiopia. With rising acknowledgement that forest 
conservation is necessary to sustain the livelihoods of the population, Oromia 
regional state is advancing CFM and REDD+. REDD+ revenues resulting from the 
Bale REDD+ Project could help fund these activities and provide a pilot project for 
Ethiopia. This research into the economics of REDD+ via CFM is timely at the case 
study site; it adds to limited data on forest carbon stocks and socio-economic 
household characteristics. Gathering primary data, this integrated, ex-ante study of 
the proposed REDD+ via CFM intervention could also inform the intervention 
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design. The forests of the BME are typical of many forests in developing countries 
that present a de facto open access regime on a common pool resource. With 
REDD+ via CFM being supported more widely in East Africa and beyond, this 
research also adds to the limited literature on PES, such as REDD+, on common 
property regimes. 
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Figure 4. Four major forest and habitat types of the Bale Mountains Eco-Region  
(a) Afro-alpine habitat, (b) Dry forest, (c) Moist forest, and (d) Woodland Source: author’s photos 
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Chapter 4: Conceptual framework and methods  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Drawing on both ecological sciences and social sciences, I undertake an integrated 
study of the economics of CFM at a case-study site in Ethiopia. This Chapter 
presents the conceptual framework of this research. An ecological approach is 
followed to understand forest carbon stocks, emission reductions and REDD+ 
revenues at the case study site. A more social sciences approach is then adopted to 
estimate household opportunity costs (OCs) of forest conservation. The approaches 
are then combined to explore how REDD+ via CFM might be implemented as a 
local-level PES scheme. The conceptual framework is followed by an overview of 
research methods applied for forest carbon accounting, and for the estimation of 
the OCs of REDD+ through household survey, market price valuation, and 
scenario modelling. These quantitative methods are complemented by more 
qualitative attitudinal data on the proposed forest conservation intervention which 
gives context to the empirical findings. A description of the data collection and 
analysis is also presented. 
 
4.2. Conceptual framework 
4.2.1. REDD+ as a PES 
 
A REDD+ mechanism recognises and rewards the positive externalities of climate 
regulation provided by forest users. It involves an economic incentive that turns 
standing forest into a valuable asset. It can, therefore, be regarded as a PES scheme 
(Angelsen, 2008, Campbell, 2009, Fisher et al., 2011). Establishing a price and a 
market, PES inherently requires the commoditisation of an environmental 
‘product’. In the case of REDD+, this is the carbon stored in the biomass of trees 
and forest vegetation. Forests absorb atmospheric carbon through growth and 
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release carbon dioxide (CO2) through decay, combustion and respiration. The 
avoidance of deforestation slows the build-up of CO2, a major GHG, in the 
atmosphere thus mitigating the impacts of climate change (Bonan, 2008). Forest 
losses also result in emissions of other GHGs, particularly, methane and nitrous 
oxide. Emission reductions are therefore, reported as tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalents (tCO2e) which includes other major GHGs standardised according 
their global warming potential. Following the Wunder (2005) definition of PES, the 
well-defined product – a tonne of carbon emission reduction equivalents – is then 
voluntarily ‘bought’ from a ‘provider’ who continually secures the supply of the 
environmental service.  
  
Based on the underlying logic that voluntary contracts can overcome the market 
failures of environmental externalities, PES schemes are theoretically grounded in 
the work of Coase (1960). Coase proposed that if property rights are defined and 
transaction costs minimal, a socially efficient resource allocation can result from 
bargaining between those willing-to-pay for an environmental externality and 
those willing-to-accept compensation for its provision. Although these conditions 
are unlikely to hold in real life, PES can operate where the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for a service exceeds a provider’s OCs of alternative, or foregone, land uses 
and practices, as well as their participation and transaction costs (Wünscher et al., 
2008). Considered by some to be the largest cost in studies of REDD+ (Karky and 
Skutsch, 2010), in overcoming the OCs of forest conservation the payment should 
be sufficient to make forest conservation more economically attractive than land 
use alternatives (Pagiola and Platais, 2007, Engel et al., 2008).  
 
It is acknowledged that PES can exist at many levels. Public schemes, for example 
in Costa Rica, Mexico and China exist where the state is the buyer of 
environmental services. Private schemes are often smaller-scale and more local to 
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the point of environmental service provision, with buyers often paying 
stakeholders directly rather than through intermediaries (Wunder, 2005). The 
differing scales inherently imply implementation and transaction costs of 
payments for the variety of stakeholders depending on how it is structured. The 
level at which REDD+ will operate in the future is not clear. At present, the REDD+ 
discourse is moving towards national-level REDD+ whereby international financial 
transfers under a national REDD+ scheme will be based on national-level carbon 
accounting systems with country governments, or intermediaries, then paying 
subnational governments or local land owners for emission reductions.  
 
Under some national-level proposals, REDD+ may not operate as a PES. REDD+ 
can be implemented through a number of policies, actions and measures and these 
may include strengthening of law enforcement or reductions in logging, rather 
than payments to communities local to forests (see also Section 2.1). Fisher et al. 
(2011), for example, note that REDD+ in Tanzania could be implemented through 
alleviating the demand for deforestation by raising agricultural yields on existing 
cropland and increasing charcoal fuel-use efficiency rather than the OCs of rents 
from agricultural and charcoal production. It is therefore recognised that even if 
financial transfers where to be conditional and voluntary at the national level, it 
may not be at the local-level, for example if national level tenure reforms and law 
enforcement is put in place to reduce deforestation (see Angelsen, 2008, Olander, 
2011 for reviews).  
 
Sub-national, or project-level REDD+ experiences continue to generate most 
lessons for future REDD+ implementation (Caplow et al., 2011). Alongside these 
project experiences, a number of initiatives are currently building national REDD+ 
readiness for example the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility or the 
UN-REDD Programme, but discussion on how national-level REDD+ would 
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operate in international climate change negotiations is ongoing (see the COP17 
outcomes of the UNFCCC, 2011). I therefore consider REDD+ as a local-level PES 
and assume that whether project or national-level REDD+ is pursued, or a 
combination of both, incentives will still be required on-the-ground to change land 
use behaviours. 
 
4.2.2. The opportunity costs of REDD+ 
 
The foregone benefits of an alternative investment, activity or use of a resource, 
private OCs of land are limited to those people directly affected by the 
conservation intervention (Pirard, 2008). The OCs of forest conservation land will 
be dependent on the underlying drivers of the forest loss. Broad-scale drivers of 
deforestation are variable; extensive cattle ranching and large-scale soybean 
production drives losses in South America and large-scale oil palm and wood 
product plantations in Asia. In Africa, deforestation for small-scale staple crops 
and fuelwood collection is the primary driver (FAO, 2009).  
 
At a finer scale, the drivers of deforestation depend on returns from non-forest 
land uses and are affected by accessibility to markets, climate regime, soil fertility, 
as well as socio-economic variables such as commodity prices, GDP, population 
growth and density (Geist and Lambin, 2001, Tomich et al., 2005, Chomitz, 2007). 
A substantial body of literature on household income from forests show that forest 
reliance is highly heterogeneous (Godoy and Lubowski, 1992, Byron and Arnold, 
1999, Cavendish, 2000, Coomes et al., 2004, Dovie et al., 2005). The OCs of forest 
conservation interventions that alter forest access and extent are, therefore, 
unlikely to be identical between households. 
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The drivers of land-use change and thus OCs of land also change over time. The 
future OCs incurred by local forest stakeholders will be affected by changes in 
income from direct activities such as agriculture and forest product extraction. The 
underlying drivers of deforestation will also play a role in influencing future OCs, 
including changes in demographic, economic, technological, policy and 
institutional, and cultural factors (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Where resource use is 
currently unsustainable, OCs may well decline through degradation of the 
resource base (Pearce and Markandya, 1987). OCs may also be altered through 
direct actions of conservation interventions, for example, where attempts are made 
to commercialise and increase the prices of forest products or to diversify 
livelihoods (Brandon and Wells, 1992, Arnold, 2001). Conservation interventions, 
however, often suffer from a lack of explicit goals and quantitative operational 
targets (Margules and Pressey, 2000). This linguistic uncertainty arises from the 
underspecificity, or generality of most conservation objectives (Regan et al., 2002). 
With uncertainty about the future drivers of land-use change and uncertainty in 
the impacts of conservation interventions on households, the OCs of forest 
conservation are difficult to predict.   
 
The utility of measuring the OCs of forest conservation for a household in the 
context of REDD+ is threefold. In the first instance, the OCs of forest conservation 
can be used to estimate the costs of a REDD+ intervention (Fisher et al., 2011). For 
REDD+ as a local-level PES, information of the magnitude of the OCs of forest 
conservation can provide information on the private incentives that must be 
overcome to generate the desired level of forest conservation (Polasky et al., 2005). 
This therefore helps to estimate payment levels if local communities must forgo 
certain land uses, but also establishes the feasibility to the project; if OCs of forest 
conservation are higher than the value of the emission reductions generated 
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through avoided deforestation or degradation then the project may not be 
financially feasible for the investors to engage in.  
 
Secondly, understanding and incorporating the heterogeneity of the OCs of 
REDD+ between households into a conservation intervention design can also serve 
to reduce the risks of negative social impacts. For example, by providing an 
understanding of whether particular social groups are more likely to experience 
higher OCs of changes in forest access than others. This is important given 
growing obligations to ensure that REDD+ projects ‘do no harm’ to forest 
communities (e.g. Griffiths, 2007, CCBA, 2008, Griffiths, 2009). 
 
Finally, an understanding of how the OCs of forest conservation change through 
time will also help meet these costs over time. This will better allow emission 
reductions to persist into the future and increase the change of REDD+ delivering 
permanent climate change mitigation benefits as the mechanism was intended. By 
necessitating and understanding of the drivers of deforestation over time, 
assessment of the OCs of forest conservation may also reduce the possibility of 
leakage – the displacement of emission reductions – by ensuring that livelihood 
needs are considered in policy making. 
 
4.2.3. REDD+ via CFM 
 
Although support for REDD+ via CFM is growing (Klooster and Masera, 2000, 
Murdiyarso and Skutsch, 2006, Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Hayes and Persha, 
2010), there has been little consideration of the divergence in incentive design 
between PES and CFM (Skutsch et al., 2011). The literature on PES has focussed on 
contracts with individual stakeholders and rarely considers PES on common pool 
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resource or under common property regimes, as is established through CFM 
(Muradian et al., 2010).  
 
Cooperation on a common pool resource largely means that resource 
appropriators extract less than private incentives might dictate on an open access 
resource. However, individuals are willing to incur these costs as well as those that 
might be incurred for monitoring of extraction, for example, for the longer term 
sustainability of the resource. This is largely on the understanding of reciprocity 
and cooperation of others (Heckathorn, 1993, Seabright, 1993). Under CFM, social 
and cultural norms will act as sanctions and as disincentives for resource 
appropriators to free-ride, in addition to fines, loss of rights and/or incarceration 
(Ostrom, 1990). These social and cultural norms have a strong influence on a 
household’s payoffs of cooperation in CFM; their costs and benefits.  
 
PES and OCs estimates of REDD+ omit this logic of collective action on which CFM 
has historically operated. Estimates of the OCs of REDD+ also omit changes in non-
market environmental values generated through forest conservation such as 
watershed protection, biodiversity protection and the conservation of landscape 
beauty (Pearce and Warford, 1993, Davies and Richards, 1999). An understanding 
of non-market values and influence of collective action logic on payoffs could 
allow more appropriate incentive design.  
 
More cooperation and self-restraint in forest use can bring more significant benefits 
when followed a greater proportion of users cooperate (Baland and Platteau, 1996, 
Castillo and Saysel, 2005). Although debate in the literature still remains if bigger 
groups sizes, and so larger number of cooperating individuals, bring greater 
benefits. An understanding the characteristics and determinants of households’ 
supply of cooperative effort for REDD+ via CFM ex-ante, could therefore also 
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encourage cooperation of households thus generating greater climate change 
mitigation benefits overall. 
 
It is increasingly recognised that an understanding of households’ environmental 
attitudes and perceptions of the resource base condition, of perceived 
environmental responsibilities, and of perceived legitimacy of the intervention are 
important for conservation success (Zanetell and Knuth, 2004, Davies and Hodge, 
2006, Nkonya et al., 2008). Environmental attitudes are underpinned by motivation 
and belief systems that give rise to values and thus behaviours (Kotchen and 
Reiling, 2000). In community-based conservation such as CFM, the engagement 
and participation of the community is by definition central to the interventions 
success. An understanding of stakeholders’ attitudes towards forest management 
and the use of the resource base will, therefore, allow better consideration of socio-
cultural factors for cooperation that go beyond payment incentives that PES theory 
highlights. For REDD+ via CFM undertaken together, therefore, rather than as 
separate interventions, sustained cooperation of households in the intervention can 
deliver more permanent emission reductions. An ex-ante understanding of the 
perceptions and household’s intention to cooperate in a REDD+ via CFM forest 
conservation intervention can aid in appropriate intervention design and necessary 
longevity for real climate change mitigation benefits. 
 
4.3. Overview of methods 
4.3.1. Forest carbon accounting 
 
The assessment of revenues from the proposed REDD+ via CFM intervention 
requires knowledge of the amount of carbon stored in forests and the rate of forest 
loss. This will allow an understanding of deforestation; the complete removal of 
forest as a result of anthropogenic activities. Forest degradation, which reduces 
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biomass without necessarily losing forest cover, is not assessed here. The rate of 
forest loss in the BME is being assessed by both Frankfurt Zoological Society and 
BERSMP – both NGOs involved in natural resource management in the area – 
through remote sensing, which uses space or air-based platforms to measure 
spectral indices of forests to which field-based forest carbon measurements are 
correlated (DeFries et al., 2006). Data on forest carbon stocks in Ethiopia, however, 
is largely lacking. Ethiopia’s national average forest carbon stocks have been 
reported at 37tC/ha and 47tC/ha (FAO, 2000, Brown, 1997). The national forest 
inventory of Ethiopia, however, is criticised for conflicting data (Teketay et al., 
2010) and country wide estimates are likely to underestimate the forest carbon 
stocks in the BME for which no estimates are known by the author. 
 
Documented biome averaged carbon stocks are quick to apply and very low cost. 
These biome averages capture broad ecological variables that determine carbon 
stocks such as climatic zones which are based on temperature and rainfall regimes 
(IPCC, 2003, IPCC, 2006). The simple application of biome averages of carbon 
stock, however, obscures the substantial heterogeneity of forests. The biomass and 
so carbon content and rate of accumulation, also varies with factors such as soil 
type, topography, elevation, species composition, age and land use history (UNDP, 
2009). Human activities in a given year such as logging intensity, distance to 
settlements, transport networks, and forest edge, will also impact on carbon stocks 
(Larocque et al., 2008).  
 
More complex forest carbon stock accounting uses forest inventory to statistically 
relate tree diameters, or biomass volumes, to carbon stock using documented 
allometric relationships established through destructive tree measurements (e.g. 
Brown, 1997, Chave et al., 2005). Tree diameters and volumes can be sourced from 
field measurements or existing forest inventories which record forest stand 
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structure, age, growth rate, biomass accumulation, and wood density (see FAO, 
2006). Criticism of Ethiopia’s national forest inventories, however, highlight the 
conflicting data that has been produced and that no regular or consistent inventory 
exists (Teketay et al., 2010). The above-ground biomass carbon pool at the case 
study site was, therefore, estimated by gathering direct tree measurements from 
108 forest plots of 20m by 20m (see Section 4.3.3 on data collection).  
 
Direct tree measurements and sampling protocol followed best practice 
methodologies and guidance (e.g. Brown, 1997, MacDicken, 1997, Pearson et al., 
2005). Carbon is present in above-ground biomass, below-ground biomass, dead 
organic wood and litter, soil organic matter and harvested wood products. 
Although resulting in an underestimate of carbon stocks, only the above-ground 
tree biomass carbon pool was considered here as it contains the greatest fraction of 
total living biomass in a forest and this pool is most immediately impacted by 
deforestation and degradation (Brown, 1997, FAO, 2003).  
 
Pan-tropical allometric equations were applied to estimate biomass from Brown 
(1997). These allometric equations were applied as few exist for Sub-Saharan 
African trees and woodland (Henry et al., 2011, Shackleton and Scholes, 2011). 
However, it is acknowledge that site and species specific allometric equations 
would allow better biomass estimation as they capture heterogeneity in forest 
characteristics. Thus, while few datasets from Africa exist to validate the allometric 
equations applied to the direct tree measurements at the case study site (Gibbs et 
al., 2007), resources to undertake destructive sampling to verify allometric 
equations were not available. Height measurements were also impractical and 
wood density estimates did not exist for the study area (see also Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.1 for a longer discussion on allometric equations).  Tree biomass was converted 
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to carbon using the IPCC carbon fraction guidance of 0.47 (IPCC, 2006) and 
converted to a per hectare value. 
 
To explore the discrepancy between simple and complex forest carbon accounting, 
Chapter 5 applies biome averaged and primary data to estimate the emission 
reductions and REDD+ revenues that could be generated in the BME. Biome 
averages are sourced from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Emission reductions are evaluated as the difference between a business-as-
usual (BAU) deforestation baselines and an avoided deforestation project scenario. 
Methods to establish this deforestation baseline are controversial and have been 
discussed at length in the literature (see Olander et al., 2008, Huettner et al., 2009).  
 
Approaches range from simple extrapolation of historical deforestation rates to 
complex and dynamic models of future land use (see Parker et al., 2008). 
Extrapolating from trends in forest cover change generated from GIS imagery 
analysed by the BERSMP, a historical emissions approach was adopted to establish 
the BAU deforestation scenario for the BME. A linear deforestation rate of 4% in all 
forest types was used to estimate emission reductions and subsequent REDD+ 
revenues. More complex models that predict deforestation rates and incorporate, 
for example, demographic, economic and technological variables which lead to 
infrastructure, energy and food demands that drive land-use change can also be 
used to establish BAU deforestation baselines (Huettner et al., 2009). These 
complex models are more politically acceptable and better predict deforestation 
rates (Böttcher et al., 2009), but the substantial data sets and technical capacity 
meant that this approach was not possible at the case study site.  
 
Emission reductions were adjusted to account for possible project leakage and non-
permanence. Leakage is the relocation of emission generating activities away from 
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a REDD+ project boundary. It is termed primary leakage where the project fails to 
address the drivers of the original deforestation baseline; activities are shifted 
elsewhere or there is outsourcing for the products used as the baseline scenario. It 
is termed secondary leakage where third parties are incentivised to increase 
emission reductions activities as a result of the project; market effects on product 
supply and demand for example (Aukland et al., 2002). Both categories of leakage 
need to be accounted for so that emission reductions are not overestimated. Project 
permanence is the persistence of emission reductions over time (Sedjo and 
Marland, 2003). Permanence can be threatened by financial or management failure; 
economic risks, rising OC; political and social instability; and natural disturbances 
(fires, pests, disease and extreme climatic events) (VCS, 2007).  
 
The dominant project-based method to deal with leakage and non-permanence are 
buffers of emission reductions, with other options suggested to be repayments of 
revenues/fines, expiring emission reductions, ex-post payments, portfolio 
approaches and insurance (Peskett and Harkin, 2007). A non-tradable reserve of 
emission reductions, the buffer acts as insurance for any emission reductions 
targets that are not achieved. With a history of forest fire, potential land disputes 
and imminent infrastructure development at the case study site, a buffer of 65% of 
emission reductions are set aside in Chapter 5. 
 
To remaining emission reductions, market variables are applied to estimate 
possible REDD+ revenues. REDD+ revenue will depend on the price of a tonne of 
emission reductions and the costs of getting the emission reductions to market. 
Although social costing of carbon would value emission reductions more highly at 
US$23/tCO2e (Tol, 2008), the voluntary carbon market is currently the only trading 
platform from which value can be realised from avoided deforestation. In 2007, the 
average price for emission reductions on the voluntary market was US$6.1/tCO2e 
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(Hamilton et al., 2008). With greater flexibility and less stringent validation 
processes, the voluntary market price is lower than that in compliance markets. 
Prices for emission reductions through the CDM on the compliance market fetched 
an average of US$13.6/tCO2e in 2007 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). The VCM also 
allows price variation according to the source and integrity of the offset. In 2007, 
emission reductions on the VCM were sold for between US$1.8 to US$300 per 
tCO2e (Hamilton et al., 2008). The highest prices went to projects with easily 
verifiable attributes and those that were more publicly appealing. Lower prices 
were realised by projects with low social or environmental co-benefits and high 
economic and project delivery risks. Where social co-benefits refer to additional 
positive impacts beyond climate regulation and may include improvement in long-
term livelihood security or employment opportunities, for example. 
Environmental co-benefits may refer to REDD+ activities that operate in areas of 
high biodiversity, or those that contribute to watershed and soil regulation for 
example. In 2006-2007, emission reductions from avoided deforestation averaged 
US$4.8/tCO2e (Hamilton et al., 2008). Two prices were used in Chapter 5, 
US$3/tCO2e and US$6/tCO2e to illustrate the sensitivity of emission reductions to 
market price.  
 
Estimated REDD+ revenues were further adjusted for the implementation, 
transaction and capacity building costs incurred when bringing emission 
reductions to market. Implementation costs are either one-off or ongoing, but are 
incurred through actions directly generating emission reductions. They include; 
guards, intensification of agriculture, and re-routing of road projects. Transaction 
costs are those experienced when identifying the programme, negotiating 
transactions, and for MRV of emission reductions (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). 
Capacity building costs include those for the development of research capacity, 
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technology transfer and legal support to establish REDD+ projects (see Hoare et al., 
2008).  
 
The bulk of these additional costs are experienced upfront and have, to date, been 
absorbed by stakeholders other than the ultimate forest users. Particularly where 
forest users are rural communities they have been absorbed by NGOs such as; The 
Nature Conservancy in Bolivia, and Conservation International and Wildlife 
Conservation Society in Madagascar (Asquith et al., 2002, WCS, 2009). With 
REDD+ an emerging policy instrument, very little has been documented about 
costs. The few estimates that do exist, however, show that these costs can be 
substantial (Cacho et al., 2005). Implementation costs were predicted by Nepstad et 
al. (2007) to be US$0.58/tCO2e. Antinori and Sathaye (2007) found average 
transaction costs of US$0.38/tCO2e from a sample of eleven project reports. Based 
on their experiences in Madagascar, the Wildlife Conservation Society estimate the 
costs of REDD+ project development at between US$220-450 million, excluding 
implementation costs and brokerage of emission reductions (WCS, 2009). REDD+ 
revenues estimated in Chapter 5 were adjusted for costs of REDD+ project 
implementation estimated using a feasibility assessment undertaken by forestry 
consultants in the BME (UNIQUE, 2008). 
 
4.3.2. The opportunity costs of REDD+  
4.3.2.1. Estimates of the OC of REDD+ 
 
Estimates of the OCs of REDD+ can be broadly split into top-down and bottom-up 
assessments. Top-down assessments are coarse, aggregating forests into large 
blocks for example by country, continent or biome. They commonly make use of 
commercial agricultural returns on a hectare of land and estimate the highest 
potential OCs. These estimates differ in choice of the time frame considered, the 
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costs included, market feedbacks, drivers of deforestation, land conversion 
benefits, elasticity of transformation, carbon density, and the benefits derived from 
retention of forest (see Nabuurs et al., 2007). At large spatial scales they make 
broad assumptions for agricultural returns, ignoring the substantial heterogeneity 
of both ecological and socio-economic factors.  
 
Such top-down OCs analyses are too coarse to feed into on-the-ground REDD+ 
project design. Instead they have utility as components of global partial 
equilibrium models and global assessments of REDD+ supply (e.g. Grieg-Gran, 
2006, Kindermann et al., 2008). Supply curves express OCs by quantity of emission 
reductions rather than by area. The OCs estimates, typically in US$ per hectare, are 
converted into US$ per tonne of emission reductions. The comparison of OCs 
estimates is made complex by the type of OCs reported.  Average OCs in 
Indonesia, for example, ranged from US$-0.26 to US$5.22/tCO2 where forest was 
razed for agricultural use and US$13.34/tCO2 where it was commercially logged 
(Tomich et al., 2005). The ‘choke’ price to reduce all deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon was found to US$1.49/tCO2e (Nepstad et al., 2007). Although coarse, top-
down model estimates broadly indicate where emission reductions will be most 
cost-effective, and allow a comparison of abatement costs through forestry 
compared to other mitigation sectors. 
 
Bottom-up studies are more specific to a particular locale, but still make use of 
agricultural returns, production models or land prices and, therefore, also consider 
the OCs of land. Fisher et al. (2011), for example, include both OCs of agricultural 
production and charcoal production within 53 districts in Tanzania finding net 
present value of between US$663 and US$1456/ha for agricultural production, and 
US$358 and US$502/ha for charcoal production. Bottom-up models are better able 
to include local factors including soil type, climate, technological inputs, and 
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market access which enhance OC estimates (e.g. Merry et al., 2002, Bellassen and 
Gitz, 2008). Where substantial data sets and technical capacity exists, more 
complex production functions can be used to model agricultural returns. The 
production function approach incorporates variables such as yields, inputs, 
commodity prices and other spatial details. Alternatively, land values can be used 
to infer OCs as the market price of land, under perfect markets, should reflect its 
highest-value use (Bishop, 1999). This method, however, requires data to be 
available on land title costs. In developing countries, this data is limited and clear 
ownership and land markets often do not exist (Waggoner, 2009).  
 
Few studies have considered the OCs of REDD+ via CFM. In Nepstad et al. (2007) 
the costs of REDD+ are assessed in the Brazilian Amazon. They establish the OCs 
of land for private forest stewards and for the government, and also suggest a 
payment level that can incentivise forest stewardship and conservation on ‘social’ 
forest reserves. These social forests comprise 26% of the Amazon’s forest and 
include indigenous lands, extractive reserves, and sustainable development 
reserves. Nepstad et al. propose a Public Forest Stewardship Fund on these forest 
areas from which direct payments can be made to households. The payment is 
delivered per household, not by area, and payments are uniform and anchored to 
half a minimum salary (amounting to US$1200 per year). These payments are 
lacking conditionality on service provision and it is noted that more research is 
required to make these payments performance based.  
 
In Karky and Skutsch (2010), the costs of carbon abatement through community 
forestry are calculated in Nepal. Establishing the break-even price that would be 
required for emission reductions to make REDD+ via CFM feasible, they call for 
the analysis of the OCs of land that encompasses more than agricultural returns 
and note the numerous other drivers of deforestation such as the harvest of 
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fuelwood, fodder, timber and NTFP. Studies based on marginal analysis of the 
OCs of agriculture may be inadequate to anchor payments for REDD+ via CFM 
where they do not consider other inputs for subsistence livelihoods. In Chapter 6, I 
therefore, estimate both the OCs of agricultural production but also the OCs of 
fuelwood and timber on a hectare of land. These bottom-up estimates are based on 
household returns to land uses which are established through household survey 
and market price valuation.  
 
4.3.2.2. Estimating OCs at the case study site 
 
In the BME, under the proposed Bale REDD+ Project of REDD+ via CFM 
households will experience a change from open access to the forest resource to a 
common property regime. Despite the illegality of the expansion of agricultural 
land and the harvesting of fuelwood from live trees, in the status-quo anyone is 
able to use resources from the forest to the level they desire. This de facto open 
access situation is due to a lack of law enforcement and political interest in 
conserving the forest resource base (see the full Bale REDD+ Project description in 
Chapter 3).  
 
Under the CFM regime, clearly defined use rights to the forest will make forest use 
excludable from those not participating in CFM and also to regulate forest use. The 
forest management agreement signed by the community groups will prohibit 
household expansion of agricultural land and engagement in timber and fuelwood 
extraction. Timber and fuelwood harvest reduces the biomass content of the forest 
where they are in excess of annual biomass growth. These are therefore termed, 
high-impact forest products here. The extraction of bamboo, honey, coffee, and 
climbers from the forest, will still be allowed under the intervention. These 
products can be managed such that they are harvested without the reduction in the 
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biomass of the forest (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006). They are, therefore, termed 
here, low-impact forest products. While agricultural expansion and harvest of 
high-impact forest products will be prohibited by the Bale REDD+ Project, low-
impact forest products can still be harvested, providing this extraction remains at 
sustainable levels.  
 
The OCs of forest conservation will therefore be those of agriculture or high-
impact forest products on a given hectare. As no model of land use change exists 
for the BME, so it cannot be predicted whether the next hectare will be converted 
to agriculture or deforested through harvest of high-impact forest products. Both 
OCs of land are therefore estimated in Chapter 6 and explored in regard to the 
implementation of the Bale REDD+ Project.  
 
The OCs for a hectare of forest conservation (US$/ha) is first modelled as the 
foregone income from crop production. A second calculation is made of the OCs 
for a hectare of forest conservation net of low-impact forest product income that 
can instead be derived from the hectare of forest conserved. The inclusion of these 
market benefits of low-impact forest products better capture the household trade-
offs on this hectare of land. 
 
The OCs of high-impact forest product (US$/ha) is then estimated by aggregating 
the village forest income from timber and firewood, through household survey 
and market price valuation, and then dividing over the total forest area. While 
other studies have estimated by biomass per hectare and converted by market 
survey to estimate land use values (Fisher et al., 2011), it was not possible to do so 
at the case study site as estimates of a donkey load of biomass for fuelwood were 
unavailable (see Section 4.4.4). This assessment of OCs of high-impact forest 
products assumes that all household use of high-impact forest products must stop 
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under the Bale REDD+ Project. It is recognised, however, that households need 
fuelwood. The Bale REDD+ Project implementers are already undertaking 
activities to meet these energy needs through woodlot establishment, fuel-efficient 
stove promotion and biomass briquettes. However, the measures to reduce the 
need for households to gather these products from natural forest will take time to 
be implemented. Woodlots, for example, will take time to be planted and mature. 
These OCs of the intervention may therefore be overcome as the intervention 
matures. As with agriculture, a second calculation of the OCs of high-impact forest 
products is calculated net of low-impact forest products.  
 
Having estimated the OCs of forest conservation, the implications of the different 
OCs measures, with regard to any payment design of REDD+ via CFM as a local-
level PES, are discussed in Chapter 6. The OCs of land generated by the REDD+ via 
CFM intervention are directly compared with the carbon revenues per hectare of 
conserved forest in Chapter 7.  
 
Households also derive value from non-market benefits of the forest. These include 
other direct use values such as shade, recreation and cultural values; indirect use 
values that support and protect production such as soil fertility and the micro-
climate; option value for future direct and indirect value; and, non-use values 
which capture the value of the forest’s existence and bequest for future generations 
(Davies and Richards, 1999). The values that households derive from forests in the 
status-quo are, however, net of the negative externality that households exert on 
each other due to the non-excludable, rival nature of the forest. Inherent in the 
definition of an externality is that households do not take into account the effect on 
others when deciding how much of this externality to produce (Kolstad, 2000). 
Under CFM, households will experience benefits from the removal of the negative 
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externality of a common pool resource, thus it is likely that non-market 
environmental benefits will be greater than in the status-quo.  
 
Households will also benefit from the scheme according to the value placed on the 
use rights which they are awarded, any increase in social capital and 
empowerment as a result of CFM, as well as any payments for carbon under a 
REDD+ project. These benefits of the conservation intervention may serve to offset 
some of a household’s OCs, but transaction costs will also be incurred by 
household participating in the scheme including negotiation, monitoring and 
enforcement costs that are not measured here. These transaction costs include; 
arranging, bargaining, monitoring and enforcing agreements (North, 1990).  
 
An understanding of transaction costs can help in intervention design to reduce 
negative social impacts. Meshack et al. (2006), for example, assessed the transaction 
costs of CFM in Tanzania including for forest monitoring and meetings, against the 
benefits including the forest products consumed at the household level. Poorer 
households were found to benefit more than medium and rich households, 
although richer households had greater net benefits; poor taking on more of the 
transaction costs of CFM. Although it is noted that forest condition also plays a 
role in determining the transaction costs of CFM. Similarly, in Nepal it was found 
that while richer household bore almost twice as much as poorer households, 2312 
versus 1265 Nepalese rupees per year, costs are higher as a percentage of resource 
appropriation costs for poorer households; with all households investing a mean of 
between 20 and 30 days per year (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). 
 
Transaction costs of CFM, however, are complex to measure. With varying 
definition, they are also difficult to separate from production decisions in addition 
to which each individual will experience different transaction costs (Benham and 
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Benham, 2000). Estimates of transaction costs in CFM are, therefore, few (Richards 
et al., 1999, Adhikari and Lovett, 2006, Meshack et al., 2006). While this thesis does 
not assess transaction costs of CFM, or the non-market benefits of the forest that 
result from conservation are omitted in the OC calculations in Chapters 6 and 7, 
they are discussed further in Chapter 8 and in Chapter 9.  
 
In order to estimate the three OC measures, a number of simplifying assumptions 
are made about the household and about the costs and benefits of the intervention 
(see Table 2). One major assumption is that a household is a pure profit maximiser; 
thus profit affects consumption with no feedback on production decisions. 
However, it is well recognised that rural households in developing countries face a 
number of market imperfections and constraints. This includes variable transaction 
costs for households of accessing markets, inexistence of land markets and 
constraints on market participation (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). In such 
situations, there is a link between production and consumption behaviour; where 
production is the inputs, choice of activities and desired production levels, while 
consumption is affected by consumption preferences, and demographic 
composition of the household, for example. Behaviour can therefore be understood 
in a non-separable household model (for example see; Palmer and Macgregor, 
2009). A non-separable model has implications for the market price of what is 
consumed and the household internal equilibrium determines the shadow price of 
a product. At the case study site, however, it was not possible to estimate shadow 
prices for each household for each product due to resource and time limitations 
(see also Section 4.4.5) and therefore production and consumption decisions were 
assumed separable that is likely to overestimate values. These limitations are 
returned to in Chapter 9.  
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Another assumption is that low-impact forest products are sustainably harvested 
and high-impact forest products are not. These stylised assumptions were 
necessary as incomplete data existed on whether these uses are sustainable and at 
what level harvests can be maintained. There were also insufficient resources to 
estimate this at the case study site. It is acknowledged that the reduction in OCs of 
land as a result of low-impact forest products may, therefore, be an overestimate if 
they are to be restricted under the intervention. Furthermore, some harvest of 
biomass growth or gathering of dead biomass for fuelwood may be allowed under 
the intervention and would not necessarily prove unsustainable use of forest 
resources. As an ex-ante study of the OCs of high-impact forest conservation, 
however, it was also not possible to estimate the impact of restrictions on a 
household that were less than 100%. This is firstly as the by-laws that will generate 
these restrictions are yet to be negotiated and agreed by the communities with the 
authorities, and secondly as restrictions are difficult to relate to household 
harvests. Thus, the OCs of forest conservation was estimated as a total ban on 
harvesting of all high-impact forest products and with no restrictions on low-
impact forest products. Further research into the sustainability and extractive 
potential of forest products is necessary.   
 
Finally, in order to establish a per hectare value for the OCs of forest products, it is 
also assumed that the complete forest area in a village is utilised evenly. This 
assumption of area was used to calculate both the OCs of high-impact forest 
products, but also those of low-impact forest products per hectare. While the 
income per hectare of agricultural land was based on reported area of a 
household’s cultivated land, households were unable to recall areas of forest used. 
It is recognised that problems of attribution of deforestation to households or 
individuals exist in the REDD+ literature (Börner and Wunder, 2008). This is 
acknowledged as a substantial assumption and explored further in Chapter 6, but 
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was the best approach given the data available and that follow up research could 
improve upon.  
 
Table 2. Assumptions made in the estimate of the opportunity costs of REDD+ via CFM at the 
case study site.  
 
Assumption Justification Implication 
Livestock income was not 
accounted for 
Livestock are grazed both in forest 
and on agricultural crop residues 
and income is experienced over 
multiple years, thus there is 
complexity in their valuation (see 
Naidoo and Iwamura, 2007). 
Rotational grazing restrictions 
required under CFM are not 
predicted to impact more than 
10% of a household’s grazing 
activities (Irwin, 2009). 
Households are short-
term, risk neutral, profit 
maximising agents with 
complete information, 
unlimited by capital and 
labour constraints 
While households in rural 
developing economies often link 
production and consumption 
decisions this assumption was 
unavoidable in light of time and 
resource constraints.  
It is possible that by using a 
separable model with market 
prices the values of OCs are 
overestimated in this thesis.   
Foregone land uses 
generate the same income 
as a household’s existing 
income from that land 
use 
Information on factors which 
impact income, such as accessibility 
to markets, climate regime and soil 
fertility, were not available. 
Land not under a specific use 
are likely to be more marginal, 
which may result in an 
overestimate of OCs.   
The one-off benefits of 
deforestation and 
conversion costs are zero 
A common assumption in OCs of 
forest conservation and REDD+ 
where these values are not known 
(e.g. Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, 
Grieg-Gran, 2008). 
In the light of small-holder 
driven land conversion in the 
BME this assumption appears 
reasonable. 
Newly cultivated land 
derives from forested 
land 
No data are available on land 
conversion other than estimates of 
overall rates of forest loss. 
More data on land dynamics in 
the BME are required to fully 
assess the impact of this 
assumption  
Households have access 
to the total forest area in 
their village, from which 
they can harvest low-
impact forest products 
Households were unable to report 
the area of forest they harvested 
forest products from. The total 
forest area in the village was 
therefore the best assumption 
available.  
At present it is not known if this 
over or underestimates the area 
of extraction and more research 
is required to understand the 
implication for the OC estimate. 
Non-market 
environmental benefits 
and scheme benefits are 
assumed 0 
Values are complex to calculate and 
methods vary in theoretical validity 
and acceptance, data requirements 
and ease of application (see OECD, 
2002, Pagiola et al., 2005b).  
These non-market values are 
likely to increase under the 
intervention. Thus, OCs may be 
an overestimate.  
  
Transaction costs  are not 
accounted for and 
assumed 0 
Transaction costs (e.g. negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcement), 
particularly the time burden 
imposed on households is unclear.  
This is likely to underestimate 
the costs to a household of the 
intervention.  
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4.3.2.3. Household survey of land use income 
 
In order to elicit information about a household’s use of the forests, agricultural 
production and other economic activities, semi-structured surveys were 
undertaken at the case study site. A household is defined here as ‘the people that 
normally eat and sleep under the same roof’ (Rowland and Gatward, 2003). Semi-
structured household surveys allow the collection of data in a formal standardised 
manner, but also have room for open-ended responses. The household survey was 
formulated according to best practice guidelines and to be as specific and simple as 
possible (de Vaus, 2002). It collected data on the previous year of crop production 
and forest product collection, with income defined to households as production 
both consumed at home and exchanged on markets. 
 
Surveys were designed to be verbally administered in either Amharic or Oromifa, 
the two dominant dialects at the case study site. Neither postal nor telephone 
surveys were a viable option and self-completing questionnaires would suffer 
from problems of illiteracy. Households were considered as the appropriate unit 
for decision-making and respondents were largely  household heads, defined by 
Adhikari et al. (2004) as ‘the person who makes all decisions on behalf of all the family and 
decides livelihood activities for the welfare of family members’. Each respondent was 
given an introduction to the research, a promise of confidentiality of the 
information gathered, and an estimation of the survey duration. Respondents were 
then asked if they wished to proceed.  
 
The survey began with questions regarding attitudes to the environment and forest 
management. Values and beliefs were elicited in agree/disagree statements and 
open-ended questions explored environmental concerns as well as opinions of 
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past, present and proposed forest management regimes. More sensitive data were 
gathered in part two which explored the household’s forest use and agricultural 
production including the products, yields, any inputs (seeds, fertiliser and 
equipment per year) and the share of production consumed at home versus that 
sold in local markets. Part three of the household survey went into more detail on 
the proposed Bale REDD+ Project and the final section elicited household 
information including family size and the education level of the household head 
(see Appendix 1). 
 
The quality of the survey data relies on the reliability of self-reporting by 
households. Reliability of data can be called into question where respondents have 
motives to alter their apparent resource use or if respondents are unable to 
accurately recall production information over a given time span (Milner-Gulland 
and Rowcliffe, 2007, Angelsen et al., 2011). In the first instance, respondents might 
be reluctant to answer accurately where it is feared that information would reach 
the authorities, for example, where resource use is illegal as hypothesised in Gross-
Camp et al. (2012). Alternatively, respondents may inflate their use of resources 
where they perceive future benefits, for example strategic responses might be 
given when households are asked their willingness-to-accept restrictions 
(Whittington, 1998). In order to minimise the risk of false self-reports, interviews 
were designed for a sole respondent and those participating in the survey were 
given the assurance of anonymity. Respondents also had the opportunity to opt 
out of participation. No government staff accompanied the fieldwork team, 
although permissions to conduct surveys were necessarily sought from the Federal 
government and also the regional Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
At each survey location permission to conduct surveys was also requested from 
village leaders after an introduction to the research aims and the fieldwork team 
had been given. Time was invested at each survey location in earning the trust of 
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communities; three to four weeks were spent at each location, and no payments 
were offered for participation in the survey.  
 
Recall error may also erode confidence in household survey data (Angelsen et al., 
2011). In order to address recall issues focus groups were conducted to ask locals 
the longest recall periods that were possible. Four small groups of between four 
and seven people were brought together to discuss whether households would be 
able to recall production from the last 12 months. Respondents were confident they 
could accurately recall this information, with some focus group participants stating 
they could remember as much as five years back. Confidence in recall amounts is 
also high because many crops only have one harvest per annum. With some forest 
products, such as fuelwood, enumerators were able to scale up where respondents 
recalled monthly or weekly yields.  
 
4.3.2.4. Market price valuation 
 
Research into household incomes and household income from forest resources has 
been primarily undertaken with a focus on the dependence and resilience of rural 
households (see reviews of Lampietti and Dixon, 1995, Godoy and Lubowski, 1992, 
Vedeld et al., 2004). Household incomes are commonly assessed through 
household surveys to which market-based valuation of household production is 
employed, particularly to determine the relative reliance of households on forests 
as a livelihood-generating resource (e.g. Dercon, 1998, Dovie et al., 2005, 
Shackleton and Campbell, 2001).  
 
The costs of household labour were not subtracted from the income calculations, as 
is common in household income studies, (Cavendish, 2000, Fisher, 2004, Babulo et 
al., 2009, Yemiru et al., 2010). In 2008, focus groups also revealed that job 
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opportunities in rural areas were extremely limited, seasonal and largely only 
available for males. Thus, the market wage was not a good measure of the shadow 
wage and resources were insufficient to estimate the shadow wage indirectly as an 
opportunity cost of time (Palmer and Macgregor, 2009). Thus income is defined as 
the return to capital and labour a household has access to.  
 
The household income calculation includes production of agricultural goods and 
forest goods both for home consumption and market exchange. These methods 
vary in theoretical validity and acceptance, data requirements and ease of 
application (see OECD, 2002, Pagiola et al., 2005b). Where goods and services are 
marketed, they have evident values. Where goods and services are not present in 
markets revealed preference, using surrogate markets to infer value, and stated 
preference methods, using hypothetical markets, can be applied (see Arrow et al., 
1993). In addition to these methods, benefit transfer can be used to determine value 
from related studies (Splash and Vatn, 2006).  
I apply market-based valuation to establish the income that households derive 
from both forest and agricultural land use. Following observation of a household’s 
products and yields, for both subsistence and sale, local market prices are applied. 
The cost of similar goods or next best alternatives can also be used as a proxy 
where there is a high degree of substitution between goods (see Section 4.4.5). It is 
recognised, however, that production and consumption decisions are non-
separable in many rural developing country households (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
1995). Multiple market failures mean that there can be a large discrepancy between 
seller and buyer prices of a product; each household, therefore, will have its own 
shadow price for a product.  
There are a number of ways to establish a households’ shadow price which can be 
used to better value non-marketed products; i.e. those consumed at home. This 
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includes establishing barter values for non-traded commodities that are exchanged 
between households; using contingent valuation to ask respondents directly for 
their value preferences; considering substitute good values; using local prices; and, 
assessing time embedded in products as well as other inputs (Angelsen et al., 
2011). Ideally, establishing the time and other inputs would allow better 
calculation of minimum values of products. Chopra (1993) for example, valued 
firewood collection and other NTFP through embedded labour collection time; the 
opportunity cost of labour time. It is however, difficult to measure embedded time 
and thus shadow prices for each product. Individuals often multi-task, shadow 
costs vary according to the household members whose labour is used and can also 
vary by season (Angelsen et al., 2011).  
 
As it was not possible to establish a shadow price for each product for each 
household, this study uses market price valuation. Market prices reflect decision-
making reality and so are good estimates of WTP (UNEP, 1998). Adopting a 
utilitarian concept of value, WTP reveals the value individuals hold for market and 
non-market goods and the trade-offs made in the pursuit of these goods (Freeman, 
2003). However, using market price valuation assumes that the market is efficient 
and so inclusive of input costs (Bishop, 1999). As it is noted that market 
imperfections are commonplace in rural developing countries, it is likely that this 
method causes and overestimate of value as a result of included marketing and 
transport costs, or where middle men are buyers and seller increasing the 
difference between market price and shadow price.  
 
In attempting to minimise this overestimate, local-level market prices were used 
and extrapolated to ‘free’ products that were consumed within the home but not 
traded. In the BME, households sell home produce in unrestricted markets where 
there are no barriers to entry. On market days many buyers and sellers converge to 
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sell identical produce brought predominantly by pack animals. These local 
markets are not for sale to intermediaries or middle-men, and although the use of 
market prices may lead to overestimation it represents the best price for products 
that were available (see Appendix 2).  
 
4.3.2.5. Scenario modelling futures 
 
Complete knowledge of the future is just not possible. Partial forecasting of 
futures, however, can be achieved through systematic historical trend analysis and 
extrapolation (Helmer, 1977, Wack, 1985, Bell, 1997). Regarded as a strategic tool, 
futures research explores a range of possible, plausible futures and, therefore, 
differs from research attempting to converge on a single view or answer (Gordon, 
1992). Alternative futures can answer questions such as: what can or could be 
(possible)?; what is likely to be (probable)?; and, what ought to be (preferable)? 
(Börjeson et al., 2006). Thus futures research is useful for strategic decision-making 
under uncertain but predictable situations, where adaptation is possible through 
the reallocation of means and resources (Kaivo-oja et al., 2004). Futures research 
therefore has applications for the private sector (Huss and Honton, 1987), as well 
as being important for policy planning where they can be used to identify and 
evaluate alternative policies and provide early warning of threats and 
opportunities. In addition, where more desirable futures can be selected, 
stakeholders can act to maximise the probability of desirable futures being 
achieved (Gordon, 1992, Kaivo-oja et al., 2004).  
 
Futures research encompasses a number of methods. Reviewed in Gordon (1992), 
the most simplistic division of futures methods is by quantitative or qualitative 
and normative futures (those that seem desirable), or exploratory futures (those 
that seem plausible) (Table 3). There is a substantial terminology in futures 
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methods, often with overlapping terms (Marien, 2002). The UK Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs have a dedicated horizon scanning and 
futures programme for example, with its own terminology to describe futures 
methods and techniques. While horizon scanning is considered as a first step to 
understand the problem being researched, methods of establishing how the future 
will play out include: examining wild-card high impact, low probability events; road 
mapping of inhibitory and enabling processes; wind-tunnelling to identify how 
economic, political, social, environmental and technical factors would need to exist 
for scenarios to be plausible, and back-casting, which works backwards from a 
vision to the present (DEFRA, undated).  
 
Table 3. An outline of futures methods  
(adapted from Gordon, 1992) 
 
 Normative Exploratory 
Quantitative Scenarios 
Technology sequence analysis 
Scenarios 
Time series 
Regression analysis 
Multiple-equation models 
Probabilistic models  
- trend impact 
- cross impact 
- interax 
Non-linear models 
Qualitative 
Scenarios 
Delphi 
In-depth interviews 
Expert group meetings 
Genius 
Science fiction 
Scenarios 
Delphi 
In-depth interviews 
Expert group meetings 
Genius 
 
Of futures methods, scenarios can be applied for normative and explorative, 
qualitative and quantitative futures analysis. Scenarios embody the central 
principles of futures research through creative thinking and present multiple 
plausible futures (Bishop et al., 2007). As in Bohensky et al. (2006), scenarios are 
defined as a set of plausible narratives depicting alternative pathways to the 
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future. They can synthesise and communicate information, including uncertainties, 
to stakeholders as well as the public (Alcamo, 2001). Gordon (1992) rates scenarios 
as less complex than alternative quantitative models methods. Models often rely 
on the past as being able to predict the future but in the future relationships 
between variables may change. Time series analysis is more demanding 
numerically, necessitating the fitting of mathematical models to trend data. 
Scenarios are also relatively low on training and data requirements as compared to 
other quantitative futures methods. Scenarios are also unlike other methods to deal 
with decision-making under uncertainty. Unlike decision theory, for example, 
scenarios do not require information on the probabilities of outcomes (Polasky et 
al., 2011). Unlike sensitivity analysis, which focuses on marginal changes in 
specific biophysical or economic parameters, scenarios have the benefit of being 
able to change groups of parameters (White and Minang, 2011). 
 
The internally consistent and realistic narratives describing potential future states 
established in quantitative scenarios can lead to more resilient conservation 
policies (Peterson et al., 2003). Despite this utility, scenarios have been 
underutilised in conservation intervention planning (Peterson et al., 2003, 
Bohensky et al., 2006).  
 
The application of scenarios in environment policy is, however, growing. The IPCC 
produces special reports on emission scenarios, or ‘projections of the future state of 
the society and environment based on specific assumptions about key determinants such as 
population, economic growth, technological change, or environmental policies’ 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment built scenarios 
to explore user needs, supply and demand for ecosystem services and how well-
being might change into the future (MA, 2005, Carpenter et al., 2006). Participatory 
methods were used to generate four policy relevant scenarios with ecologists, 
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economists, and social scientists from the private sector, public sector, NGOs and 
indigenous groups all engaged in the process (Bohensky et al., 2006). Similarly, 
scenarios were used in the recent UK National Ecosystem Assessment, to explore 
how ecosystems and their services will change in the future and the associated 
impacts on human-well-being. The National Ecosystem Assessment created six 
scenarios of ecosystem service impacts on society, economy and human well-being 
up to 2060. These incorporated five indirect drivers of change; demographic, socio-
political, economic, science and technological, and cultural and religions, and three 
dominant direct drivers of change; climate change, land-use change, and resource 
consumption (Haines-Young et al., 2010).  
 
Where applied for environmental policy scenarios are more commonly applied at 
broad spatial scale. Osvaldo et al. (2000) created three scenarios of the future 
biodiversity of ten major biomes based on assumptions about the five main drivers 
of biodiversity change; land use, climate, nitrogen deposition, biotic exchange, and 
atmospheric CO2. The scenarios considered no interaction, synergistic interaction 
and antagonistic interactions between the drivers and land-use change was 
projected to have the biggest impact on biodiversity distribution in 2100. However, 
the authors recognise that regional analysis, with tailored biological, social and 
economic characteristics, will improve the accessibility of the scenarios to policy-
makers (Osvaldo et al., 2000).  
 
Scenarios are being increasing used to consider carbon storage in natural 
ecosystems. Swetnam et al. (2011) was also at broad-scale, building two scenarios 
of carbon storage in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania. Considering change in 
five sectors; energy, formal economy, agriculture, forestry and population, it was 
estimated that in 2025 there would be a 41% loss in carbon storage under business 
as usual charcoal production and agricultural expansion. Translating scenarios 
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onto land use maps, it was shown that in the optimistic scenario only 3.8% of 
carbon storage of might be lost. Strassburg et al. (2012) applied scenarios of global 
carbon values to explore how REDD+ might influence biodiversity conservation. 
They found that under all scenarios, REDD+ will help reduce biodiversity losses.  
 
A qualitative study by Wollenberg et al. (2000) argued that scenarios should be 
utilised in bottom-up conservation planning. Applied to anticipatory learning for 
adaptive co-management of community forests, the study finds that scenarios may 
not remove uncertainties, but they can help stakeholders to prepare for them, and 
thus cope with them.  
 
Studies that consider the OCs of conservation largely report OCs for a single year 
or assume OCs are constant over time subject only to discounting (Börner et al., 
2009, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Chomitz et al., 2005). Incorporating the lack 
of information the on on-going drivers of change and the underspecificity 
uncertainty in conservation objectives, scenarios are applied in Chapter 7 to 
understand how OCs may change over the lifespan of a conservation intervention. 
Three scenarios are generated which explore how assumptions of agricultural 
productivity improvements, proposed commercialisation of forest products, and 
the sustainability of land use impact upon three OCs measures of forest 
conservation through CFM. The annual OCs are those experienced by a household 
in a given project year. The cumulative OCs are those experienced for a hectare of 
land taken out of production at a given project-year until the end of the project. 
The total OCs are the sum of the cumulative OCs, over the area of avoided 
deforestation, for the project lifespan.  
 
Scenario analysis can include indirect socio-political, economic, science and 
technological, cultural and religious, and demographic drivers (Haines-Young et 
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al., 2010). This study focuses on the direct economic drivers of resource 
consumption, with simple but credible changes in income from land uses modelled 
under the proposed CFM conservation intervention in the BME. Two explorative, 
or probable, scenarios utilised subjective judgements about the drivers of land-use 
change to illustrate what may happen under a CFM conservation intervention. The 
third scenario is normative and back-casts from a goal of zero total OCs of forest 
conservation. Scenarios are calibrated with data from peer reviewed and grey 
literature, research institutions, government sources and non-governmental 
organisations outlined in Chapter 3, as well as knowledge of the region and 
intervention gathered through fieldwork. The potential of REDD+ revenues from 
the project to overcome the OCs of forest conservation is then assessed by applying 
revenue estimates from Chapter 5.  
 
4.3.3. Environmental attitudes, perceptions and intention to cooperate in CFM 
 
The qualitative study of opinions and perceptions of conservation interventions 
allows unobservable values to be better understood (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). 
At the case study site, open ended questions and agree/disagree statements were 
included in the household survey described in section 4.3.2.3. A series of open-
ended questions also explored opinions of past, present and proposed forest 
management regimes in the survey villages. Following a description of the 
intervention, households were also asked if they would take part in CFM as it was 
proposed. Chapter 8 reports these findings to provide an understanding of local 
attitudes to resource management and conservation at the case-study site.  
 
Qualitative data complements the empirical estimates of households’ OCs of 
REDD+ via CFM as a household’s decision to cooperate is based on them weighing 
up the costs and the benefits that they perceive they will incur (Lubell, 2002, 
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Adams et al., 2003). The household survey also elicited a household’s intention to 
cooperate in the proposed forest conservation intervention through a voluntary 
contribution. The voluntary contribution was a portion of their yearly income that 
they would pay into the CFM cooperative so that it could be used to better manage 
the forest. This voluntary contribution can be considered a quantitative indicator of 
intention to cooperate in the proposed CFM intervention. A higher voluntary 
contribution is assumed to represent greater cooperative intention where 
cooperation is defined here as a household entering into a scheme, abiding by the 
rules, and undertaking pro-conservation behaviours. 
 
Other studies have elicited WTP in order to value environmental goods or services 
through a method called contingent valuation. For example, Köhlin (2001) assesses 
the WTP for community forest plantations in India. Urama and Hodge (2006) 
consider WTP for a river basin restoration scheme in Nigeria. Contingent valuation 
relies on the stated preferences of individuals rather than their preferences 
revealed through behavioural trails through the elicitation of a value for changes in 
the level of provision of a good or service through intended action on a 
hypothetical market (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Eliciting an individual’s WTP to 
avoid a loss or for a gain, or willingness-to-accept in lieu of a gain or to suffer a 
loss, contingent valuation is able to capture not only direct-use values, but also 
indirect, option (potential to be used either directly or indirectly in the future), and 
non-use values (existence, bequest and altruistic values) (Christie et al., 2008). 
Despite difficulties in its application in developing countries (Whittington, 1998), 
contingent valuation has been applied in Ethiopia (e.g. Mekonnen, 2000). In 2009, 
however, a pilot contingent valuation survey was conducted at the case study site 
and the value elicitation question was met with either exceedingly high monetary 
amounts or protest responses, thus contingent valuation was not feasible at the 
case study site. 
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As it was unable to observe preferences through a contingent valuation question, a 
households’ voluntary contribution was instead elicited as a quantitative measure 
of behavioural intention. Such an approach was has been taken elsewhere in the 
literature. Howe et al. (2011) use a voluntary pledge to measure behavioural 
intention to contribute to a conservation intervention in Russia. Champ et al. (1997) 
considered voluntary contributions to road removal near the Grand Canyon in the 
United States. In adopting the voluntary contribution approach a number of 
methodological limitations are acknowledged. In particular a voluntary 
contribution may not be incentive compatible, free-riding on the donation of others 
towards a public good could lead to the reduction of donation amounts and free 
riding on others (Champ et al., 1997). Alternatively, the hypothetical nature of the 
contribution could lead to inflated donation responses for a warm glow effect 
(Andreoni, 1989). As a result of the limitations of the measure, the voluntary 
contribution is not interpreted as a welfare measure, but instead a focus is given to 
the determinants of households’ cooperative intention.  
 
The determinants of a household’s intention to cooperate were investigated 
through regression analysis based on a priori assumptions of impact on cooperation 
established through literature review. The literature on common pool resource and 
that on common property regimes have explored cooperation through a large body 
of case-studies. Some have found that wealthier individuals take on more of the 
burden of initiating collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1999, Bardhan, 2000). In 
contrast, others have found non-linear wealth impacts on cooperation (Dayton-
Johnson and Bardhan, 2002). Many find that the poor bear a higher share of 
transaction costs and receive lower benefits from access to forest products 
(Adhikari and Lovett, 2006, Lund and Treue, 2008, Nielsen and Treue, 2012). 
Appropriator’s returns from the forest have been shown to provide material 
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incentives to cooperate (Baland and Platteau, 1999, Lise, 2000, Agrawal and 
Chhatre, 2006). Adhikari and Di Falco (2009) consider the determinants of access to 
participatory processes, defined as procedural justice or involvement in decision-
making rather than entry to a scheme (Skutsch, 2000, Pascual et al., 2010). Looking 
at the probability of membership in local forest management institutions in Nepal, 
Adhikari and Di Falco find that lower-caste groups have lower probability of being 
elected as members of the committee of user groups. Dayton-Johnson (2000) 
creates a model of determinants of collective action supported by evidence from 
Mexican cooperative irrigation systems. The paper finds that cooperation is highly 
dependent on the distributive rules for cost sharing and water allocation, with 
social heterogeneity and landholding inequality associated with lower 
maintenance of irrigation systems. 
 
The literature on cooperation has focussed on the impact of heterogeneity in 
wealth, interest, and social diversity of resource appropriators. Naidu (2009) 
summarises that the impact of wealth depends on the relationship between wealth 
and the returns from the forest resource. Naidu also finds that moderate levels of 
social diversity lead to low collective management, but high social diversity can 
lead to high collective management. This study underlines that the impact of 
wealth, interest and social diversity on CFM success remain mixed (see also 
Poteete and Ostrom, 2004 for a review). This is complicated by studies using 
different measures of cooperation, undertaken at differing scales and with a 
variety of methods. The existing body of literature on cooperation largely 
considers cooperation ex-post. As Cavalcanti (2010) notes, if factors to improve 
cooperative self-governance are known they can be actively promoted and that this 
is particularly relevant where common property regimes are instigated by external 
actors. This is the case for REDD+ via CFM at the case-study site, hence 
household’s attitudes and cooperative intention are explored ex-ante. 
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4.4. Data collection and analysis 
4.4.1. Fieldwork permissions 
 
In order to undertake research in Ethiopia, a memorandum of understanding was 
signed with the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority of the Ethiopian 
Federal Government. Permissions were also sought from the Oromia Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the Bale Mountains National Park authorities, 
and the woreda level Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development offices. At 
each survey location permission to conduct surveys was also requested from 
village leaders after an introduction to the research aims and the fieldwork team 
had been given. The Economic and Social Research Council provided funding for a 
total of 61 weeks of fieldwork (inclusive of 14 weeks for difficult language 
training). The Frankfurt Zoological Society and BERSMP provided further financial 
and logistical support in-country. The British Embassy in Ethiopia also provided 
additional finance to undertake forest carbon stock assessment in the (proposed) 
Bale Mountains National Park.  
 
4.4.2. Fieldwork teams 
 
Primary data for forest carbon stock analysis was undertaken with a team of para-
ecologists who were trained how to undertake direct tree measurements. Between 
December 2008 and April 2009, 49 carbon plots were undertaken. In a second 
fieldwork period between December 2009 and April 2010 a further 59 carbon plots 
were inventoried by a smaller team also trained in the same methodologies. 
 
Two enumerators were employed to conduct the household survey on the basis of 
their English language skills in an attempt to limit information lost in translation. 
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One enumerator also had prior experience with household surveys and with 
undertaking research. These enumerators were local to the region, but not to the 
villages surveyed. Thus they had in-depth local knowledge particularly about local 
conditions and customs, without creating data sensitivity issues. At each survey 
location a local liaison officer was also employed to guide the enumerators to 
households. Enumerators were first trained in the objectives of the research, 
rationale and objectives, the application of the methodologies, how to approach 
respondents and the recording of responses. These enumerators were accompanied 
at fieldwork sites and supervised during questionnaires at intervals. Enumerators 
recorded responses in data books also reviewed at regular intervals. 
 
4.4.3. Forest carbon plots 
 
Forest carbon plot sampling was based on forest stratification by UNIQUE forestry 
consultants into: tropical moist degraded forest; tropical moist non-degraded 
forest; degraded tropical dry forest; degraded woodland; and non-degraded 
woodland (UNIQUE, 2008). No non-degraded tropical dry forest remains. Carbon 
stocks were assessed in all forest types except woodlands where allometric 
relationships were not available for the specific location in the BME. Furthermore, 
the woodlands will act as a leakage belt under the proposed REDD+ project and 
will therefore not generate emission reductions for sale. Forest carbon plots were 
dispersed across the study area, but limited to logistically accessible areas. 
Logistical limitations of permissions and transport prevented a priori calculation of 
the sample size required to estimate mean forest carbon stocks with a particular 
level of confidence. However, retrospective power analysis was undertaken to 
establish the maximum predictive power achieved by the primary data collection.   
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Drawing on forest inventory protocols (MacDicken, 1997, Pearson et al., 2005, 
Greenhalgh et al., 2006), tree measurements were collected from a total of 108 
forest plots of 20m by 20m (Figure 5). The geo-coordinates of forest plots were 
identified by overlaying 1km by 1km latitude and longitude grids on maps of the 
selected study areas, with random number generation used to identify crosshairs 
representing the centre of forest plots. Plots were then located on foot with a 
compass and a handheld global positioning system. Within each plot, the diameter 
at breast height (dbh) – or 1.3 metres above the ground – of all trees was recorded 
with a lower limit of 5cm dbh was used to define a ‘tree’ and buttress roots not 
encountered. In addition to canopy cover, the angle of the slope of the land, 
altitude and aspect was also recorded. Tree measurements were noted on data 
sheets, later entered into Excel after which documented allometric relationships 
were applied to estimate forest carbon stocks.  
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Figure 5. Data collection in the Bale Mountains Eco-Region.  
Showing the case study site with woreda, or district boundaries and the three household survey 
locations, Agarfa, Goro and Delo Mena. The three major forest types and location of forest carbon 
plots are also shown as well as the major roads in the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME). Source: 
author generated 
 
 
4.4.4. Household survey data 
 
The provisional household survey design was informed by discussions with staff 
of two NGOs involved in the management of the BME resources; Frankfurt 
Zoological Society and FARM-Africa/SOS-Sahel. Fourteen pilot surveys were also 
conducted in Dinsho village, where the (proposed) Bale Mountains National Park 
headquarters are situated. Both discussions and pilot surveys enabled questions to 
be revised for clarity and ease of understanding, checked for political and cultural 
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sensitivities, and tailored to the dominant activities of the region. Post pilot, the 
household survey was condensed substantially due to lengthy completion times 
could impact on results due to respondent fatigue (Angelsen et al., 2011). A by-
product of the reduction of the survey is the omission of household composition, 
which means that the standardisation to adult equivalents is not possible, as well 
as more detailed information on households with respect to their distance from 
market and assets such as livestock holdings. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
question, data on total household income was also removed at the pilot stage.  
 
Between January and April 2010, 237 household surveys were undertaken in three 
survey villages (see Chapter 3; Figure 5). Given the disbursed nature of households 
at the household survey villages, respondents were selected opportunistically from 
walks through town and agricultural fields. It is acknowledged that this non-
probabilistic sampling method suffers from self-selection, but was an unavoidable 
limitation of the survey. Ideally, to reduce bias complete randomisation of 
households would be achieved given prior knowledge of number and identity of 
households in the area. This information was not available. A further limitation 
was that survey respondents were also all male. This was a result of cultural 
barriers preventing enumerators approaching females within their households. 
These limitations and their implications are discussed further in Chapter 9. 
 
It had been intended that the biomass needs of households could be established 
through survey data. Households reported fuelwood and other products in 
‘donkey loads’, however. Although an attempt was made to assess the weights of 
donkey loads at a major market place, neither sellers no buyers were willing to 
participate as both sale and purchase is currently illegal: dead firewood can only 
be collected for home consumption. Furthermore, I was also unable to find 
consistent or valid estimates of donkey load volumes for the region. As households 
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were also unable to estimate the area of forest which they utilise I was also unable 
to estimate the area over which forest products were sourced. Even with the 
forester’s rule of thumb of 1m3/ha/year of growth, I was therefore unable to 
estimate if wood extraction was sustainable. This is a limitation of the thesis that 
could be conducted in the future to increase the utility of this analysis, and is 
returned to in Chapter 9. 
 
4.4.5. Market price survey 
 
In the BME, households sell home produce in unrestricted markets, there are no 
barriers to entry, and on market days many buyers and sellers converge to sell 
identical produce. As noted in Section 4.3.2.4. there are limitations to the market 
price approach under imperfect market conditions, however, overestimation was 
attempted to be minimised as much as possible through surveying local-level 
markets as establishing shadow prices was not possible.  
 
In order to determine market prices, twelve market price surveys for key forest 
and crop products were conducted during the household survey period (see 
Appendix 2). A limitation of the market price survey is that seasonality in prices 
could not be assessed; field work was restricted to dry season due to transport 
limitations and lack of all-weather roads. Three market surveys were conducted in 
major towns and three at survey villages, with two individuals gathering price 
data at each. Market prices were averaged out over all locations. These market 
prices were applied to products that households derive from the forest area and to 
households’ crop yields. Income was converted from Ethiopian Birr (ETB) to US 
dollars at 1 ETB to US$ 0.0749, the average exchange rate of the first quarter of 
2010, when the survey was carried out. 
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4.4.6. Econometric analysis 
 
All data was first entered into Excel, cross-checked to limit input errors and 
cleaned. Data analysis was carried out using STATA 10 software. In Chapters 6 
and 8 ordinary least squares (OLS), Logit and Tobit regression analysis were 
employed to explore the determinants of household income from forest and 
agricultural sources, as well as to understand household cooperative intention 
through a voluntary contribution proxy.  
 
Based on a linear relationship between independent variables and the dependent 
variable Yi, OLS regression coefficients are obtained by the minimisation of the 
sum of the squared error terms assuming homogeneous influence of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable (Verbeek, 2004; Equation 1). 
Coefficients are reported in model results throughout.  
 
iuiXiY += β          Eq 1.  
 
where iX  is a vector of the independent explanatory variables 
and     )|( iii XYEX =β  
 
OLS assumes an error term ui with normal distribution which is unlikely in cross-
sectional data. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors were therefore estimated 
as the square root of White’s variance estimator (Carter-Hill et al., 2007). In order 
to test OLS model specification a Ramsay Regression Equation Specification Error 
Test (RESET) was used post-estimation. This tests whether the functional form is 
incorrect, for example, if non-linear combinations of the estimated values explain 
the endogenous variable, and is designed to detect omitted variables (Carter-Hill et 
al., 2007). 
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In Chapter 6, Logit and Tobit regression models were used to analyse the 
determinants of household income from low-impact forest products. This was 
necessary as 50% of the households in the sample did not have income from these 
forest products, but where they did the income was a continuous random variable 
with positive values. Both the Logit and Tobit suppose a latent variable yi* which 
remains dependent on xi (Verbeek, 2004; Equation 2).  
 
iuiXiy += β
*
   Eq.2 
 
Where the observed yi is defined by: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = �𝑦𝑖∗       𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖  ∗ > 00        𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖  ∗ ≤ 0  
 
The Logit model predicts the probability of the occurrence of an event and is 
therefore a binomial model. In Chapter 6 the Logit model predicts the presence or 
absence of income from low-impact forest product income. We observe yi = 1 if 
low-impact forest product income is derived, thus if y*i > 0 and yi = 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, the response yi is binary and a realisation of random variable Yi and 
takes the value of one and zero with probability pi and 1-pi, respectively. The Tobit 
model is a censored version of the regression model. The Tobit model supposes a 
latent variable yi* is only observed for values greater than 0 and censored 
otherwise. In Chapter 6 the Tobit predicts the probability of being above the censor 
and the determinants of low-impact forest product income if income is greater than 
zero. The estimation of both the Logit and Tobit model is achieved through 
maximum likelihood estimation. Assuming a distribution, parameter values are 
estimated as those that give the observed data the highest probability (Verbeek, 
2004).  
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The explanatory variables used in regression models were selected based on their 
predicted impacts on the dependent variable. Thus cause and effect relationships 
are based on a priori assumptions. This is opposed to an ecological or more natural 
sciences reductionist approach where non-significant explanatory variables are 
eliminated in a step-wise approach (Armsworth et al., 2009). The cross-sectional 
data-set is limited given that there are three survey locations with three differing 
forest types. Effects due to forest characteristics and village characteristics, 
therefore, cannot be separated. A village dummy variable was included to 
encapsulate these differences to help control for unobserved but constant variation 
across survey locations. These village fixed effects should provide consistent 
estimates even in the presence of correlation between village-specific 
heterogeneity, which is time invariant, and the right hand side variables. A 
correlation matrix was assessed pre-estimation to assess the possibility of 
multicolinearity – where a linear relationship between explanatory variables gives 
an unreliable regression estimate – as the individual impact of each variable is 
hard to determine (Verbeek, 2004). 
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Chapter 5: Uncertain emission reductions from forest conservation  
 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1. Problem statement 
 
Assessing the decrease in emissions from projects or policies impacting on forests 
still contains substantial uncertainty despite a global proliferation of REDD+ 
activities. This emission reductions accounting is necessary to illustrate both 
climate change mitigation potential of forests, as well as monitoring progress 
towards climate change mitigation targets through forest conservation activities. 
Emission reduction estimates are therefore necessary irrespective decisions to be 
made on the ultimate financing mechanism of REDD+ under the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see Section 2.1 for a discussion of 
financing options for REDD+). Under a project-based approach to REDD+, 
however, emission reductions accounting is critical. These sub-nationally 
implemented REDD+ projects generate lessons for future REDD+ implementation, 
with a view to trading emission reductions in voluntary carbon markets (see 
Section 4.3.1 for a discussion on REDD+ and the voluntary carbon markets). Thus 
the revenues available to alter economic incentives for forest conservation in such 
REDD+ projects will be dependent on the market value of the emission reductions 
and the costs of getting them to market.  
 
Emission reductions accounting requires the quantification of forest area, forest 
area change and forest carbon stock. Advances are being made in the technology 
and accessibility of remote sensing imagery for the measurement of forest area and 
forest area change and it is being increasingly used to infer forest biomass and so 
foret carbon stocks (Achard et al., 2004, Mayaux et al., 2005, DeFries et al., 2007, 
Ramankutty et al., 2007, Baccini et al., 2008, Goetz et al., 2009, Bucki et al., 2012). 
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Baker et al. (2010) report that remote sensing is mature enough to use in national 
systems of forest cover monitoring systems; although more research could still 
improve accuracy and detail of this imagery. Romijn et al. (2012), however, found 
capacity gaps for forest monitoring for REDD+ still existed in many forested 
nations and particularly in Africa and many countries lacked resources and 
expertise to make the most in advances in satellite imagery technology, for 
example. 
 
Appropriate methods to establish the past and predicted rates of forest change in 
order to calculate the emission reductions resulting from an intervention continue 
to be developed (Angelsen, 2008, Olander et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009, Griscom et 
al., 2009, Huettner et al., 2009, Estrada, 2011). For project-based REDD+, standards 
have emerged that set out detailed methods and procedures, including for the 
establishment of baselines (Estrada and Joseph, 2012). The Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS) is the most commonly applied in voluntary carbon markets, and 
price premiums can be received for emission reductions registered to the VCS and 
other carbon standards (e.g. VCS, 2007, CCBA, 2008).  
 
This Chapter focusses on the third aspect of emission reductions accounting; forest 
carbon stocks. Forest carbon stock refers to the carbon content in the dry biomass 
of a forest per unit area, often measured in tonnes of carbon per hectare (UNDP, 
2009). High uncertainty in forest carbon stock estimates often results from a lack of 
data on key forest variables and parameters, resources or capacity (Brown et al., 
1989, Smith and Heath, 2001, Andersson et al., 2009). Changes in the estimates of 
forest carbon stock in the FAO Forest Resource Assessment, a widely used 
database of global and national forest statistics, for example, are found to have 
changed due to information availability rather than stock changes (Houghton, 
2005). In 2009, a technical paper of the UNFCCC considering the costs of 
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monitoring systems for REDD+ indicated that a number of developing countries 
have insufficient capacity to undertake forest monitoring and mapping; inclusive 
of forest carbon stocks (UNFCCC, 2009). Three years later, Romijn et al. (2012) 
found similar conclusions to the UNFCCC in their assessment of the status and 
development of monitoring capacities for REDD+, also identifying that Africa 
suffers the greatest capacity gap.  
 
As popularity in REDD+ has grown, so has literature on the estimation of forest 
carbon stocks and uncertainty in forest carbon stocks as they pertain to a REDD+ 
mechanism (Houghton and et al., 2001, Houghton, 2005, Mollicone et al., 2007, 
Ramankutty et al., 2007, Pelletier et al., 2010). The uncertainty of forest carbon 
stocks has also been demonstrated through global and regional forest carbon stock 
mapping efforts. Saatchi et al. (2011), for example, produced a global map of forest 
carbon stocks through satellite imagery and on-the-ground forest plots. 
Propagating errors through the estimation process they found uncertainty in forest 
carbon stocks of 38% over Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia; 
although the analysis was not applied at a country level. Work is ongoing to 
improve forest carbon stock estimates; Le Toan et al. (2011) outline an ongoing 
initiative to map global biomass, of which approximately 50% is carbon, with error 
not exceeding 20%. 
 
As a result of lack of data at finer resolution at national and sub-national scales, the 
application of biome-averaged forest carbon stock data to estimate emission 
reductions has, therefore, become widespread where data on forest carbon stock is 
not available locally (Brown and Gaston, 1995, Gibbs et al., 2007, Djomo et al., 
2010). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have compiled best 
available methods and published guidance and guidelines for countries to 
undertake GHG inventories and to identify the emissions and removals of GHGs 
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from land use, land-use change and forestry activities (IPCC, 2003, IPCC, 2006). 
IPCC guidance is intended to promote broad engagement of countries irrespective 
of their data sets and capacities to manipulate this data (see Baker et al., 2010). As a 
result there are three Tiers of methods with increasing levels of uncertainty, with 
countries selecting Tiers based on data requirements and methodological 
complexity. While Tier 3 uses advanced estimation approaches that involve 
complex models and highly disaggregated data, Tier 2 employs more country-
specific carbon stock information and requires activity data disaggregated to 
smaller scales, and Tier 1 is based on biome-averaged data for carbon stocks 
(Böttcher et al., 2009). 
 
Biome-averaged data used in Tier 1 is able to capture broad ecological variables 
influencing forest carbon stocks, such as temperature and rainfall (Chave et al., 
2004, GOFC-GOLD, 2008), but it obscures substantial local forest heterogeneity 
(Houghton and et al., 2001, Bradford et al., 2010). An emission reductions estimate 
using this simple accounting method is, therefore, likely to contain more 
uncertainty than applying more complex and data intense methods which 
statistically relate measured forest attributes to above-ground carbon stock using 
allometric relationships (Brown, 1997, Chave et al., 2005). Comparisons across six 
countries by GOFC-GOLD (2008) found that application of biome-averaged 
defaults overestimated forest carbon stock as much as 33% in Mexican temperate 
forest and underestimated by as much as 44% in African rainforest when 
compared to plot measurements. The uncertainty introduced by carbon accounting 
methods is non-trivial, but the magnitude and direction of the discrepancy so far 
varies from case to case.  
  
While IPCC guidance was not designed to produce emission estimates for REDD+ 
projects, the UNFCCC has supported the use of guidance by countries for REDD+ 
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(UNFCCC, 2009). A large discrepancy between the use of simple and complex 
forest carbon stock methods in estimating emission reductions could be the 
difference between making a decision to implement a REDD+ project or not. 
However, there is no standardised method to assess or communicate uncertainty 
in emission reductions accounting. Where carried out, uncertainty assessments 
have relied upon published information and expert judgement. Less commonly 
measurement data has been used and total uncertainty quantified through 
propagation of error and Monte Carlo simulation methods (Heath and Smith, 2000, 
Smith and Heath, 2001, IPCC, 2003, Peltoniemi et al., 2006, Monni et al., 2007).  
 
The principle of conservativeness remains a dominant approach to dealing with 
uncertainty in emission reductions accounting (Mollicone et al., 2007, Grassi et al., 
2008). The principle of conservativeness requires omitting carbon pools or taking 
lower bound estimates to ensure a low probability that carbon emission reductions 
are overestimated (GOFC-GOLD, 2008). However, conservativeness assumes zero 
uncertainty and decision-makers are left without an idea of the confidence interval 
of estimate of emission reductions (Andersson et al., 2009). Attempts are being 
made to communicate the uncertainties of emission reductions accounting to 
policy-makers and to aid decision-making (Brown, 2002, Andersson et al., 2009, 
Waggoner, 2009). Kerr et al. (2004), for example, quantitatively translate errors in 
estimating carbon stocks into environmental integrity of emission reductions for 
avoided deforestation in their assessment of potential emission reductions in Costa 
Rica, finding that uncertainty is impacted strongly by forest type; particularly in 
tropical wet forest. Pelletier et al. (2010) used five carbon stock estimates for 
Panamanian forests in land conversion and transition models, finding 144% 
difference in emission reductions resulted from highest to lowest. Acceptance of 
Tier 1 accounting, however, remains high. 
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Feasibility studies for project-based REDD+ will often combine uncertain forest 
carbon stocks with uncertain market variables. With a 20-100 year project lifespan, 
a feasibility assessment for a REDD+ mechanism requires assumptions and best-
guesses to be made regarding voluntary carbon market price trends, 
implementation and transaction costs. Using a back of the envelope calculation 
Pelletier et al. (2010) take their emission reduction accounting using five forest 
carbon stock estimates further, by demonstrating that break even prices for 
emission reductions were more than twice as high with lowest global default forest 
carbon stocks as compared to local forest carbon stock estimates in Panama.  
 
There are a number of REDD+ projects and activities emerging in Sub-saharan 
Africa (Diaz et al., 2011, Climate Funds Update, 2011, Forest Carbon Portal, 2012). 
The Kasigua Corridor REDD+ Project in Kenya, run by Wildlife Works, for 
example, has been generating emission reductions since 2005 and has been 
exemplary in being the first REDD+ project to deliver validated, verified and 
issued VCS certification emission reductions (Wildlife Works, 2012). Other 
countries in East Africa are following this example, but Africa suffers substantial 
data gaps for forest carbon stocks (Glenday, 2006, FPAN, 2010, Mustalahti et al., 
2012, Romijn et al., 2012). While simple accounting methods can be, and often are, 
applied to calculate emission reductions potential in REDD+ feasibility studies, 
complex accounting methods are applied during project development and to meet 
carbon standards (Shoch et al., 2011). Resulting discrepancies in emission 
reductions between these estimates are likely to erode the credibility of a REDD+ 
project. It may not, therefore, be surprising that expectations of wealth transfer 
through REDD+ mechanisms have been high but not always forthcoming 
(Clements, 2010). 
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REDD+ may not be suitable to overcome the opportunity cost of private incentives 
driving deforestation in all situations. For REDD+ projects, if estimated revenues 
are insufficient to meet cost demands of REDD+ then other tools to fund forest 
conservation should be considered (Fisher et al., 2011). Conversely, climate change 
mitigation potential is lost where emission reductions are more substantial than a 
feasibility assessment would indicate. Uncertainty in emission reductions 
accounting must be quantified, reduced where possible, and communicated more 
appropriately (Waggoner, 2009, Baker et al., 2010). 
 
5.1.2. Aims and objectives 
 
Using a proposed REDD+ project in the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME) of 
Ethiopia, this paper quantifies the discrepancy between simple and complex forest 
carbon stock methods to estimate emission reductions. It then explores the 
potential REDD+ revenues under uncertainties in both forest carbon stock and 
market variables and the resultant implications for project implementation at the 
case study site. This paper adds to current knowledge through the collection of 
primary forest data and calculation of forest carbon stock in the BME. It also builds 
on a limited literature on the financial implications of emission reductions 
accounting discrepancies as well as implications on the environmental integrity of 
REDD+ projects.  
 
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Assessing carbon stocks and estimating emission reductions 
 
In the BME of Ethiopia a REDD+ project is being developed by the Oromia Forest 
and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE), with the support of the Bale Eco-Region 
Sustainable Management Program (BERSMP): a joint NGO program between 
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FARM-Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia (see Chapter 3 for a full project description). 
Ethiopia is not well known for REDD+ activities and East African forests are often 
characterised by miombo and acacia woodland; thus they are not as dense as 
rainforest of the Congo Basin or West Africa. The dry and moist, montane forests 
of East Africa, however, are gaining prominence for REDD+ project activities (see 
FPAN, 2010, Diaz et al., 2011).   
 
The proposed REDD+ project lies in the south eastern Ethiopian Highlands in 
Oromia Regional State between 50˚22'-80˚08'N and 38˚41-40˚44'E. The annual 
temperature of the Bale zone is 17.5˚C ranging from 10˚C to 25˚C, with annual 
rainfall of 875mm experienced in one long season between June and October, and 
one short rainy season between March and May (Yimer et al., 2006). Moist tropical 
forest is found between 2600 masl and 1500 masl, characterised by Hagenia 
abyssinica and wild coffee (Coffea arabica). North of the plateau habitats comprise of 
dry forest, woodlands, grasslands and wetlands, largely between 2500 masl and 
3500 masl. The dry forests contain high-value commercial species such as Juniperus 
procera and Podocarpus falcatus as well as Prunus africanus, a threatened species. The 
lower altitude land of the south east of the BME, below 1500 masl, is dominated by 
acacia woodland (Teshome et al., 2011, UNIQUE, 2008).  
 
The BME has deforestation rates four times the national average at 4% losses in 
forest area annually (Dupuy, 2009). Ethiopia is also in the top ten countries for 
forest loss in tropical Africa (FPAN, 2010). The main drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation in Ethiopia are small scale conversion to agriculture, large scale 
conversion to agriculture, and unsustainable forest management (R-PP, 2011). This 
pattern of exploitation is consistent over the BME, with rural communities rapidly 
deforesting to procure land for crops and livestock grazing and to meet livelihood 
needs through timber and firewood extraction (BERSMP, 2006, BMNP, 2007).  
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To address the decline in forest area, the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise 
(OFWE) are implementing CFM across all forests of the BME. Therefore, CFM is 
regarded here as a mechanism to implement the REDD+ project, alongside the 
creation of 15,000 hectares of woodlots and fuel efficient stoves to reduce 
household wood fuel demands (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 9 for a discussion on 
REDD+ via CFM). The project is in the early stages of development and secondary 
data in this paper is based on an early feasibility studies by forestry consultants 
UNIQUE (UNIQUE, 2008, UNIQUE, 2010). The estimates of required area for 
woodlots to meet household demands, however, are based on their expert 
judgement rather than through assessment of biomass needs per households. 
 
The project area covers 923,593 hectares, of which 60% is dry and moist tropical 
forest, the REDD+ project aims to reduce deforestation to 1% a year by project-year 
20 within this area. The decline in deforestation is predicted to be gradual as the 
project is implemented, with rates of deforestation slowed to 3% in years 1 to 5, 2% 
in years 6 to 10, and 1% in years 11 to 20. REDD+ revenue is generated from 
avoided deforestation only on dry and moist forest. The area of avoided 
deforestation amounts to 5,769 ha/yr in years 1-5, 11,537 ha/yr in years 6-10 and 
17,306 ha/yr in years 11 to 20. This amounts to 259,585 ha of avoided deforestation 
over the project lifespan. Although emission reductions generated on woodland 
are not sold, they still must be generated, thus the area of avoided deforestation 
including dry forest, moist forest and woodland amounts to 9,236 ha/yr in years 1-
5, 18,472 ha/yr in years 6-10 and 27,708 ha/yr in years 11 to 20: a total of 415,617 ha.  
 
As reported across wider Africa, local estimates of forest carbon stocks for use in 
modelling emission reductions from REDD+ in Ethiopia are few, and what exists is 
wide-ranging (FPAN, 2010). The IPCC present an Africa specific forest carbon 
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stock estimate of 122tC/ha in tropical moist forest and 56tC/ha in tropical dry 
forest, as well as estimates based on ecological zones of 85tC/ha in tropical moist 
forest and 61tC/ha in tropical dry forest (IPCC, 2006based on converting biomass 
to carbon using 0.47 carbon fraction of biomass). Gibbs et al. (2007) reviews forest 
carbon stock estimates across forest types in Africa with estimates in the range of 
30 to 200tC/ha. A later study estimated forest carbon stocks in Africa between 0 
and 454tC/ha, although only three countries are used to produce this estimate; 
Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Uganda (Baccini et al., 2008). Lewis et al. (2009) 
estimated forest carbon stocks from permanent plots across Africa with average of 
202 tC/ha. Ethiopia’s national average forest carbon stocks have been reported at 
37tC/ha and 47tC/ha (FAO, 2000, Brown, 1997). The national forest inventory of 
Ethiopia, however, is criticised for conflicting data (Teketay et al., 2010) and no 
estimates of forest carbon stock are known by the author for the BME. The country-
wide estimate, however, is predicted to underestimate forest carbon found in the 
BME REDD+ project area as a result to Ethiopia’s wide-ranging topography.  
 
Three forest carbon stock estimates were used to model emission reductions: 
1. Ecological zone specific forest carbon stock from the IPCC Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Good Practice Guidance (IPCC, 2003) 
2. Africa specific forest carbon stock from the IPCC Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use guidelines (IPCC, 2006) 
3. Primary estimate of forest carbon stock reliant on field sampling of above-
ground tree biomass in the BME.  
 
The application of default data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) illustrates simple forest carbon stock methods, whereas primary 
data collection in the moist and dry tropical forest of the BME represents more 
complex forest carbon stock methods. 
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The annual emission reductions generated by the BME REDD+ project can be 
represented by Equation 3. Where ERt,i are emission reductions in tons of carbon 
dioxide (tCO2) in year t, utilising forest carbon stock estimate Ci (tC/ha) where i can 
take the value of 1, 2 or 3, representing the three forest carbon stock estimates used 
to model emission reductions. DBAU is the annual business-as-usual (BAU) 
deforestation in a without project baseline in hectares; DREDD the area of 
deforestation (ha) during the project in year t; and 44/12 is the ratio of the 
molecular weight of carbon dioxide to that of carbon. 
 
( )
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The annual area of deforestation under a BME REDD+ project baseline, DREDD, is 
based on project goals to reduce deforestation below the annual BAU baseline in 
three stages. In years 1 to 5 DREDD is 3% as compared to DBAU of 4%, in years 6 to 10 
DREDD is 2%, and in years 11 to 20 DREDD is 1%. The total emission reductions 
generated by the project, Eproject, i (tCO2), can be represented by Equation 4 which 
sums annual emissions over the 20-year project lifespan.  
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5.2.1.1. Forest plots and carbon stocks 
 
Primary data collection was focussed on the above-ground tree biomass carbon 
pool. Containing the greatest fraction of total living biomass in a forest, this pool is 
most immediately impacted by deforestation and degradation (Brown, 1997, FAO, 
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2003). This estimate therefore omits below-ground carbon in tree roots, soil organic 
carbon, and that contained in dead wood and litter. The forest was stratified using 
satellite imagery by UNIQUE forestry consultants into: tropical moist degraded 
forest; tropical moist non-degraded forest; degraded tropical dry forest; degraded 
woodland; and non-degraded woodland. No non-degraded tropical dry forest 
remains (UNIQUE, 2008). Carbon stocks were assessed in all forest types except 
woodlands, which will act as a leakage belt under a REDD+ project and will not 
generate emission reductions for sale.  
 
Drawing on forest inventory protocols (MacDicken, 1997, Pearson et al., 2005, 
Greenhalgh et al., 2006), data were collected from 108 forest plots of 20m by 20m 
between December 2008 and April 2010 (see Figure 5, Chapter 4). Plots were 
dispersed across the study area, but limited to logistically accessible areas and 
regions for which permissions to undertake field sampling was granted by the 
Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development and village elders. The geo-
coordinates of forest plots were identified by overlaying 1km by 1km latitude and 
longitude grids on region maps, with random number generation used to identify 
crosshairs representing the centre of forest plots. Plots were then located on foot 
with a compass and a handheld global positioning system (Figure 6). Within each 
forest plot, the diameter at breast height (dbh) – or 1.3 metres above the ground – 
of all trees was recorded. Butress roots that obstructed dbh measurements were not 
encountered. In addition to dbh, canopy cover, the angle of the slope of the land, 
altitude and aspect were also measured. Tree saplings with dbh less than 5cm dbh 
were not measured; a lower limit of 5cm dbh was used to define a ‘tree’. 
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Figure 6. Example forest plot selection for degraded dry forest of Argafa.  
In selecting forest plots a grid was overlaid on a forest map and crosshairs numbered. Random 
number generation then determined the geo-coordinates of sampling points indicated by the 
numbered points. The points were then located by compass and handheld global positioning 
system. This map illustrates the plots located in Galema Hebano and Dera Honsho, both areas 
within Agarfa.  
 
5.2.1.2. Power analysis 
 
Logistical limitations of permissions and transport prevented a priori calculation of 
the sample size required to accept the estimate of mean forest carbon stocks with a 
particular level of confidence. Retrospective analysis following Pearson et al. (2005) 
was instead undertaken to illustrate the minimum number of plots required for the 
mean forest carbon stock estimate to be within an error bound of 20% of the mean 
with 95% probability. The error bound is that within which the mean can be found 
with probability 1-α, where α is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is true (or Type I error). The error bound E of the forest carbon stock 
estimate can be calculated using E=Cβ where C is the estimate of forest carbon 
stock and β is the precision: the half-width of the allowed error interval around the 
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mean expressed as a percentage of the mean. The precision is also the probability 
of not rejecting a false null hypothesis (or a Type II error), and from this the 
probability of finding a difference that does exist, or the power of a statistical test, 
can be calculated using 1-β.  
 
This retrospective power analysis can, therefore, establish the maximum predictive 
power achieved by the primary data collection and estimation of forest carbon 
stocks. Given that the total project area, total size of each forest strata, the forest 
plot area, and standard deviation of carbon stocks for each stratum is known, for L 
strata, n plots are required and can be calculated in Equation 5.  
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where, Nj is the maximum number of sample forest plots in stratum j, sj is the 
standard deviation for stratum j, NTOT is the maximum number of sample plots in 
the project area, E is the allowable error or the half-width of the desired error 
interval (calculated by multiplying mean carbon stock by the desired precision in 
percentage), and t is the sample statistic from the t-distribution for the 95% 
confidence level.  
 
Once n has been determined, the required distribution of plots across strata is 
shown by Equation 6. The actual number of plots sampled can then be compared 
to the number of plots estimated by this power analysis to achieve a forest carbon 
stock estimate with at least 20% precision with a 95% probability. 
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5.2.1.3. Biomass regression equations 
 
To determine carbon stocks, the above-ground biomass was first estimated per 
tree. This required the application of mixed species broadleaf regression equations, 
or allometric equations, for dry and moist tropical forest to dbh measurements. 
 
Few allometric equations exist in Sub-Saharan Africa for estimating biomass in 
trees and woodland (Henry et al., 2011, Shackleton and Scholes, 2011). Where 
available, site and species specific allometric equations allow better biomass 
estimation as they better capture heterogeneity in forest characteristics. While 95% 
of the variation in the above-ground tropical forest carbon stocks of trees can be 
explained by dbh (Brown, 2002), studies indicate that using measurements of tree 
height and wood density – the dry weight per unit volume of wood – in allometric 
equations can improve biomass estimates (Brown et al., 1989, Chave et al., 2005, 
van Breugel et al., 2011, Marshall et al., 2012). Height is often difficult to measure 
accurately in tropical forest, however, and studies of tropical forests often omit this 
variable. Henry et al. (2011) reviewed 850 allometric equations for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, finding only 15% of African allometric equations use height. The review 
also indicated that allometric equations do exist in Ethiopia, but many were for 
single species forests rather than mixed forests, and equations were of varying 
quality.  
 
Pan-tropical allometric equations were applied to estimate biomass (Brown, 1997; 
Table 4). Destructive tree sampling to generate site-specifc allometric equations 
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was not feasible at the case study site. Height measurements were also impractical 
with time restraints, and wood density estimates did not exist for the area. These 
allometric equations are not applicable to woodland and forest carbon stocks in 
woodland are therefore not estimated. Woodland allometry is under development, 
however, and Shirima et al. (2011) estimated mean above ground carbon storage in 
Tanzania’s miombo woodlands to be between 13-30tC/ha.  
 
Trees with diameters that exceeded the upper limit of the range used to create the 
regression equations were restricted to 148cm dbh as  Chave et al. (2005) found that 
tree allometry is conserved across sites in different continents and so regression 
models should be applicable in all forests, within their range of validity as 
determined by the maximum and minimum tree dbh used to generate the 
equation. Of 2698 measured living trees, 12 exceeded the limit of 148 cm dbh, 
implying the resultant carbon stock estimate may be an underestimate of forest 
carbon stock. Given that large diameter trees account for a large proportion of 
above-ground biomass (Brown, 2002), it is acknowledged that this is a further 
source of uncertainty that could be substantial. 
 
Table 4. Biomass regression equations applied to direct tree measurements in order to establish 
the above-ground tree biomass in forest plots.  
These equations are valid when applied to trees within the range of diameter at breast height (dbh) 
of trees used to generate the equations (sourced from Brown, 1997).  
 
Climatic Zone Equation Range in dbh (cm) 
Moist Forest Y = exp(-2.134+2.530ln(dbh)) 5-148 
Dry Forest Y = exp(-1.996+2.32ln(dbh)) 5-40 
 
Tree biomass was converted to carbon using a carbon fraction of 0.47 (IPCC, 2006). 
Forest carbon stock per hectare was established by adjusting plot areas for their 
average slope angle using cos (slope). This slope correction is necessary as forest 
area is estimated without taking topography into account. This correction 
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improves the likelihood that each quadrat contained the same total area as seen on 
a two-dimensional satellite image. 
 
The weighted mean of forest carbon stocks in non-degraded moist, degraded moist 
and degraded dry forest were calculated. Forest plots were randomly resampled 
with replacement 1000 times to obtain an empirical bootstrap distribution for forest 
carbon stock (Efron, 1979, Guan, 2003). Bootstrapped confidence intervals were 
established using the percentile method; where the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles 
constitute the limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
 
While natural variation in the forest ecosystem will always result in some 
uncertainty, in the final estimate of forest carbon stock, uncertainty arises from 
sampling error, measurement error, and that inherent in underlying equations and 
assumptions. Table 5 identifies these sources of uncertainty and the methods 
applied in this study to reduce uncertainty. This study focussed on sampling error 
as errors in measurement. The application of the allometric equation, and the ratio 
of biomass to carbon has been addressed elsewhere in the literature (Clark and 
Clark, 2000, Keller et al., 2001, Ketterings et al., 2001, Chave et al., 2004).  
 
5.2.1.4. Estimating emission reductions 
 
Estimated forest carbon stocks were utilised to estimate emission reductions, 
evaluated by the difference between a BAU deforestation baseline and an avoided 
deforestation REDD+ project baseline. The establishment of a BAU baseline relies 
on forest area and area change data as well as predictions of future drivers of 
deforestation. As noted in Baker et al. (2010), the IPCC guidance was not developed 
with REDD+ in mind and therefore does not deal with estimating a baseline (nor 
issues of leakage, additionality, and permanence). Methods to establish this 
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deforestation baseline are controversial and have been discussed in length 
elsewhere in the literature (see Olander et al., 2008, Huettner et al., 2009).  
 
Table 5. Inputs and sources of uncertainty in estimates of forest carbon stock as well as methods 
applied to reduce these uncertainties as far as possible.  
 
Input 
Source of 
uncertainty 
Method to reduce uncertainty 
Selection of 
forest plots 
Sampling error  
 
Forest plot geo-coordinates were selected using random 
number generation, but within logistical constraints, and 
good practice for sampling design and forestry 
inventory was followed (MacDicken, 1997, Pearson et 
al., 2005, Greenhalgh et al., 2006, Grassi et al., 2008). 
Measurement of 
dbh 
Measurement error  
 
Training and education in measurement of dbh was 
conducted to reduce measurement error. It was ensured 
that trees were not measured twice or dead trees 
counted as living. Measurement uncertainty on a single 
tree of diameter 10cm or greater has been estimated at 
16%, but found to average out at forest stand level 
(Chave et al., 2004) and so it is not addressed in this 
study. 
Application of 
allometric 
equation 
Estimation error: 
allometric 
equations 
originating from 
Asian and Latin 
American data 
Allometric uncertainty is not addressed here. Although 
acknowledged as a potential source of error, pan-
tropical equations are based on a large number of trees 
that span a range of dbh. As the destructive sampling of 
a sufficient number of trees to create an area-specific 
allometric regression equation was not possible, their 
application is appropriate. The dbh was, however, 
restricted to values used to create the regression 
equations. Error due to the application of the allometric 
equation is estimated at 10-20% and can be amplified 
where large trees are numerous (Clark and Clark, 2000, 
Keller et al., 2001, Ketterings et al., 2001, Chave et al., 
2004).  
Application of 
ratio of biomass 
to carbon 
Estimation error: 
the carbon content 
of biomass 
components and 
tree species differ 
The error of the carbon fraction is not addressed here. 
The IPCC (2006) present a default value of 0.47 for 
tropical and sub-tropical forest, but within an interval 
estimate of 0.44-0.49. This is an improvement on 0.5 
suggested by Westlake (1966), but suggests relative error 
of 5%.  
 
The BAU deforestation baseline for the BME was generated from GIS imagery 
analysed by the BERSMP and assumes a linear deforestation rate of 4% in all forest 
types. The uncertainty of this rate of loss is dependent on the resolution of GIS 
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imagery and method of image analysis, as well as assumptions regarding the rate 
and location of changes in forest area in the future. Research has shown that forest 
area data based on satellite imagery has accuracies between 80% to more than 99% 
(Achard et al., 2001, DeFries et al., 2007, Grassi et al., 2008, Gonzalez et al., 2010). In 
the (proposed) Bale Mountains National Park the accuracy of estimation of forest 
area follows these findings, ranging between 81% and 97% (Teshome et al., 2011).  
 
Deforestation resulting during implementation of the BME REDD+ project is based 
on stated project goals to reduce deforestation. These predictions of are subjective 
rather than based on past experience of intervention. Until the project in the BME 
progresses, estimating how much deforestation can be reduced as a result of 
REDD+ policies, actions and measures will continue be uncertain and models of 
emission reductions will need to be revised regularly as new information is 
acquired. 
 
It is acknowledged that this carbon accounting exercise is a static representation of 
the forest ecosystem in the BME. The methodology contains an inherent 
assumption of a steady state in mature forest. This assumption is still under debate 
and there is no easy way to assess if this is the case (Phillips et al., 1998, Houghton, 
2005, Bonan, 2008, Grote et al., 2011). Anthropogenic impacts on carbon stocks of 
forests are also ongoing and non-linear, which makes it difficult to differentiate 
between inter-annual variability in the forest ecosystem and indirect feedbacks 
from direct human activities (UNDP, 2009).  
 
In the case of avoided deforestation, it is common to assume that all carbon in 
biomass would be emitted to the atmosphere at the time of forest loss. It is possible 
that this may overestimate emission reductions where harvested wood products 
(HWPs) are manufactured (Lim et al., 1999, Karjalainen et al., 1999). In the BME, 
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HWPs are used in construction of housing and farm implements, however, as no 
consensus on accounting for HWPs exists (Winjum et al., 1998) the assumption that 
all carbon is emitted during deforestation is necessary.  
 
This study does not add to the debate on the definition of forest which varies by 
country. A lower limit of 5cm dbh was used to define a ‘tree’ and ‘forest’ was 
determined by the authors, and so no assumptions on canopy cover were made. 
The implications forest definition on the BAU deforestation baseline, and on 
emission reductions generated through forestry carbon activities and distribution 
of REDD+ funds between countries is addressed elsewhere (Neef et al., 2006, 
Zomer et al., 2008, Meridian Institute, 2009). The limitations of this study further 
highlight the research needs within forest carbon stock methods and for even more 
complex emission reductions accounting with advanced estimation approaches 
that involve complex models and highly disaggregated data on key forest carbon 
stocks through time (IPCC, 2006, Böttcher et al., 2009). 
 
5.2.2. Estimating revenues and REDD+ rent 
 
Taking the best- and worst-case emission reductions estimates, the potential 
revenues of the BME REDD+ project were calculated. The discounted REDD+ 
revenue can be expressed by Equation 7 where: πi is the profit in 2010 US$ over the 
20-year lifespan of the REDD+ project utilising forest carbon stock estimates 
denoted by subscript i; Et,i are the emission reductions generated by the project in 
year t (tCO2); B is the buffer of emission reductions expressed as a proportion; p is 
the price per ton of CO2 in US$; r is the registry cost per ton of CO2 in US$; A are 
the annual operating cost of the project in US$; δ is the discount rate; and, K is the 
upfront costs (US$) of project establishment experienced in project year 1. 
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Not all emission reductions generated by the project activities can be sold. Forestry 
carbon projects must account for the risk that emission reductions will not persist 
over time. Termed ‘permanence’, it is possible that forest carbon stocks could 
deteriorate or be depleted over time due to natural disturbances such as fire, pests 
and disease, or anthropogenic disturbances such as political instability leading to 
land-use change (see Sedjo and Marland, 2003). No assumptions are made 
regarding the liability for non-permanence, however see Chapter 9 where this is 
discussed in the context of the BME REDD+ project. In addition, leakage might 
relocate emissions outside of the woodlands and REDD+ project area. To deal with 
non-delivery risks of permanence and leakage, a non-tradable buffer, or reserve, of 
emission reductions is commonly set-aside as insurance (Peskett and Harkin, 
2007).  
 
In this study, 40% of emission reductions were set-aside for non-permanence, and 
a further 25% of emission reductions were set-aside in case of leakage. These 
buffers are at the higher ranges for project activities, and were chosen to reflect 
imminent infrastructure development, a history of forest fire, and potential land 
tenure disputes and political instability in the BME (UNIQUE, 2010).  
 
Remaining emission reductions were valued at predicted over-the-counter (OTC) 
voluntary carbon market prices. Although social costing of carbon would value 
emission reductions more highly at US$23/tCO2e (Tol, 2008), the voluntary carbon 
market is currently the only trading platform from which value can be realised 
from avoided deforestation. The OTC voluntary carbon market is motivated by 
corporate social responsibility and individuals wishing to contribute to a ‘solution’ 
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for climate change. In 2009, the price of emission reductions on the OTC ranged 
from US$0.30 to US$111/tCO2e, with an average price of US$6.50/tCO2e. In the 
following two years, average OTC prices have remained around US$6/tCO2e, 
although price ranges have remained wide. Volume weighted prices for REDD+ 
emission reductions were US$2.9/tCO2e in 2009, varying from approximately US$1 
to US$13/tCO2e, and lower than the previous three years. However, REDD+ 
emission reduction prices rebounded to US$5/tCO2e in 2010 and US$12 in 2011, 
but with large range in prices for emission reductions. For emission reductions 
from Africa, average 2009 prices are lower than those in 2006 and 2007, but since 
2009 prices have remained around US$8/tCO2e (Hamilton et al., 2007, Hamilton et 
al., 2008, Hamilton et al., 2009, Hamilton et al., 2010, Peters-Stanley et al., 2011, 
Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012; see Table 6).  
 
With no clear trend in the value of emission reductions from REDD+ or African 
projects, there is uncertainty in the price that can be expected for emission 
reductions from the BME REDD+ project. Early interest indicates that the first 
tranche of emission reductions could sell for US$3/tCO2e (UNIQUE, 2010). When 
the BME REDD+ project is certified to Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) standards, as is planned, 
emissions reductions might receive a price premium. In light of this, and current 
OTC market prices for emission reductions, potential revenues were predicted 
using both US$3 and US$6/tCO2e.   
 
The costs of generation and sale of emission reductions are subtracted from 
expected revenues to give the REDD+ revenues of the BME REDD+ project. The 
costs of listing the BME REDD+ emission reductions in a public register, which 
increases transparency of the voluntary carbon market, were estimated at 
$0.10/tCO2e. One-off costs of US$3,225,000 for REDD+ project establishment, 
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estimated by carbon consultancy UNIQUE (UNIQUE, 2010), were assumed to be 
experienced in year 1. Ninety-eight percent of this cost is for establishment of 
15,000 ha of woodlots to meet fuelwood demand in the BME, the remainder was 
for the establishment of CFM across the forest area; project design documentation 
development; and, validation to VCS and CCBA standards. Annual monitoring, 
verification, and operational costs of CFM, similarly estimated by consultants, of 
US$650,000 over the 14 woredas were also subtracted from sales revenues 
(UNIQUE, 2010). These costs estimates reflect other literature showing that REDD+ 
project implementation costs can be substantial (Cacho et al., 2005, Antinori and 
Sathaye, 2007, Nepstad et al., 2007, WCS, 2009). 
 
Table 6. Over the counter carbon price trends and markets.  
The Ecosystem Marketplace and Bloomberg New Energy Finance annually reports weighted 
averages of voluntary carbon market prices. Over-the-counter (OTC) market prices are presented 
with sample sizes and range where available (n). OTC prices are those of all locations and project 
types, REDD+ prices are for all locations, Africa prices are for all project types within the continent. 
Prices illustrate that the value of emission reductions is uncertain and without clear trends 
(US$/tCO2e) Source: Hamilton et al., 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; Peters-Stanley et al 2011; Peters-Stanley and 
Hamilton, 2012. 
 
 Carbon Price US$/tCO2e 
Year OTC REDD+ Africa  
2006 
4.1 (0.45-45) 
- 
14 (10-18) 
- 
18 (6-19) 
n=4 
2007 
6.1 (1.8-300) 
n=155 
4.8 (2-30) 
n=11 
13.7 (10-34) 
n=9 
2008 
7.34 (1.2-46.9) 
n=137 
6.3 (5-28) 
n=10 
5.1 (5-30) 
n=12 
2009 
6.5 (0.03-111)  
n=410 
2.9 (1-13) 
n=10 
8 (-) 
n=26 
2010 
6 (-) 
n=461 
5 (1-25) 
- 
9.1 (-) 
- 
2011 
6.2 (-) 
n=1798 
12 (-) 
- 
8 (-) 
n=12 
 
The REDD+ revenue over the 20-year project lifespan is then calculated in 2010 
US$ by applying a discount rate. The implications of discounting in the forestry 
sector have been reviewed by Hepburn and Koundouri (2007). They provide a 
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rationale for time-declining discount rates in long-term forestry projects to both 
increase intertemporal efficiency and intergenerational equity. However, they also 
conclude that a constant discount rate will generally be appropriate for short-term 
projects of 22 years or less. As the choice of constant discount rate does, however, 
remain influential on the net present value, both 5 and 10% discount rates are 
modelled in this study following Greig-Gran (2006) of the Stern Review (Stern, 
2007). 
 
It can be seen that the REDD+ revenue is an outcome that relies on uncertain 
inputs in addition to the forest carbon stock estimated in section 6.2.2. Table 7 
summarises these uncertainties and presents the method by which these 
uncertainties are addressed in this paper. Total uncertainty is communicated using 
an interval estimate of the possible values of REDD+ revenue that a REDD+ project 
in the BME could generate.  
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Table 7. Inputs and sources of uncertainty in profit assessment and methods by which 
uncertainty is dealt with in this study. 
 
Input 
Source of 
Uncertainty 
Method to deal with 
uncertainty 
Values used 
Project risk 
Uncertain 
impact and 
success of 
project 
A non-tradable buffer of 
emission reductions is set aside 
to deal with leakage (Sohngen 
and Brown, 2004) and non-
permanence (Sedjo and 
Marland, 2003) following 
requirements of the VCS (2007). 
Over time, it is possible that a 
portion of the buffer emissions 
could be sold. 
Under high project risks 
faced in the BME, 25% of 
emission reductions are set 
aside for leakage and 40% 
for permanence non-
delivery risk. Following the 
principle of 
conservativeness, it is 
assumed that none of the 
buffer is sold. 
Carbon Price 
Subjective 
judgement, 
Variability 
With uncertainty in future of 
forestry emission reductions in 
carbon markets, OTC voluntary 
carbon market prices are 
predicted from best-guess under 
current market circumstances. 
To illustrate the sensitivity 
to market price for emission 
reductions two carbon 
prices are modelled: 
US$3/tCO2e and 
US$6/tCO2e 
Costs of 
Implementation 
Subjective 
Judgement, 
Variability  
The implementation and 
transaction costs of REDD+ are 
often high and 
underappreciated (Grieg-Gran, 
2006, Nepstad et al., 2007, 
Boucher, 2008, Antinori and 
Sathaye, 2007, Böttcher et al., 
2009). Cost estimates therefore 
rely on expert judgement of the 
implementing agencies in the 
BME. 
Costs included in this 
analysis are:  
Registry costs of 
US$0.1/tCO2e; 
One off costs of 
US$11,475,000 to establish 
CFM; and 
annual costs of US$650,000, 
as predicted by (UNIQUE, 
2010). 
Discount rate 
Subjective 
judgement, 
Variability 
The choice of discount rate for 
environmental cost-benefit 
analysis and forestry is 
addressed in detail elsewhere 
(Weitzman, 1998, Pearce et al., 
2003, Groom et al., 2005, 
Hepburn and Koundouri, 2007). 
The sensitivity to variable 
discount rate is shown by 
modelling discount rates of 
both 5 and 10% following 
Greig-Gran (2006) in the 
Stern Review (Stern, 2007). 
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Carbon stock and emission reductions potential  
5.3.1.1. Forest carbon stock 
 
The dbh of 2698 trees were measured, with average of 35 trees per plot, with 
higher tree occurrence in moist non degraded forest (59). Both moist degraded 
forest (25) and dry forest plots had fewer trees (20) as expected. Four plots in moist 
forest had no trees present when the geo-coordinates were reached, reflecting 
either delay between imagery and survey, or misclassification of forest glades. 
 
Applying allometric equations to primary field data indicated the highest carbon 
stocks of 289tC/ha ± 108 (expressed as the 95% confidence interval of the mean) are 
found in moist non-degraded forest, followed by moist degraded forest at 199tC/ha 
± 54 and dry degraded forest at 132tC/ha ± 73 (Figure 7). The confidence interval of 
the mean of the forest carbon stock estimates is large, particularly for dry degraded 
forest, due to the small sample size (n=18) and large variation between plots. 
Despite this, non-parametric comparison of carbon stock between forest types 
shows a significant difference between forest types at the 5% level (Kruskall-
Wallis, K=6.942, df=2, p=0.0311*).  
 
High variation in above-ground forest carbon stocks has been observed elsewhere 
(Henry et al., 2011). This can be due to differences in temperature, precipitation 
and soil fertility as well as disturbance such as; selective wood harvest, ground 
fires, shifting cultivation, browsing and grazing (Houghton, 2005). Signs of human 
disturbance were observed in a number of plots ranging from pathways and 
evidence of grazing. Estimated canopy cover of the plots was 50% in dry forest, 
rising to 58% in moist forest. Some plots in moist forest contained very high carbon 
stocks as a result of the presence of high dbh trees.  
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Figure 7. Average forest carbon stocks by forest type.  
Shown with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals the highest forest carbon stocks are found in 
moist non-degraded forest, follwed by moist degraded and dry degraded forest in the Bale 
Mountains Eco-Region. 
 
The area weighted mean forest carbon stock across the forests of the BME is 
195tC/ha ± 81. Although forest carbon stock distribution is found to be non-normal 
for all forest types (Shapiro-Wilks for moist non-degraded forest n=32, W=0.77, 
p<0.000; moist degraded forest n=58, W=0.76, p<0.000; dry forest n=18, W=0.68, 
p<0.000), a more robust bootstrapped distribution that resampled with 
replacement 1000 times, gave a very similar result to the normal approximation 
(Table 8). 
 
The above-ground weighted mean forest carbon stock estimate from primary data 
is consistent with global forest ranges of 20 to 400 tC/ha reported by Hairiah et al., 
(2001), but substantially higher than published Ethiopia-wide data of 37tC/ha and 
47tC/ha (FAO, 2000, Brown, 1997). The all forest weighted mean is comparable to 
Africa wide estimates (Gibbs et al., 2007, Baccini et al., 2008, Lewis, 2009; see 5.2.1.) 
as well as forest carbon stock studies in the region. Glenday (2006) found forest 
carbon stocks of 330tC/ha in tropical moist forest in Kenya; although her estimates 
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include below-ground carbon stocks. Munishi et al. (2010) reported tropical moist 
forest in the Eastern Arc Mountains to be in the range of 252 and 581 tC/ha. 
Although, Marshall et al. (2012) more recently estimated forest carbon stocks at 
174.6tC/ha also in the Eastern Arc mountains of Tanzania.  
 
Table 8. Bale Eco-Region forest carbon stock by forest type.  
Comparing forest carbon stock mean and confidence intervals (tC/ha) between normal 
approximation and resampling with bootstrapped percentile confidence intervals, minimum and 
maximum carbon stock estimates are presented. 
 
Forest Type 
Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Min Max Normal 
approximation  
Bootstrap (1000 reps) 
Mean Upper CI Lower CI 
Moist Non-Degraded 
(n=32) 
289 ± 108 289 187 400 0 1439 
Moist Degraded 
(n=58) 
199 ± 54 199 148 258 0 1024 
Dry Degraded  
(n=18) 
132 ± 73 132 66 208 25 569 
All forest  
(weighted mean) 
195 ± 81 195 120 278 0 1439 
 
Comparing primary data forest carbon stock estimates to biome-averaged data 
from the IPCC LULUCF-GPG, in both moist and dry forest the default figures and 
the lower bound of the primary data confidence interval coincide. Simple defaults 
would however, underestimate the moist forest carbon stock of the BME by 
between 47% and 63% and dry forest carbon stock by an average of 56% (Table 9). 
This largely corresponds with GOFC-GOLD findings of 44% underestimate in 
forest carbon stocks in African rainforest moving from Tier 1 to Tier 3 methods 
(GOFC GOLD 2008). 
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Table 9. Comparison of primary data and documented biome-averaged forest carbon stocks.  
Comparison of primary data with default above-ground carbon stock estimates, by forest type, 
show the discrepancy between simple and complex forest carbon stock accounting (tC/ha). Default 
data sourced from IPCC, 2006; note that the Ecological Zone data has only a point estimate. 
 
 Primary Data Ecological Zone Specific Africa Specific 
Forest 
Classification 
tC/ha tC/ha 
As a % of 
primary data 
tC/ha 
As a % of 
primary data 
Tropical moist 
231 
(179-283) 
85 
(-) 
- 63% 
122  
(75-202) 
- 47% 
Tropical dry 
132 
(58-206) 
61 
(-) 
-54% 
56  
(56-61) 
- 58% 
 
5.3.1.2. Power analysis 
 
The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate relative uncertainty of 37% in 
moist non-degraded forest, 28% in moist degraded forest and 53% in dry forest or 
39% over all forest types. Comparing this error to Africa specific default data 
provided by the IPCC (2006), the interval estimate gives relative uncertainty of 
46% in moist forest to 4% in dry forest (adjusting to assume symmetrical 
confidence intervals). Retrospective power analysis, using Equations 5 and 6, was 
used to determine the minimum number of forest plots required in the BME to say 
with 95% certainty that the results have precision of 20%: the allowable error 
interval is within 20% of the mean. Table 10 gives the value of variables used in the 
calculations for the BME as outlined in Pearson et al. (2005). 
 
The required number of plots using the standard deviation of primary data was 
calculated at 108. While the total number of plots concurs with the total plot 
numbers required to achieve 80% power, the actual number of plots completed 
exceeded that required in dry forest and were less than that required in moist 
degraded forest (Table 11). This implies that dry forest has precision level between 
20% and 30%, while moist degraded forest has precision between 10% and 15%. 
The estimate for moist non-degraded forest can be assumed with maximum 
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precision of at least 20%. This concurs with the actual findings of precision 
estimated through calculating the standard error as a percentage of the mean; 19% 
in moist non-degraded forest, 14% in moist degraded, 28% in dry degraded forest. 
The sampling error of the primary field data is, therefore, much higher than Chave 
et al. (2004) who reports sampling error of 10% of the mean but is within the 
bounds of sampling errors expected for ecological studies of relatively small 
sample size.  
 
Table 10. Variables used to calculate the number of plots required for statistical rigour in the 
Bale Mountains Eco-Region  
 
Abbreviation Description Value 
N maximum number of sample plots in the project area 1442 
Ni maximum number of sample forest plots in stratum i 
215, moist degraded 
621, moist non-
degraded 
606, dry forest 
si standard deviation for stratum i 
211, moist degraded 
312, moist non-
degraded 
159, dry forest 
E 
allowable error or the desired half-width of the error 
interval, as calculated by multiplying the non-weighted 
mean carbon stock by the desired precision of 20%  
21.4 
t 
sample statistic from the t-distribution for the 95% 
confidence level 
1.96 
L Number of forest strata 3 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8, to increase the precision of the forest carbon stock 
estimate to 10% would require data from three times as many, or 347, forest plots. 
It can also be seen that 108 plots is also past the point where the curve begins to 
level out, and there are diminishing gains to precision as sample size increases.  
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Table 11. Ex-post assessment of the number of forest plots required and those completed.  
Logistical limitations meant that retrospective sample size analysis was conducted and although 
total number of plots concur with required plot numbers at 20% precision with 95% confidence, 
plot number exceeded that required in dry forest and were less than that required in moist 
degraded forest.  
 
Forest Strata Area (ha) 
Carbon 
Stock  
(tC/ha) 
Standard 
Deviation (s) 
Plots 
Required 
(n) 
Plots 
Completed 
All 576,856 214 242 108 108 
Moist Degraded 86,101 289 211 15 32 
Moist non-
degraded 
248,350 199 312 62 58 
Dry  242,405 132 159 31 18 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Power curve showing the total number of forest plots required to accept the outcome 
with particular level of confidence.  
The figure demonstrates that 108 forest plots will achieve power of 80%, or 20% precision, and that 
increasing this precision to 10% would require 347 forest plots to be surveyed. 
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5.3.1.3. Emission reduction estimation 
 
Estimating the cumulative emission reductions generated over a 20-year project 
lifespan, primary data give results more than twice as high as those generated 
using IPCC ecological zone default data; 180,272 ktCO2 compared to between 
71,305 and 89,723 ktCO2 using ecological zone and Africa specific data, respectively 
(Table 12). These estimates support existing findings that local estimates give 
higher emission reduction estimates (Grassi et al., 2008, Pelletier et al., 2010, Preece 
et al., 2012).  
 
Table 12. Comparison of annual and cumulative emission reduction estimates illustrating the 
discrepancy between simple and complex forest carbon stock accounting.  
Annual emission reductions (tCO2e) figures illustrate the increasing protection of forest and 
reduction of the deforestation rate.  
 
Emission Reductions (tCO2e) Primary Data 
Ecological Zone 
Specific 
Africa Specific 
Annual emission 
reductions 
Years 1-5 4,006,040 1,584,661 1,993,849 
Years 6-10 8,012,080 3,169,103 3,987,698 
Years 11-20 12,018,121 4,753,654 5,981,547 
Cumulative Emission 
Reductions 
180,271,808 71,304,816 89,723,208 
 
5.3.2. Revenues and profit 
 
The difference between REDD+ profits estimated using primary data and IPCC 
Ecological Zone default data, the lower of the two default estimates, is substantial. 
Primary data suggest that after costs, a REDD+ project in the BME could bring in 
an estimated US$48 million as compared to US$9 million using default data with a 
conservative market price of US$3/tCO2e and a 10% discount rate (Table 13). It 
should be noted that reported returns are pre-tax and no assumptions have been 
made about the sharing of revenues between the various forest stakeholders, as 
these details are yet to be decided by the REDD+ project developers. 
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Calculating REDD+ revenue per hectare, positive net revenues are generated under 
both simple and complex forest carbon stock methods. Shared over all conserved 
ha of forest, primary data estimates generate between US$115 and US$445/ha 
depending on the area under consideration, the carbon price and discount rate 
chosen. Default, secondary data returns are less substantial over the same area at 
between US$21 to US$152/ha (Table 13). In fact, the cumulative REDD+ revenues 
show that using secondary data with US$3/tCO2e and a 10% discount rate, the 
project does not break even until year 6 (Figure 9).  
 
Table 13. Net present value of profits under different forest carbon stock methods. 
Calculated by subtracting the costs of REDD+ project implementation from revenues generated 
through sale of emission reductions. Two prices are modelled, US$3 and US$6, and two discount 
rates (5 and 10%) are presented and net profits given in 2010 US$. 
 
 
 
Primary Data Ecological Zone IPCC default 
Carbon Price US$6 US$3 US$6 US$3 
Discount Rate 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Profit US$ (000) 184,978 113,607 82,671 47,591 63,359 35,129 22,893 9,017 
REDD+ 
revenue 
(US$/ha) 
conserved 
moist and 
dry forest 
713 438 318 183 244 135 88 35 
all 
conserved 
forest 
445 273 199 115 152 85 55 21 
all forest 200 123 90 52 69 38 25 10 
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Figure 9. Estimated projected cumulative profits over the Bale Mountains Eco-Region REDD+ project lifespan showing primary and secondary IPCC 
data under variable carbon price and discount rates (DR). 
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5.4. Discussion 
 
Comparing primary data from the BME to default forest carbon stock given by 
the IPCC, however, reveals a large discrepancy between Tier 1 and an 
estimation of forest carbon stock through tree measurements. Primary data 
estimated area-weighted average forest carbon stock of 195tC/ha ± 81, ranging 
from 298tC/ha in non-degraded tropical moist forest to 132tC/ha in tropical dry 
degraded forest. Secondary data, therefore, underestimated carbon density by 
as much as 63% in combined moist forest and 58% in dry forest. This scale of 
discrepancy is higher than the 44% for African rainforest reported in GOFC-
GOLD (2008) but, in the same direction as four of the five comparisons that the 
GOFC-GOLD project made in tropical rainforest. These results suggest that 
diversity of forests is not sufficiently captured by the twenty ecological zones 
and four climate domains encompassed by the IPCC data (IPCC, 2006). Thus 
Tier 1 does not meet the call of the IPCC for accurate emission reductions 
accounting that is neither an under nor an overestimates, with uncertainties 
reduced where possible (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The application of biome-
averages appear to underestimate forest carbon stock at the project site. 
 
Findings also confirm high uncertainty surrounding the use of mean estimates. 
The 95% confidence intervals for primary forest carbon stock estimates are, on 
average, 39% of the forest strata mean. The large uncertainty results in the 
overlap of the lower confidence interval bounds of primary data with upper 
bounds of the secondary data interval. The total uncertainty of forest carbon 
density estimates is likely to have been even higher if measurement and 
estimation errors were included this study. While increasing sample size can 
also improve the precision of forest carbon stock estimates in this case, it would 
take three times as many forest carbon plots to achieve precision of 10% rather 
than 20%. Given the substantial time and resource requirements of field data 
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collection, the costs of increasing the statistical power of forest carbon stock 
estimates may, therefore, be greater than the benefits given diminishing returns 
to sampling effort.  
 
The discrepancy between accounting methods leads to more than a two-fold 
difference in potential emission reductions from a REDD+ project in the BME. 
At a voluntary carbon market price of US$3 and discount rate of 10%, this 
difference in emission reductions is worth close to US$39 million over the 
project lifespan, even after project costs and project delivery risks have been 
accounted for. Despite the fact that emissions accounting using simple biome-
averaged data can be undertaken immediately for low or no cost, which has 
made them an attractive option in developing countries, there are clear financial 
incentives for investing finance and time, and building the capacity to gather 
primary data. However, with costs of reducing uncertainty rising as methods 
become more data-intensive, trade-offs may emerge. Tools such as sensitivity 
analysis could be employed to identify components with the most impact on 
total uncertainty which can then be prioritised (Elston, 1992). With the 
popularity of REDD+ partially dependent on the transfer of finance from 
developed to developing countries, more complex accounting can also ensure 
that rewards for reducing deforestation and degradation are of appropriate 
scale.   
 
Despite differences between accounting methods and subsequent revenues, 
models predicted net positive profits at the end of the 20-year BME REDD+ 
project lifespan. Best case returns were US$445/ha while worst case returns 
were US$21 per hectare of avoided deforestation in dry forest, moist forest and 
woodland. Even though the financial calculation does not include tax that 
might be taken by federal and regional government or payments to forest 
stakeholders which have yet to be negotiated, the returns to investment in the 
BME REDD+ project are positive. Given that finance for forest conservation in 
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the BME is low and currently largely donor funded, even small net positive 
revenue from this forest management strategy may be a sufficient argument for 
implementing REDD+. This is further supported by the fact that the 
implementation of REDD+ through CFM also intends to shift forest resource 
use onto a sustainable path from the current unsustainable one. Decisions on 
whether to implement REDD+ may therefore not rely on completely of cost-
benefit feasibility analyses. This decoupling of REDD+ policy decisions and 
cost-benefit analysis is evidenced by many cases where the costs of REDD+ 
project and policy development are being absorbed by intermediaries or met 
through donor finance.  
 
While this paper considers project-based REDD+ financed through the VCM, 
whatever a future REDD+ mechanisms looks like, there is a need to understand 
carbon stocks better. Verchot et al. (2012) report slow progress to generate new 
data for GHG inventories from forests and the capacity of countries to 
implement higher tier inventories. Expecting all countries to be able to 
undertake higher Tier accounting in the near term might be infeasible, but 
ensuring that countries are making efforts to do so will speedy up the process. 
This study, therefore, makes a case for earmarking a portion of international 
finance flowing to prepare countries for a REDD+ mechanism for reducing 
uncertainty and improving national forest inventories through long-term 
institutional backing and resources. This can come from dedicated REDD+ 
initiatives such as UN-REDD and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, but also through a number of other climate finance initiatives 
supporting REDD+ (Climate Funds Update, 2011).  
 
This Chapter emphasises the uncertainty in emission reductions accounting for 
REDD+ projects. It is not intended to offer authoritative results on the carbon 
stocks of the Bale Mountains; further study could improve forest carbon stock 
estimates by increasing sample sizes and through the testing or development of 
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allometric equations. With large discrepancy and no standardisation of 
methods to estimate forest carbon stocks, expected emissions reductions may 
not actually be realised due to the choice of method of accounting rather than 
changes in actual forest carbon stock. If this occurs then the environmental 
integrity, and so credibility, of a REDD+ mechanism will be called into question. 
There is, therefore, a need to improve the quantification of uncertainty, 
reduction of uncertainty where possible and better communication so that 
uncertainty forms part of policy decisions. Reducing the sectors reliance on the 
conservativeness principle to deal with uncertainty in emission reductions 
accounting will aid a more appropriate handling of uncertainty. While the 
conservativeness principle will remain important to ensure emission reductions 
are not overestimated, it should not preclude the quantification and 
communication of forest carbon stock uncertainties.  
 
Dealing with decision-making under uncertainty is not novel in climate change 
policy (see Webster et al., 2002). Under UNFCCC negotiations, countries are 
encouraged but not obliged to include uncertainty estimates in their national 
communications to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2002). While highly uncertain 
accounting might be acceptable for national communications, it is insufficient 
for a performance-based incentive mechanism like REDD+. Although additional 
costs will be incurred to reduce uncertainty, and trade-offs between factors in 
the accounting process may be introduced, the financial incentives for 
improved emission reductions accounting are clear.  
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Chapter 6: Household heterogeneity in forest income and the 
opportunity cost of forest conservation  
 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Problem statement 
 
There are growing calls for community forest management (CFM) to be used a 
policy mechanism to deliver REDD+ (Klooster and Masera, 2000, Murdiyarso 
and Skutsch, 2006, Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, Hayes and Persha, 2010). CFM 
establishes a common property regime where members of a well-defined group 
of forest users establish collective regulations for resource use, membership, 
monitoring, and sanctioning procedures (Arnold, 2001, Baland and Platteau, 
2003, Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009). It has been shown that CFM can lead to 
reductions in GHG emissions where forest use becomes more sustainable 
(Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009, Skutsch and Ba, 2010). Thought to inherently 
address the livelihood needs of communities, REDD+ via CFM could reduce the 
risks and associated costs of dealing with the displacement of emissions outside 
of the project area, termed leakage (Smith and Scherr, 2003). Research is also 
emerging that indicates that the costs of MRV and community enforcement of 
forest conservation regulations can also be lower under CFM than the 
equivalent labour and administration requirements provided by professionals 
and central forest departments (Somanathan et al., 2009, Palmer Fry, 2011). 
 
REDD+, however, emerged as a PES scheme whereby the environmental service 
of carbon dioxide emission reductions are sold, through a voluntary 
transaction, and payment is conditional upon the provision of that service 
(Wunder, 2005). This view of REDD+ as a PES scheme predominantly discusses 
a mechanism with direct, output based payments that are strongly additional 
and conditional on continued service provision (see Santilli et al., 2005, Parker 
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et al., 2008, Bond et al., 2009). Such theory of PES works best where there are 
well-defined buyers and providers with clear property rights; thus property 
rights are a foremost issue in PES (Wunder, 2007, Engel and Palmer, 2008, 
Clements et al., 2010). With voluntary enrolment into a local-level PES scheme, 
theory predicts that households will not engage with a REDD+ scheme with 
voluntary participation at the household level if their costs of participation are 
not met (Wünscher et al., 2008). Although it is also known that decisions to 
participate in PES will also be driven by non-use values and individuals 
preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and conformity with the wider community 
(Velez et al., 2009; see also Chapter 8). It has been proposed that an estimate of 
the private opportunity costs (OCs) of forest conservation could be used to 
anchor the level of payment needed to achieve the desired level of forest 
conservation for REDD+ (Pirard, 2008, Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008, Pagiola and 
Bosquet, 2009, White and Minang, 2011).  
 
Estimates of the OCs of forest conservation are predominantly based on 
agricultural productivity as the main driver of deforestation. These are 
estimated as forgone revenues per hectare, thus the OCs of land (e.g. Chomitz 
et al., 2005, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Börner et al., 2009). The OCs of land 
resulting from other drivers of deforestation such as; logging, cattle ranching or 
small-scale staple crop and fuelwood collection, are less frequently assessed. 
Fisher et al. (2011) is rare in considering the OCs of charcoal production on land 
as well as of agriculture; finding the OCs of agriculture to exceed those of 
charcoal per hectare of forest in the districts across Tanzania. Karky and 
Skutsch (2010), in considering the abatement costs of REDD+ via CFM in Nepal, 
note that households may incur OCs of agricultural land, but will also 
experience the impacts of restrictions on their use of fuelwood, fodder, timber 
and NTFP. Although they do not estimate per hectare values, they suggest that 
the OCs of agriculture may not be the appropriate measure to gauge incentives 
for REDD+. It is also clear that forgone agricultural benefits may be somewhat 
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offset by the benefits that standing forest can continue to provide through 
NTFPs, but also a host of other use and non-use values (see also Chapter 8). 
 
The PES literature has afforded less attention to community-level PES than PES 
negotiated with private individuals (Muradian et al., 2010). Community-level 
PES schemes provide payment at the community level, such as in Mexico where 
the national Programme of Payments for Biodiversity, Carbon and Agroforestry 
Services distributes funds to communities from the government (Corbera and 
Brown, 2008). Others provide in-kind payments including, clinics, schools, 
public transport and infrastructure (Sommerville et al., 2009). This contrasts 
with PES schemes that typically operate on a per hectare payment where 
individual land rights can be established (Engel et al., 2008).  
 
Community level payments are often made when the attribution of costs and 
benefits to one household or individual is complex. In undertaking REDD+ via 
CFM this will be the case. Multiple members of the CFM group will overlap in 
their use of the forest, all members of the CFM group will have legitimate forest 
use rights and it is not clear who would have deforested under the status quo, 
either for agriculture or via other unsustainable practices. The resulting 
difficulty in establishing costs and benefits on any hectare, and to a particular 
household, complicates the establishment of a payment level. This is 
particularly true given that the literature on household income from forest 
resources shows that reliance on forests and households returns from 
agriculture are highly heterogeneous even within a small geographical area 
(Godoy and Lubowski, 1992, Byron and Arnold, 1999, Cavendish, 2000, Coomes 
et al., 2004, Dovie et al., 2005).  
 
It is worth noting that many PES schemes implemented in developing countries 
find environmental service provision hard to attribute to individuals. As a 
result, payments are commonly uniform and input-based with indirect and in-
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kind incentives; but this is especially so where PES operates at a community 
level (Sommerville et al., 2009, Southgate et al., 2009, Skutsch et al., 2011).  
 
Studies that consider the OCs of forest conservation have often deliberately 
excluded forests that are de facto common pool resources. Some note that use 
and deforestation on such common pool resources are often forbidden by 
statutory law (e.g. Grieg-Gran, 2006, Börner and Wunder, 2008). It is, therefore, 
suggested that the OCs of land may be an inappropriate measure for 
assessment of the feasibility of REDD+ policy as either illegal behaviours would 
be rewarded or emission reductions may not be additional (Börner and 
Wunder, 2008). It is for this reason that Wünscher et al. (2008), in their 
calculation of OCs of forest conservation, assume natural forest produces no 
commercial income. The costs incurred by the government of improving laws 
and law enforcement have in some cases been considered more relevant than 
the OCs of land for forest users in planning interventions where forest use is 
illegal (Börner and Wunder, 2008, Busch et al., 2009, Gregersen et al., 2010).  
 
Under CFM, however, communities are recognised as forest management 
agents and legally become environmental service providers. A common 
property regime is established, often on previously de facto common pool 
resources. Despite the complexity, the quantitative assessment of the OCs of 
forest conservation under a CFM regime can, therefore, still be used to provide 
information on the private economic incentives that need to be overcome to 
generate the desired level of conservation, and so to help assess payment levels 
and implementation design. Appreciating the heterogeneity in OCs could, at 
the least, inform obligations to ensure that REDD+ projects ‘do no harm’ to 
forest communities (e.g. Griffiths, 2007, CCBA, 2008, Griffiths, 2009).  
 
In considering the OCs of forest conservation for REDD+ on community forest 
lands in the Brazilian Amazon, Nepstad et al. (2007) propose the creation of a 
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Public Forest Stewardship Fund for avoided deforestation on ‘social’ forest 
reserves comprising 26% of the area’s forests, including indigenous lands, 
extractive reserves, and sustainable development reserves. From this fund, it is 
proposed that direct uniform payments should be made to households of these 
communities anchored to half a minimum salary at US$1200 per year. A 
uniform payment for REDD+ via CFM that is not linked to the OCs of forest 
conservation for stakeholders, however, is more of a ‘PES-like’ scheme, in 
which the voluntary or conditional nature of the payment is relaxed (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002, Wunder, 2008). Uniform payments in PES, however, are 
not able to account for heterogeneity in the OCs of forests conservation. The 
conditionality of the payment on service provision is reduced and the 
additionality of the emission reductions can also be called into question if 
payments are in excess of forgone benefits. Alternatively, payments may be 
insufficient to fully overcome the OCs of those most involved in damaging 
activities. With the potential to make households worse off if this is the case, it 
may threaten the longevity, and thus permanence, of REDD+ via CFM.  
 
In Ethiopia a project to generate REDD+ through CFM is being undertaken in 
the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (BME; see Chapter 3 for a full description of the 
Bale REDD+ Project). A number of national REDD+ strategies submitted to 
multilateral initiatives financing REDD+ activities, such as the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), are also pursuing REDD+ via CFM 
(see FCPF, 2011). If CFM continues to be a favoured approach for implementing 
REDD+, there is a need for more empirical research into the impacts of REDD+ 
via CFM on households’ OCs and into the mechanisms by which PES-type 
interventions can operate in a common property regime. Empirical, ex-ante 
assessment of the OCs of forest conservation at the case study site can give a 
greater understanding of the incentives that drive deforestation. These 
assessments can also inform the Bale REDD+ Project design. If the magnitude 
and heterogeneity of the OCs of REDD+ via CFM are not sufficiently addressed 
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in payments to communities, the longevity of the intervention, the permanence 
of emission reductions and thus climate change mitigation benefits are called 
into question.  
 
6.1.2. Aims and objectives 
 
This chapter uses primary cross-sectional data gathered from household 
surveys in southwest Ethiopia to estimate household forest income and 
heterogeneity in forest use. Household income from agriculture is also 
established. Multivariate regression is used to investigate the determinants of 
household income from forest use and agriculture. The OCs of forest 
conservation under the proposed Bale REDD+ Project are then estimated as the 
forgone income from a hectare of agricultural revenues and the forgone 
revenues from forest products at the case study site. As an ex-ante study, these 
OC estimates are discussed with a view to understanding how the design of a 
proposed Bale REDD+ Project, achieved via CFM, might capture income 
heterogeneity in payment incentives. The study adds to the limited literature on 
the OCs of forest conservation, particularly the OCs of REDD+ via CFM. I also 
contribute to the limited literature on community-level PES, with wider 
implications for REDD+ via CFM in tropical forests.  
 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Household income from forests and agriculture in the Bale Mountains 
 
Through household surveys information about a household’s use of the forest, 
agricultural production and other economic activities were elicited. From these 
household surveys the income from the previous years’ crop production and 
forest products was estimated using market price valuation. Total household 
income was not estimated as income from other sources such as livestock and 
trade were not valued (see Chapter 4). Income is defined here as the return to 
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capital and labour that a household has access too. It includes both products 
consumed at home as well as those sold on markets. To reported products and 
yields, local-market prices were applied (see Appendix 2).  
 
It was not possible to establish the shadow price for each household, such as 
through embedded time or barter values (see Section 4.5.5). Being able to 
attribute a shadow price to each household for each product would provide a 
more accurate estimate of income. The estimated income may, therefore, be an 
overestimate. However, market prices were applied from local markets which 
had no entry restrictions or middle men, in an attempt to minimise 
overestimation. In establishing OCs the main input costs were subtracted. The 
agricultural income established was net of inputs including fertiliser, seed and 
equipment, which were estimated as costs by the survey respondents, however, 
the costs of household labour were not subtracted. The main input for forest 
products was labour and was not subtracted. As noted in Section 4.3, the 
market wage was not a good measure of the shadow wage and resources were 
insufficient to estimate the shadow wage indirectly. 
 
Forest income was separated into two types of forest products based on broad 
assumptions about their impact on the Bale REDD+ Project. Timber and 
fuelwood are considered high-impact forest products as they involve the 
removal of large amounts of biomass from the forest. Bamboo, coffee, climber 
and honey are considered low-impact forest products, as they perceived to 
remove lower amounts of biomass when harvested. These broad categorisations 
are in line with the Bale REDD+ Project intentions to impose forest product use 
restrictions on high-impact forest product extraction and none on low-impact 
forest product extraction. It is acknowledged, however, that further research 
would need to be conducted on their wider impact on biomass, such as of 
cultivation and harvest method, and thus on emission reductions. For example, 
high-impact forest products such as timber, can still be sustainable if harvest is 
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less than growth, and the production of forest coffee may lead to losses in 
biomass if canopy cover is altered. Schmitt et al. (2009), for example, consider 
wild forest coffee management in the southwest of Ethiopia. They find that 
natural forest yields of coffee are lower than in semi-managed systems where 
canopy cover is and undergrowth vegetation is removed.  
 
6.2.2. Econometric analysis 
 
An understanding of what drives household incomes allows a more detailed 
exploration of how households will be impacted by the Bale REDD+ Project 
intervention. Household’s income from agricultural production, and from 
forests, disaggregated into low-impact and high-impact forest income, is 
regressed against predicted determinants. This enables the OC estimates to be 
placed in the context of the proposed Bale REDD+ Project intervention.  
 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is used to investigate the 
determinants of a household’s income from high-impact forest products and 
agricultural production. Continuous income variables were log transformed to 
allow for a non-linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. The log transformation also normalises the residuals and reduces 
potential outliers. A Logit and a Tobit regression were used to determine 
household income from low-impact forest products. These model specifications 
were necessary as 50% of the households in the sample did not have income 
from biomass conserving forest products, neither for home consumption nor 
sale, but where they did the income was a continuous random variable with 
positive values. The Logit model predicts the presence or absence of income 
from low-impact forest products with a binary, yes or no, response. Tobit, on 
the other hand, predicts the probability of being above zero and the 
determinants if the income is greater than zero (see Chapter 4 for a description 
of the regression models). 
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The explanatory variables used in the regression models were selected based on 
their predicted impacts on agricultural or forest production. Observable socio-
economic factors expected to influence a household’s forest and crop incomes 
are hypothesised to be; household size (HH-size), education of the household 
head (education), age as equated by the number of years the household head 
has lived in the village (village_years), and the number of livelihood sources 
that respondents reported to derive income from (livelihood_sources). The 
existence of alternative sources of income is predicted to reduce income from 
any single source (Godoy et al., 1997, Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). 
However, it is not assumed that other income sources have equivalent impacts 
on income; some might generate proportionally higher revenues.  
 
Village dummy variables were included to control for unobserved but constant 
variation across survey locations (Agarfa and Goro). These variables and their 
justifications are discussed in Table 15. A correlation matrix showing the degree 
of dependence posed by a linear relationship was established for the 
explanatory variables; no strong colinearity between any of the independent 
regressors was observed (Table 14).  
 
Table 14. Correlation matrix of independent variables.  
Correlation coefficients describing the degree of relationship between the variables used to 
predict household (HH) income from low-impact forest products (lifp) and high-impact forest 
products (hifp).  
 
 h
h_
si
ze
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
vi
lla
ge
_y
ea
rs
 
liv
el
ih
oo
d_
so
ur
ce
s 
hh_size 1    
education -0.14 1   
village_years 0.12 -0.35 1  
livelihood_sources -0.02 0.07 0.00 1 
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Table 15. Explanatory variables for household income.  
Description, hypothesised impact and justification for variables used to explore household 
(HH) income from forest products. + denotes a positive impact, - a negative impact, 0 a neutral 
impact and n/a a determinant not included in the regression analysis. High-impact forest 
products (hifp) include timber and fuelwood, low-impact forest products (lifp) include bamboo, 
climber, coffee, and honey.  
 
Explanator
y variable 
Description 
Hyp impact 
Justification 
lif
p 
hi
fp
 
cr
op
 
HH_size The total number of 
people in the household 
+ + + 
Larger households have a larger 
labour force and labour is a dominant 
input for forest product harvesting 
(Davies and Richards, 1999). Crop 
production has also been shown to 
increase with labour and HH food 
requirements (Godoy et al., 1997). 
education 
The number of years of 
education of the HH head 
ranging from 0 to 13 
years 
+ 0 + 
Education is expected to increase pro-
conservation behaviours as well as 
improving knowledge and skills to 
extract forest products more 
sustainably and cultivate land more 
intensively (Godoy and Contreras, 
2001, Adhikari et al., 2004). 
village_yea
rs 
The number of years the 
HH head has lived in the 
village  
+ - + 
Experience through age and through 
knowledge gained during length of 
residence is expected to increase pro-
conservation behaviour, thus lifp, as 
well as crop value through better land 
practices. In contrast youth is likely to 
represent physical strength more 
appropriate for hifp (Mamo et al., 
2007). 
livelihood_
sources 
The number of sources of 
income the HH has 
including; agriculture, 
forest products, livestock, 
trade, remittance, and 
paid labour 
- - - 
The existence of alternative sources of 
income is predicted to reduce income 
from any single source (Godoy et al., 
1997, Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). 
agarfa 
Location dummy 
variable; 1= Afarfa, 0= 
not Agarfa Dummy variables for location were included in the 
model to control for village and forest type fixed 
effects. 
goro 
Location dummy 
variable; 1= Goro, 0= not 
Goro 
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6.2.3. The opportunity costs of forest conservation 
6.2.3.1. The opportunity costs of forest products 
 
Under the proposed Bale REDD+ Project, households will move from the open 
access status-quo to the proposed CFM, common property regime. A 
cooperative of households will be required to negotiate a Forest Management 
Agreement with the forest government agency that outlines resource use and 
deforestation restrictions as well as household responsibilities (see Chapter 3 
for a more detailed discussion on the Bale REDD+ Project design and case study 
site).  
 
Under Forest Management Agreement, to prevent the loss of forest cover, 
households will be limited in their collection of timber and fuelwood; 
collectively termed high-impact forest products. Households will be allowed to 
continue to gather forest coffee, honey, bamboo and climbers; collectively 
termed as low-impact forest products. The complete by-laws of forest use had 
not yet been negotiated with the forest government agency and the community 
at the time of the survey. These would dictate the restrictions on the households 
for high-impact forest products.  It was necessary to assume, therefore, that all 
high-impact forest products were restricted. Predominantly as by-laws have yet 
to be agreed, and secondly as restrictions are difficult to relate to household 
harvests. For example, if fuelwood collection is restricted to deadwood for three 
days a week, it is not clear what proportion reduction this would have on a 
household. 
 
The OCs of forest conservation were estimated as a total ban on harvesting of 
all high-impact forest products and with no restrictions on low-impact forest 
products. As households need to access fuelwood and alternative energy 
sources are few, the Bale REDD+ Project implementers are distributing more 
fuel-efficient stoves, mechanisms to generate biomass briquettes and are 
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establishing woodlots (BERSMP, 2006). These measures will reduce or 
substitute household demand and thus reduce the OCs of these high-impact 
forest products. However, it may be some years until woodlots are mature 
enough to substitute the needs of households completely, thus the OCs of high-
impact forest products may only be experienced by households at the outset of 
the intervention. 
 
Household’s reported the forest products and quantities that were collected, but 
were understandably unable to estimate the area of land from which they 
harvested these products. It is therefore difficult to establish the area of land 
and associated income from forest products for any given hectare of forest, as 
has been used in other studies of the OCs of forest conservation (Börner et al., 
2009). To establish the OCs of forest products on a per hectare basis, average 
forest income of the survey households was first aggregated to all households 
to estimate the total village’s income from forest products, which is then 
divided by the total area of forest available to the village population. This 
assumes that the whole of the forest area of the village is available for 
exploitation; that the forest income is representative of the village as a whole; 
and, the forest is freely accessible to all villagers. Although some dense areas of 
forest may be underused, the majority of forest observed in the BME is 
exploited. The number of households in the survey locations and the area of 
forest used in the estimates of OCs of forest products per hectare were sourced 
from local Agricultural and Rural Development Offices at the relevant villages 
(see Table 1, Chapter 3).  
 
A second option to establish area of forest use, if sufficient data had been 
available, would be to use estimates of the biomass in a hectare of forest and 
then value this biomass as the diversity of products from that hectare. Fisher et 
al. (2010), for example, established the OCs of charcoal production by using 
statistical relationships between yield of wood available for charcoal, kiln 
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efficiencies for turning biomass into charcoal and profit data from charcoal 
supply chain analyses. To have estimated the value of biomass in a hectare of 
forest at the case study site, however, it would be necessary to know what 
proportion of the biomass can be used for each purpose, so for example the 
above-ground tree biomass established in Chapter 5 would be a starting point 
of the biomass per hectare if all of it was to be used for firewood. Secondly, it 
would be necessary to establish the biomass content of a donkey load of 
fuelwood, so as to establish a market price. But this was not possible at the case 
study site for reasons noted in Chapter 4. Although it is reported by the Bale 
REDD+ Project implementers (see Chapter 3) that on average, 
6m3/household/year is required for fuelwood consumption in the BME, it is also 
observed that forest use is not sustainable. Therefore, without an estimate of the 
biomass content of a donkey load of fuelwood, it was not possible to estimate 
the OCs of high-impact forest products in this way.  
 
6.2.3.2. The opportunity costs of land for agriculture 
 
Under the Forest Management Agreement, households will be unable to 
expand their cultivated land. Agricultural production is a rival and excludable 
use of land in direct opposition to REDD+ via CFM. Households that would 
have expanded in the status-quo will have to forego this income. No established 
land markets exist in Ethiopia, which under perfect market conditions could 
serve as a proxy for OCs, therefore, in order to establish the OCs of agricultural 
production per hectare, the household incomes that were established were 
divided by the area of cultivated land from which households reported yields 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.3).  
 
The OCs of agriculture may be reduced by the presence of low-impact forest 
product income on the conserved forest. Low-impact forest product income 
(including extraction of bamboo, climber, coffee and honey) is not in opposition 
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to the project and households can continue to derive this income source under 
the Bale REDD+ Project intervention. Thus net OCs of a hectare of land can be 
established from the difference between agricultural and low-impact forest 
product revenues per hectare which may better represent the trade-offs that 
household may make on a hectare of land. Two agricultural OC measures were 
generated for each household; the OCs of agricultural land (US$/ha) and the net 
OCs of land offsetting forgone agriculture with low-impact forest production 
(US$/ha).  
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Of 237 household surveys, two households were dropped due to apparent 
misreporting of yields. Descriptive statistics for the remaining surveys support 
the assumption that the sample population is representative of the wider BME 
as they are largely consistent with other household surveys of Ethiopia 
(Mekonnen, 2000, Mamo et al., 2007, Babulo et al., 2009, Yemiru et al., 2010, 
Tesfaye et al., 2011). The average number of people in survey households is 6.5 
where other Ethiopian studies find household size between 5.35 and 8.3. The 
average years of education of the household heads in the survey population 
was 4.27. The number of years the household head has lived in the village can 
be roughly equated to the age of the household head. An average of 42 years 
aligns with existing studies in Ethiopia of 35 to 50. Average land holdings of 2.2 
are comparable with means reported in other household surveys from Ethiopia 
of between 1 and 2.1 hectares. The average number of livelihood sources was 
three; agriculture, forest and livestock incomes, with only a few households 
engaging in trade or waged labour as also found in other household income 
studies within Ethiopia (Table 16) (Mekonnen, 2000, Mamo et al., 2007, Babulo 
et al., 2009, Yemiru et al., 2010, Tesfaye et al., 2011). 
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Table 16. Mean household characteristics of survey respondents.  
Socio-economic characteristics of the household (HH) survey population with mean, standard 
deviation in brackets and range.  
 
 Description Agarfa Goro Delo 
Mena 
Total 
n Number of surveys conducted  87 50 98 235 
HH head 
Percentage of survey 
respondent who were the HH 
head 
94% 100% 100% 98% 
HH size Number of people living 
within the HH 
6.2 
(2.27) 
2-14 
6.8 
(2.23) 
2-11 
6.6 
(2.49) 
2-15 
6.5 
(2.36) 
2-15 
HH head 
Education 
Years of education received by 
the HH head 
5.22 
(3.17) 
0-13 
3.04 
(2.10) 
0-9 
4.05 
(2.70) 
0-10 
4.27 
(2.70) 
0-13 
Years HH in 
village 
Years the HH head has lived at 
the survey location 
44 
(13) 
19-83 
44 
(14) 
22-100 
39 
(13) 
20-74 
42 
(13) 
19-100 
Polygamous 
Percentage of respondents 
where the male of the HH has 
more than one wife 
16% 18% 37% 26% 
Land holding The hectares of land a HH 
cultivates for crop production 
2.28 
(1.47) 
0-10 
2.02 
(0.65) 
1-3 
2.13 
(1.58) 
0.3-9 
2.16 
(1.39) 
0-10 
Livelihood 
sources 
The number of income sources 
reported by the HH 
3.1 
(0.42) 
1-4 
3.2 
(0.40) 
3-4 
3.1 
(0.33) 
3-4 
3.1 
(0.42) 
1-4 
 
6.3.2. Household forest income  
 
All survey households derived income from forest products. Six major forest 
products were collected by households, four of which were collected by more 
than 30% of households: fuelwood (99.6%), timber (54%), coffee (41%), and 
honey (30%). Bamboo and climbers were collected less, at 7% and 1% 
respectively. Fuelwood is the dominant forest product with only a single 
household not collecting it.  
 
The harvest of other forest products differs by location. Forest coffee is only 
present in Delo Mena where the moist forest type is suitable for coffee to grow. 
Forest honey is also most common in the moist forests of Delo Mena. Bamboo, 
in contrast, is only collected in Agarfa where dry forest dominates. The dry 
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forest also contains more, and more accessible, commercially valuable species 
including Podocarpus and Hygenia absynicca and the proportion of households 
collecting timber in Agarfa exceeds that of other villages (Figure 10).  
 
The differences between villages are also represented in the amount of forest 
products sold by households. Over all survey areas, an average of 40% of a 
household’s forest product value was sold in markets. Some households sold all 
forest product value while others none. Two households sold all forest products 
in the market place, while 55 households sold no forest products on the market. 
The amount sold varied by forest product. Products most likely to be sold were 
forest honey (62%), bamboo (63%), and coffee (92%). Bamboo is only found in 
Agarfa, while coffee is only found in Delo Mena. Honey was consistently sold 
at high percentage, between 61% and 84% in survey locations. Interestingly, 
while 36% and 24% of fuelwood was sold on markets in Agarfa and Irba, 
respectively, less than 1% of fuelwood was sold in Delo Mena. The remaining 
major forest products were predominantly for home consumption (Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 10. Forest product collection by survey location.  
The proportion of households collecting major forest products by survey location with forest 
type. 
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Figure 11. Forest products sold on markets.  
The average percentage of a household’s forest products collected for home consumption 
versus that sold on markets, across all survey locations. 
 
The average income from forest products collected by households was US$1,344 
in the survey year, ranging between US$51 and US$12,969 (Figure 12). 
Significant differences exist between survey locations in the value of total forest 
production, forest production for home consumption, and forest production for 
sale on markets (Kruskall-Wallis tests: total forest production, K=81.189, df=2, 
p=0.0001***; home consumption, K=5.514, df=2, p=0.0635*; forest production for 
sale on markets, K=94.969, df=2, p=0.0001***). Woodland households in Goro 
derive the lowest average forest value at US$444 and moist forest households in 
Delo Mena the highest at US$1,978; more than four times greater. The average 
household forest income in the BME is higher than the mean forest income of 
US$678 per household found in a meta-study of 54 cases over 17 countries 
(Vedeld et al., 2004), but comparisons are complicated by a host of context-
specific differences in the forest resource base. 
 
Dividing forest uses into categories of low-impact (honey, coffee, climber and 
bamboo) and high-impact (fuelwood and timber), households derive more 
income from low-impact forest products overall at US$791 ± 167 as opposed to 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Timber
Fuelwood
Climber
Honey
Bamboo
Coffee
Home consumption Sold at market
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US$553 ± 94 from high-impact forest products. There are statistically significant 
differences in both forest income types across survey locations (Kruskall-Wallis 
tests: low-impact products, K=144.620, df=2, p=0.001***; high-impact forest 
products, K=50.846, df=2, p=0.0001***). This difference is driven largely by the 
substantial income from forest coffee in Delo Mena. In Agarfa and Goro, the 
income from high-impact forest products to the average household is much 
greater than low-impact forest products as a result of timber and fuelwood, 
respectively (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 12. Mean household forest income.  
Mean household income of total forest products, home consumption and that sold on markets 
(US$) established through market price valuation reported by survey location with total forest 
income 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 13. Mean household forest income from low-impact and high-impact forest products.  
Mean household income of low-impact forest products, bamboo, climber, coffee and honey 
(FP)(US$), and high-impact FP, timber and fuelwood (US$), established through market price 
valuation reported by survey location with total forest income 95% confidence intervals and 
range. 
 
6.3.3. Household agricultural income  
 
The average land holding across survey locations was found to be 2.16 ha, with 
a range from 0 to 10 ha. Only three of 235 surveyed households reported no 
gross income from agricultural land during the 12 month recall period. Of 
these, two did not have land holdings while the third experienced total crop 
failure due to drought, although others reported no such drought. Twenty crop 
types were identified. The top five most commonly cultivated were cereal 
crops: Maize, Teff, Wheat, Barley, and Sorghum.  
 
The average household crop income was US$907 in the year of the survey 
ranging between US$ -157 and US$5,355 per household (Table 17). Two 
households had negative incomes due to higher inputs from fertilizer, seed and 
equipment in that year than the market valuation of their yields. Unlike income 
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to forest use, no significant differences in agriculture were found between 
locations (Kruskall-Wallis tests: crop total US$/household, K=2.110, df=2, 
p=0.348). Over all crop types, the average household sold 20% of gross crop 
value with no significant differences found in the amount kept for home 
consumption, but significant differences found at the 1% level for the 
proportion sold. Goro sold 38% of agricultural yields, whereas Agarfa and Delo 
Mena sold less at 22% and 6% respectively (Kruskall-Wallis tests: crop home 
consumption US$/household, K=739, df=2, p=0.6912; crop sale US$/household, 
K=26.700, df=2, p=0.0001***; Figure 14).  
 
Table 17. Mean household income from forest products and agriculture.  
Mean household income (US$) for low-impact forest products (including bamboo, climber, 
coffee and honey) and high-impact forest products (fuelwood and timber) and agriculture, 
established through market price valuation reported by survey location with 95% confidence 
intervals and range. 
 
Location 
Income description (US$/household) 
High-impact forest 
products 
Low-impact forest 
products 
Crop production 
Agarfa  
(n=87) 
937 ± 222 
(102 to 5,123) 
210 ± 189 
(0 to 7,755) 
914 ± 160 
(-154 to 3,490) 
Goro  
(n=50) 
435 ± 95 
(51 to 1,746) 
10 ± 18 
(0 to 459) 
1,088 ± 266 
(174 to 5,355) 
Delo Mena  
(n=98) 
272 ± 36 
(88 to 985) 
1,705 ±276 
(0 to 7,126) 
808 ± 125 
(54 to 3,726) 
All  
(n=235) 
553 ± 94 
(51 to 5,213) 
791 ± 167 
(0 to 7,755) 
907 ± 98 
(-154 to 5,355) 
 
Babulo et al.’s (2009) findings for the marketed and non-marketed value of 
household crop production in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia, are substantially 
lower than these findings, with annual household income from crops ETB 414 
(or approximately US$ 50). Mamo et al. (2006) instead found mean agricultural 
income of households of approximately US$675 in the Dendi district of 
Ethiopia. As with household forest incomes, comparisons are complicated by 
the context-specific differences in ecological and market variables. Mamo et al. 
also demonstrates the significant ranges in household income; with standard 
deviation of household incomes from agriculture ranging at just over US$ 600. 
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Figure 14. Proportion of gross agricultural income for sale and home consumption.  
Mean household gross agricultural income for home consumption and sale (US$) established 
through market price valuation reported by survey location with total gross agricultural income 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
6.3.4. Relative reliance on agriculture and forest income 
 
Overall, 40% of households had total forest incomes that exceeded income from 
agricultural land. This differed greatly by location, with 60% of households of 
the moist coffee growing forest of Delo Mena deriving more income from forest 
than agriculture, as compared with Agarfa (50%) and Goro (26%). Considering 
only forest products and dividing them into low-impact and high-impact, 57% 
of households overall had greater income from high-impact than low-impact 
forest products. Again, there is a split by location; Agarfa (94%) and Goro 
(100%) are both substantially higher than the moist forest of Delo Mena where 
only 3% of households have high-impact forest product income greater than 
that of low-impact forest products (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Proportion of household income from forest and agriculture.  
Mean household agricultural income and forest income (US$) established through market price 
valuation reported by survey location with total forest product and crop income 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
6.3.5. Econometric analysis of household income from land uses 
 
As in the descriptive results, the strong effect of location on forest incomes is 
also clear in the regression results. As noted in Chapter 4, this cross-sectional 
data-set is limited given that there are three survey locations with three 
differing forest types. Effects due to forest characteristics and village 
characteristics, therefore, cannot be separated. The inclusion of a village 
dummy variable however, encapsulates differences to help control for 
unobserved but constant variation across survey locations. By controlling for 
the location differences with dummy variables, further socio-economic factors 
driving income from forests and agriculture were investigated. The majority of 
findings correspond with hypotheses of forest and crop income reliance (see 
Table 15; Table 18).  
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Table 18. Determinants of household income per household. 
OLS, Logit and Tobit regression results for predictors of household income from high-impact 
forest products (hifp), low-impact forest products (lifp) and agricultural production (crop) 
reporting coefficient, robust standard errors in parentheses and significance where; * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Determinants Description 
Logit dependent 
variable 
Tobit dependent 
variable 
OLS dependent 
variable 
lifp_yn lifp log_hifp log_crop 
HH_size 
The total 
number of 
people in the 
household 
0.0479 60.89 0.0433** 0.105*** 
(0.0947) (50.82) (0.0209) (0.0244) 
education 
The number of 
years of 
education of 
the HH head 
ranging from 0 
to 13 years 
0.135 132.81*** 0.0148 0.0690*** 
(0.0898) (45.24) (0.0210) (0.0215) 
village_years 
The number of 
years the HH 
head has lived 
in the village 
-0.00579 -1.755 -0.00922** -0.000256 
(0.0194) (7.906) (0.00458) (0.00396) 
livelihood_sources 
The number of 
sources of 
income the HH 
has including; 
agriculture, 
forest products, 
livestock, trade, 
remittance, 
and paid 
labour 
-0.514 -424.4** 0.103 0.0766 
(0.416) (208.7) (0.126) (0.130) 
agarfa 
Location 
dummy 
variable; 1= 
Afarfa, 0= not 
Agarfa 
-5.297*** -2937.8*** 0.999*** -0.00340 
(0.728) (324.6) (0.122) (0.136) 
goro 
Location 
dummy 
variable; 1= 
Goro, 0= not 
Goro 
-7.00809*** -4189.9*** 0.401*** 0.286** 
(1.0457) (652.3) (0.126) (0.126) 
constant  4.932** 2142.6*** 5.122*** 5.251*** 
(1.784) (779.8) (0.471) (0.503) 
N 
Pseudo R2/ R2 
 235 235 235 231 
0.607 0.0774 0.256 0.133 
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The R2 value for the OLS regression for log transformed high-impact forest 
product income indicates that the models explain 31% of the variation. For log 
transformed crop income, the OLS model explains only 13% of the variation. 
These R2 indicate that there are other factors not observed here which impact on 
income, in particular for agricultural income. A Ramsey RESET test was used to 
assess the functional form of the OLS models to detect omitted variables, 
suggesting that the models were not miss-specified (Ramsey RESET; log_hifp 
F(3, 224)=0.64, p=0.5922); and log_crop F(3, 221)=1.74, p=0.1606). 
 
As in the OLS regressions, there are likely other factors that influence on 
income that are not included in the Logit and Tobit model. There is not an 
equivalent test to the Ramsey RESET for the miss-specification of the Logit 
model and Tobit models. A Lagrange Multiplier test, however, was used to 
determine whether the Logit specification was affected by omitted variable bias. 
Results for the Logit model showed that household size was an important 
control variable to include in the model, significant at the 10% level. Other 
controls of education, village years and livelihood sources, are not significant 
and could have been omitted them from the Logit specification. The Lagrange 
Multiplier test indicated that in the Tobit model other controls were not 
significant and could have been omitted from the Tobit specification. For 
consistency with the OLS regressions, however, even these controls which are 
not significant are reported in the Logit and Tobit regressions (Table 19). The 
most important thing to stress is that the results from the estimated coefficients 
for location are significant and robust across the models. 
 
  
  187 
Table 19. Lagrange Multiplier test for miss-specification of the Logit and Tobit model. 
Significance is noted as; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Term LM score degrees of freedom p value 
Logit lifp_yn 
HH_size 0.02 1 0.9025 
education 2.87 1 0.0901* 
village_years 1.55 1 0.2130 
livelihood_sources 0.77 1 0.3807 
simultaneous test 8.02 5 0.1549 
Tobit lifp 
hh_size 1.98 1 0.1598 
years_in_village 0.01 1 0.9042 
simultaneous test 3.78 3 0.2857 
 
Household size 
For both high-impact forest products and crop income, household size is a 
significant determinant of income. This result follows that found in the 
literature of increasing household size indicating increased labour availability 
for forest product harvesting (Davies and Richards, 1999). The coefficient can be 
interpreted as a one person increase in household size leading to almost a 4% 
increase in income from high-impact forest products. In larger households more 
crops may also be grown to feed more household members and labour is 
commonly found as a limiting factor for crop production in other household 
income studies (Godoy et al., 1997). A one person increase in household size 
leads to an 11% increase in crop income. No impact of household size was 
found for the presence or absence of low-impact forest product income 
indicating perhaps this income is not labour constrained.  
 
Household head education and years in village 
Although the average education of the household head does not exceed a 
primary education, education is a significant determinant of income from crops. 
The coefficient can be interpreted as one year of additional schooling leading to 
a 7% increase in crop income. This suggests that education can improve 
household income from a parcel of land, perhaps through knowledge of the 
application of fertiliser, improved seeds and farming techniques. Similar results 
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on the impact of education have been found in other studies (Godoy and 
Contreras, 2001). Education was not found to impact on high-impact forest 
product income, or low-impact forest product income in the Logit model. 
However, the Tobit model shows that higher education significantly and 
positively determines income from low-impact forest products. 
 
The number of years the household head has been in the village can be 
considered a proxy for the age of the household head. Older households derive 
less income from high-impact forest products, with no effects of age found on 
other income sources. The coefficient can be interpreted as a year less within the 
village increasing high-impact forest product income by 1%. This could be due 
to the physical intensity of labour required for high-impact forest product 
income sources, as Mamo et al. (2007) also found in Ethiopia; timber harvest 
requires physical strength. From household interviews and discussions at the 
case-study site, it was also clear that younger households resort to fuelwood 
and timber extraction to derive income through lack of alternatives; thus 
increasing their high-impact forest product income.  
 
Alternative livelihoods and income from other sources  
The number of livelihood sources a household derives income from was not 
found to determine income from high-impact forest products or agriculture. 
This could suggest that subsistence levels of high-impact forest products of 
fuelwood and timber as well as a certain level of crop production is necessary 
for household survival and, therefore, they are non-substitutable livelihood 
sources. While the Logit model did not reveal impact of other livelihood 
sources on low-impact forest product income, the Tobit model shows that if 
income is received from this source, the presence of other livelihood sources 
including trade, waged labour, remittance and livestock, reduced the income 
from low-impact forest products. 
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6.3.6. The OCs of forest conservation 
 
There are four estimates of the OCs of forest conservation that can be provided 
for the case-study site. First, is the restriction on high-impact forest products 
(timber and fuelwood) necessitated in the project design, and not offset by the 
benefits received through low-impact forest products allowed by the Bale 
REDD+ Project design (bamboo, coffee, honey and climber). Second, is the 
restriction on high-impact forest products offset by ability to harvest low-
impact forest products. Third, is the OCs of restriction on expansion of 
agriculture which is not offset by the benefits received through low-impact 
forest products. Finally, fourth is the OCs of agriculture, offset by low-impact 
forest products (Table 20).  
 
Table 20. OCs of forest conservation per hectare assuming conversion due to high-impact 
forest product harvest and due to agricultural conversion, with and without low-impact 
forest product harvest, by location.  
Average opportunity costs (OCs) per hectare (US$/ha) established through market price 
valuation, reported by survey location with 95% confidence intervals and range where 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
Opportunity Cost (US$/ha) of land 
Foregone high-
impact forest 
products only 
Forgone high 
impact forest 
products offset 
by low-impact 
forest products 
Forgone 
agriculture 
conversion only 
Forgone 
agricultural 
conversion offset 
by low-impact 
forest products 
Agarfa 
(n=80) 47 40 402 ± 71 401 
Goro 
(n=50) 19 19 495 ± 112 495 
Delo 
Mena 
(n=98) 
30 -157 384 ± 60 197 
All (n=228) 28 -12 415 ± 44 334 
  190 
6.3.6.1. The OCs of forest products 
 
The estimated OCs of high-impact forest products on a hectare of conserved 
forest was US$ 28/ha over all survey sites in the survey year. As expected by the 
analysis of the determinants of forest income, location played a strong role; 
Agarfa and Delo Mena experience the highest OCs of high-impact forest 
products at US$ 47 /ha and US$ 30 /ha, respectively, and with the woodlands of 
Goro returning US$ 19 /ha. 
 
Assuming low-impact forest products can offset the OCs of high-impact forest 
products, net OCs of high-impact forest products were US$ -12 /ha across the 
survey site. This figure, however, obscures the fact that it is only in Delo Mena’s 
moist forest that negative net OCs of high-impact forest products at US$ -157 
/ha are found. In both Agarfa (US$ 40 /ha) and Delo Mena (US$ 19 /ha), the net 
OCs of high-impact forest products are still positive (see Table 20). Thus, while 
on average it may appear that forest conservation appears economically viable 
where low-impact forest product needs can be met with the woodlots, biomass 
briquettes and more fuel-efficient stoves, this result is in fact location specific. 
 
Furthermore, while 100% of households received income from high-impact 
forest products, only 50% of households derived income from low-impact forest 
products. Over all survey locations, 73% of households had below-average 
income from high-impact forest products and a full 93% of households in the 
moist forests of Delo Mena have income lower than the BME average for high-
impact forest products (Figure 16). Therefore it cannot be assumed that all 
households will be able to capture low-impact forest product benefits.    
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Figure 16. The distribution of household income from low-impact forest production by 
survey location.  
Estimates of the household income from high-impact forest product harvesting (fuelwood and 
timber), in a single year as established using market price valuation and household survey 
(US$). The solid line represents the mean household income from high-impact forest products 
across all survey locations. The dotted line represents the survey location mean of high-impact 
forest product income.  
 
6.3.6.2. The OCs of agriculture 
 
A household’s foregone income from a hectare of forest land conserved was 
first calculated as the yield per hectare of cultivated land. Three households 
with no land or no income from their land due to crop failure were dropped. 
Four additional households were dropped as agricultural income was 
generated from shared land holdings and thus per hectare production could not 
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be established. Of the remaining 228 household surveys, the mean OCs of 
foregone agriculture were estimated at US$417 ± 43 /ha with no significant 
differences between survey locations (Table 20; Kruskall-Wallis tests: crop total 
US$/ha, K=2.791, df=2, p=0.2477).  
 
Where low-impact forest products can offset these OCs of agricultural land, the 
net OCs of forgone agricultural production is estimated at US$ 375 /ha. As 
would be expected given the heterogeneity in income from these products, 
there is substantial variation in net OCs of agriculture across survey sites. A 
hectare of forest in Delo Mena has estimated net OCs of agriculture of US$ 197 
/ha, whereas both Agarfa and Goro are higher at US$ 395 and US$ 495 
respectively (Table 20).  
 
Substantial variation in households’ OCs of agriculture were found; ranging 
from US$ -77 to US$ +1,785. Subtracting the fixed OCs of low-impact forest 
products appropriate for each survey site, 29 households experienced net OCs 
of agriculture that were negative; again implying that forest conservation is 
economically attractive. However, all but one of these households was located 
in the moist forest of Delo Mena where coffee is a substantial income source. 
The remaining household was found in Agarfa, with negative OCs of 
agriculture resulting from the households’ expenditure on crop production 
exceeding the market value of the yield in the survey year.  
 
Looking at the distribution of the OCs of agriculture, 68% of households have 
crop income per hectare below the mean over all survey locations. Similarly, 
67% of households had net OCs of agriculture below the mean over all survey 
locations (note that this is using a fixed OC of low-impact forest products for 
each survey location not for each household). By survey location, only 18% of 
households in the moist forests of Delo Mena have net OCs of agriculture 
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greater than the BME mean as opposed to 40% and 48% in Agarfa and Goro 
respectively (Figure 17).  
 
 
 
Figure 17. The distribution of household opportunity costs of agricultural production by 
survey location.  
Estimates of the opportunity costs (OCs) of foregone agriculture (US$/ha) and foregone 
agriculture net of low-impact forest product income (US$/ha), in a single year as established 
using market price valuation. The solid line represents the mean OC across all survey locations. 
The dotted line represents the survey location mean OC within the survey location. 
 
6.4. Discussion 
 
As REDD+ has advanced on the climate change policy agenda, there have been 
growing calls to ‘do no harm’ to communities where REDD+ is implemented 
(CCBA, 2008). This could be understood as overcoming the local private OCs of 
forest conservation. Studies of the OCs of REDD+ have so far largely focused on 
the OCs of agricultural land. The household surveys confirmed that agriculture 
was a major livelihood source at the case-study site, with only two households 
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not cultivating land in the survey year. The income that the average household 
derived from agriculture was US$907 ± 98. Under the proposed Bale REDD+ 
Project intervention, some household’s will forego future expansion of their 
agricultural land. The average OCs of agricultural land are US$ 415/ha, but it is 
possible that these OCs can be reduced by income from low-impact forest 
products on the hectare of forest conserved. In locations where low-impact 
forest products can be harvested the net OCs become US$334/ha.   
 
When considering the OCs of forest conservation, however, other drivers of 
forest decline should be considered, including use for energy needs (Karky and 
Skutsch, 2010, Fisher et al., 2011). Household surveys in the BME show that 
100% of households derived income from the forest in the survey year and 
evidence shows this use is not sustainable and thus leading to deforestation 
(BERSMP, 2006). Forest use at the case study site also appears to be business-as-
usual and not only a safety net in times of shocks or as a seasonal or cash flow 
gap filler, as hypothesised across Eastern and Southern Africa by Arnold and 
Townson (1998). High-impact forest products of fuelwood and timber appear 
products required for subsistence use with the majority of these products 
consumed within the home, in contrast to low-impact forest products - forest 
coffee, forest honey, and bamboo – which are largely exchanged on markets.  
 
The total income from forest products for an average household, with 6.5 
members, was US$1,344. The stylised analysis of the proposed Bale REDD+ 
Project, via CFM, further divides forest products into low-impact and high-
impact categories, which broadly translate into those allowed and those not 
allowed at the case study site. This reveals substantial heterogeneity in forest 
income between villages, however, probably driven by the location specific 
availability of forest products. In Agarfa and Goro, high-impact forest products 
of timber and fuelwood contributed more to household forest incomes than 
low-impact forest products of bamboo, climber, coffee and honey, whereas in 
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Delo Mena the converse was true. This finding is largely driven by the 
possibility of coffee cultivation. Coffee comprises 60% of the foreign currency 
earnings for Ethiopia and 10% of GDP, with production predominantly based 
on smallholders (Teketay et al., 2010). The coffee ceremony is also part of 
Ethiopia’s culture, thus coffee is consumed at home as well as sold. Of the 
household survey sites, forest coffee can only be grown in the moist forest of 
Delo Mena and this is reflected in forest incomes on average four times higher 
than in the woodlands of Goro and just less than twice as much as that in the 
dry forest of Agarfa. Forest honey is also dominantly available in the moist 
forest. Bamboo, in contrast, is only collected in Agarfa where more commercial 
timber species also grow; reflected in higher income from timber than in both 
other survey locations.  
 
The average OCs of high-impact forest products were estimated at US$28 /ha at 
the case study site. Although much lower than agricultural OCs, the value does 
not reflect that these products are necessary for livelihoods. Households are 
reliant on the forest for energy needs - 99% of households gather fuelwood from 
the forest – and in light of rapid population growth at 2.6%, it is clear that forest 
conservation efforts in the BME will need to address the energy needs of 
households if deforestation is to be reduced and not relocated. The Bale REDD+ 
Project implementers do have plans for woodlot establishment, promotion of 
fuel efficient stoves and biomass briquettes, all of which either divert pressure 
or reduce biomass needs for energy. However, these will take time to 
implement and the OCs of being unable to collect high-impact forest products, 
although perhaps temporary, will be experienced by households as a result of 
the intervention.  
 
It is also found that younger household heads derive more income from high-
impact forest products. This suggests that this socio-demographic group may 
incur higher OCs of high-impact forest products than others under the 
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proposed Bale REDD+ Project intervention. Further anecdotal evidence 
suggests that younger households also have lower access to cropland. 
Supplementary mechanisms may be required to be implemented to ensure that 
welfare losses are not experienced by younger household heads as a result of 
the intervention. This might include the preferential access for the young to 
woodlots, or access to livelihood diversification schemes and training. Where 
REDD+ is implemented through CFM, the by-laws can also accommodate socio-
demographic differences; younger households might be offered greater rights 
to the sustainable harvest of high-impact products than other members of the 
group, for example. Such differential treatment due to circumstance has been 
seen under traditional forest management systems in the BME in the past; 
community members have prepared and erected bee-hives, for example, for 
those that have experienced sickness or death in the family (Wakijira et al., in 
press).  
 
The OC estimates imply that households could derive more income from low-
impact forest use compared with the harvest of that hectare for high-impact 
forest products, providing fuelwood demand can be met elsewhere. As noted 
above, however, this ‘average’ household obscures the location-specific 
differences in forest coffee availability. This suggests that village level 
differentiation in the amount paid could greatly improve the efficiency of any 
payments. These findings reinforce other studies in the PES literature that have 
found that location specific payment differentiation is more efficient than broad 
scale fixed payments (e.g. Wünscher et al., 2008). The existence of negative OCs 
might also allow for redistribution of REDD+ revenues to help overcome 
strongly positive OCs in other areas of the BME, or help to fund the 
supplementary mechanisms noted above for particular socio-demographic 
groups, such as the young. 
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At locations where low-impact forest products do generate income these 
activities can be encouraged under the Bale REDD+ Project intervention that 
gives the local communities more secure use rights. The Bale REDD+ Project 
implementers might achieve this through outreach and educational 
programmes, as education was found to increase the likelihood of household 
income from low-impact forest product income in the BME. Such an impact of 
education was also found by Adhikari et al. (2004). These results suggest that 
knowledge increases the ability of a household to extract forest products more 
sustainably and/or encourages pro-conservation behaviours. Such learning may 
also occur through institutions established through the CFM groups as 
evidenced by a long history of traditional forest management in the region in 
the 19th Century (see Chapter 3).  
 
While according to these results, households with availability to forest coffee 
should have economic incentives to conserve the forest, it is also necessary to 
reflect on the present barriers to realising such behaviour; the lack of use rights 
that diminish incentive to protect valuable resources. While the additionality of 
emission reductions generated by these households might be challenged on 
financial grounds, there are clear policy barriers to generating emission 
reductions that could justify their additionality. This poses another interesting 
question for payments, as households with negative net OCs of biomass 
reducing forest products may not require a payment to economically incentivise 
forest conservation if these barriers can be removed and fuelwood and timber 
demands met elsewhere. This could facilitate the creation of a fund from the 
REDD+ revenues that will support activities across the BME, or could be used 
to cover running costs of the Bale REDD+ Project.  
 
The estimate of the OCs of forest conservation relies on a number of 
assumptions that further research could relax. The study stylises land uses and 
makes assumptions concerning the restrictions that households will incur under 
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the proposed intervention in the BME. More detailed stratification of land uses 
into, for example, types of agriculture and local soil conditions could also 
improve the OCs estimate. It is also recognised that the estimate of the OCs of 
land could be an overestimate as local level-market prices are applied to 
products consumed at home as well as those exchanged on the market place. 
This was necessary as I was unable to establish a household’s shadow price for 
each product. Furthermore, no inputs were costed for forest products as they 
are assumed to be predominantly labour and not equipment. This is, therefore, 
an upper bound estimate of the OCs of forest conservation. As implementation 
progresses and the by-laws governing forest use are developed, it will be 
possible to undertake a more detailed analysis of the income that will be 
foregone by a household; for example, it is possible that some high-impact 
activities will be allowed under the intervention, but within sustainable limits 
such that the annual biomass increment is not exceeded by biomass removal. 
 
In the BME, no models of land use change currently exist that can predict 
whether a parcel of land will be deforested for agricultural production or as a 
result of high-impact product harvesting such as fuelwood or timber. The 
development of such models would aid attribution and establish whether the 
true OCs of land are those of agriculture, high-impact forest products, or a 
combination of both (e.g. Angelsen, 1999). Such information would be useful for 
buyers of carbon emission reductions in establishing abatement costs, but also 
in establishing the true total OCs of land that must be overcome.  
 
Another major assumption is that low-impact forest products of bamboo, 
climber, coffee and honey are here assumed compatible with the Bale REDD+ 
Project and so with forest conservation. No studies at the case study site assess 
the degrading impact of coffee on the forest, but it is observed that thinning of 
the forest canopy can occur during cultivation of forest coffee (Schmitt et al., 
2009). There may also be constraints on households expanding low-impact 
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forest product activities such as labour, upfront investments or the excludability 
of products which may mean that income from this source may not be feasible 
outside of the current production boundary. Most certainly there will be 
biophysical limits too. Future research into the sustainability as well as the 
potential for households to expand their low-impact forest product activities is 
necessary. This can also be something addressed over time as the by-laws of the 
CFM groups in the BME are flexible and will be revised as monitoring of forest 
extent and quality occurs.   
 
While it can be seen that this ex-ante exploration of the OCs of forest 
conservation at the case study site can be used to guide design of any payments 
for the Bale REDD+ Project, it is acknowledged that this does not provide an 
estimate of the OCs that will be incurred by any one household in the BME 
under the Bale REDD+ Project. Instead, the OCs established here are those for 
any given hectare of land. This is because it is not possible to know which 
household would have been the beneficiaries of the next hectare of agricultural 
land or of the high-impact forest products harvested in the counterfactual to the 
Bale REDD+ Project. Such problems of attribution of deforestation to 
households or individuals is a recognised problem in the REDD+ literature 
(Börner and Wunder, 2008). It would be economically unfeasible for all 
households to be paid the maximum OCs of forest conservation. Even if it were 
economically feasible, this would impact on the effectiveness and additionality 
of emission reductions; there would be payments made without emissions 
reductions generated which a buyer would be unlikely to accept. For the same 
reason, the conditionality of the payment would therefore be eroded and 
efficiency would be reduced such that REDD+ may no longer be a cost-effective 
climate change mitigation measure.  
 
One option that could be explored in REDD+ via CFM is whether the local level 
institutions that are established will be able to attribute the costs and benefits of 
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forest conservation appropriately to households within their group. Local forest 
users should have comparative advantage over government agents for 
monitoring, particularly where group size is small; CBO size in the BME may 
well be limited to 30 households with defined forest areas (Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2002). At CBO level, self-monitoring and social and cultural incentives and 
sanctions may also improve forest management success (Ostrom, 2000). 
Implementer oversight will be necessary, however, to avoid possible social 
risks. This might include; the capture of benefits by elites, loss of access to land, 
lack of voice, exacerbation of existing income and political power disparities 
and inequitable benefit sharing (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002, Smith and 
Scherr, 2003, Griffiths, 2009, Skutsch and McCall, 2010). While CFM is proposed 
to deliver more equitable benefit sharing (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009), 
experience holds mixed evidence on whether this is the case (Agrawal, 2001, 
Campbell et al., 2001, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002).  
 
In light of the assumptions made, it is acknowledged that this is a first estimate 
of OCs of REDD+ via CFM. But, with these limitations in mind, it was explored 
how these OC estimates can feed into design of a local-level PES scheme such as 
REDD+ via CFM. While previous suggestions for the implementation of REDD+ 
via CFM incentives have tended towards more input based, indirect or uniform 
payments, REDD+ via CFM could still operate as a local-level PES mechanism 
with improved attribution of OCs achieved through mechanisms that build on 
the institutions of the CFM groups. They may well be designed by the forest 
community based organisations themselves. Location-specific payments could 
be made to the CBO groups who are then responsible for establishing who bore 
the OCs of forest conservation and therefore differentiating payment levels 
between members. In this way, REDD+ via CFM could still be efficiently 
implemented with the conditionality and the efficiency that PES was initially 
proposed to deliver (Simpson and Sedjo, 1996, Ferraro and Simpson, 2002, 
Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). 
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Chapter 7: Scenarios of household opportunity costs of forest 
conservation over time  
 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. Problem statement 
 
Conservation interventions have historically been driven by the estimated 
benefits to preserving species, species populations and ecosystems. Biological 
hotspots, for example, are chosen for their concentrations of endemic species 
and severity of habitat loss (see Myers et al., 2000). Protected areas are 
commonly based on their representation of biodiversity and ability to ensure its 
persistence (Margules and Pressey, 2000). In contrast, the use of economic costs 
in conservation planning is still nascent (Babcock et al., 1997, Moore et al., 2004, 
Brooks et al., 2006, Wilson et al., 2006). This is in spite of an increasing body of 
evidence that shows how incorporating cost information in conservation 
planning leads to more effective interventions (Polasky et al., 2001, Polasky et 
al., 2005, Naidoo et al., 2006, Naidoo and Iwamura, 2007, Carwardine et al., 
2008).  
 
Cost information can allow the targeting of conservation interventions (Babcock 
et al., 1997, Adams et al., 2010). This can achieve greater biodiversity 
representation under fixed or limited conservation budgets (Ando et al., 1998). 
Even where simple correlative relationships between costs and biological 
variables do not exist, the incorporation of costs emphasises the trade-offs 
inherent in conservation planning (Balmford et al., 2000, Williams et al., 2003).  
The private opportunity costs (OCs) of forest conservation, in particular, 
provide information on both the drivers of resource use as well as the 
incentives that must be overcome by conservation interventions (Polasky et al., 
2005). The foregone benefits of an alternative investment, activity or use of a 
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resource, private OCs are limited to those people directly affected by foregone 
benefits (Pirard, 2008). Information on the private OCs of land set aside for 
forest conservation (referred to here as the OCs of forest conservation) aids 
intervention design where drivers are understood and incentives for pro-
conservation activities are created. This is more likely to garner the support of 
local communities; necessary for intervention success (Brandon and Wells, 
1992). Quantitatively assessing OCs to use in intervention design can bring 
greater acceptance, longevity and impact of interventions (Chomitz et al., 2005, 
Adams et al., 2010).  
 
Conservation interventions largely result from concerns about the ecological 
and social sustainability of a resource system now and into the future. If private 
costs of conservation cannot be overcome through time, support for the 
intervention and success in meeting sustainability objectives may decline. The 
future OCs of land for forest conservation will be impacted by changing income 
from direct human activities such as agricultural and forest product extraction, 
and affected by infrastructure development. OCs will also be impacted by the 
underlying drivers of deforestation, including; demographic, economic, 
technological, policy and institutional, and cultural causes (Geist and Lambin, 
2002).  
 
Of the few studies that consider the OCs of land for conservation, most report 
OCs for a single year or assume OCs are constant over time subject only to 
discounting (Chomitz et al., 2005, Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Börner et al., 
2009). An exception is Ferraro (2002) who explores ex-ante the OCs over time 
imposed by the establishment of a national park in Madagascar. Without 
establishment of the park, the flow of benefits was first predicted to increase as 
locals extracted resources. As resources became degraded, however, the 
benefits would then decline. If the national park was established, the benefits of 
exploitation were assumed zero and, in the zone surrounding the national park, 
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benefit flows would decrease more rapidly by virtue of a more limited area of 
access. Over a 60 year time horizon, the average present value of costs per 
household ranged from US$353 to US$1316. This demonstrates that where 
resource use is currently unsustainable and complete exhaustion of the resource 
base is a possibility, assumptions of constant OCs are unlikely to hold (Pearce 
and Markandya, 1987).  
 
Understanding and altering economic incentives while meeting rural livelihood 
demands have increasingly become part of conservation interventions (Arnold, 
2001). Forest conservation interventions have attempted to internalise positive 
environmental externalities that, through market and policy failures, have 
undervalued or excluded forest products and services from the income received 
by stakeholders (Richards, 1999). Altering economic incentives has included 
attempts to commercialise and increase the prices of forest products, to increase 
the economic value of standing forest, to diversify livelihoods to reduce 
pressure on forest resource systems, and to increase incomes (Brandon and 
Wells, 1992). Through a PES approach, stakeholders are provided with 
economic incentives that make conservation economically viable (Engel et al., 
2008, Pagiola and Platais, 2007).  
 
Of the market mechanisms that could be used in conservation, carbon trading is 
thought to have the greatest potential to capture positive externalities to the 
degree required to make forest conservation economically viable (Richards, 
1999). This is particularly the case as carbon is often found to be the largest of 
the non-marketed environmental service values of forests (Pearce, 1997), which 
include other direct, indirect and non-use values (see Pearce and Warford, 
1993). Finance through a REDD+ mechanism therefore has the potential to bring 
greater and more sustainable finance streams to conserve the environmental 
services of forest than currently exist (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002, Pagiola et 
al., 2005a). The success of a REDD+ forest conservation intervention, however, 
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will rely on REDD+ revenues being able to overcome the OCs of forest 
conservation over time.  
 
The OCs of forest conservation over time will depend on the targets set by the 
Bale REDD+ Project implementers as well as their success in meeting these 
objectives. There are, however, a lack of explicit goals and quantitative 
operational targets in conservation (Margules and Pressey, 2000). According to 
Regan et al.’s (2002) classification of uncertainty in conservation biology, this 
can be considered a form of linguistic uncertainty, as opposed to more 
commonly researched epistemic uncertainties in determinate facts. This 
linguistic uncertainty arises from the underspecificity, or generality, of 
statements - such as conservation objectives - and/or from insufficient 
consideration of project goals on the part of implementers. Both increase the 
difficulty of understanding the dynamic nature of OCs. It is therefore hard to 
predict how the drivers of land-use change will evolve over time. More 
epistemic uncertainty is introduced where, lacking information, best-guesses 
and subjective judgement are used to select parameters in OCs modelling 
(Regan et al., 2002).  
 
Scenarios can be used to model the dynamic nature of OCs that incorporates the 
lack of information on on-going drivers of change and underspecificity 
uncertainty in conservation objectives. Scenario modelling creates a set of 
plausible narratives depicting alternative pathways to the future (Bohensky et 
al., 2006). Stimulating thinking and allowing for the evaluation of future 
eventualities by describing potential future states, scenario modelling is useful 
to synthesise and communicate information to stakeholders and the public 
(Alcamo, 2001). Scenarios have recently been applied in broad-scale analyses 
such as the UK National Ecosystem Assessment, a nationwide exploration of 
how ecosystems and their services will change in the future and the associated 
impacts on human well-being (Haines-Young et al., 2010). Swetnam et al.(2011)  
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used participatory scenario building to consider carbon storage in the Eastern 
Arc Mountains of Tanzania in 2025 under an optimistic and pessimistic 
scenario. Presenting the findings on spatial land use maps visualised potential 
changes for decision makers, illustrating a 41% loss in carbon storage under 
business as usual compared to only a 3.8% loss under a more sustainable 
scenario considering change in energy, formal economy, agriculture, forestry 
and population.  
 
The application of scenarios has been more limited in bottom-up conservation 
planning. Wollenberg et al. (2000), an exception, discuss how scenarios can 
encourage learning and adaptive co-management of community forests in 
Indonesia and Madagascar. Their study was not quantitative in nature, but the 
authors find that scenarios can help stakeholders to anticipate and adapt to 
large-scale forces of land-use change. If private costs of conservation cannot be 
overcome through time, support for the intervention and success in meeting 
sustainability objectives may decline. Scenario modelling of OCs can lead to 
more resilient conservation policies where they help stakeholders to cope with 
the dynamic nature of OCs and linguistic uncertainty (Peterson et al., 2003). 
 
7.1.2. Aims and objectives 
 
In this Chapter I use scenarios to explore potential changes in the OCs of forest 
conservation over time in the BME, Ethiopia. Scenarios take into account the 
uncertainty introduced by underspecificity of conservation objectives and 
paucity of data on how agricultural and forest productivity is changing. Three 
scenarios are generated that explore how assumptions of improvements in 
agricultural productivity, the proposed commercialisation of forest products, 
and the sustainability of land use impact upon three OC measures; the annual 
OCs, cumulative OCs and the total OCs of land under REDD+ via CFM in the 
Bale REDD+ Project intervention, over a 20-year time horizon. The potential of 
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REDD+ revenues from the project to overcome the OCs of forest conservation is 
then assessed. This study adds to a limited literature on the OCs of conservation 
and the application of scenarios for conservation planning. 
 
7.2. Methods 
7.2.1. The opportunity costs of forest conservation over time 
 
The OCs of forest conservation for the proposed REDD+ via CFM intervention 
at the case study site were estimated in Chapter 6. Under the proposed Bale 
REDD+ Project intervention, communities sign a forest management agreement 
that prohibits high-impact forest product harvest (comprising fuelwood and 
timber) and prohibits the expansion of agricultural land. Households will still 
be able to harvest low-impact forest products (bamboo, climbers, coffee and 
honey). The Bale REDD+ Project implementers plan to meet household 
fuelwood and timber demands through woodlot establishment, fuel efficient 
stove distribution and biomass briquette manufacture. It is unclear, however, 
when fuelwood and biomass needs will be sufficiently met by these actions. 
This Chapter, therefore, considers the OCs of forest conservation to be forgone 
agricultural production, net of low-impact forest products that could be 
harvested on the conserved forest area.  
 
The mean household net OCs of agricultural production in the BME were found 
to be US$334/ha in the survey year, with significant differences by forest type 
(see Chapter 6). Scaling up across the three forest types gave area weighted OCs 
of US$358ha. Using the weighted mean OC per hectare of forest conservation 
over the BME, the annual OCs (US$/ha) were calculated as the difference 
between the predicted crop (Crop) income and low-impact forest product 
(Forest) income, subject to a discount rate δ at a given project year t where goes 
from 0 to 19 (Equation 8). The cumulative OCs (US$/ha) for a hectare of land 
taken out of production in project year t are calculated as the sum of the annual 
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OCs for that hectare from year t to the end of the 20-year project (Equation 9). 
The cumulative OCs are, therefore, the discounted agricultural returns to the 
hectare of land over the 20-year period. The total OCs (US$) are those incurred 
over the total area conserved, estimated using the cumulative OCs per hectare 
and the area of avoided deforestation area A under the proposed intervention 
(Equation 10). 
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All OCs are expressed in present values so that they are representative of the 
cost of taking land out of production now. Individuals have preferences for 
current over future consumption and this trade-off between different points in 
time can be characterised using a discount rate. As a result of the sensitivity of 
cost estimates to the discount rate applied and issues of intergenerational 
equity, the existence of a ‘correct’ discount rate is debated in environmental 
valuation (Weitzman, 1998, Pearce et al., 2003, Groom et al., 2005). In calculating 
the OCs of land under forests for the Stern Review (2007), Grieg-Grann (2006) 
applied discount rates of 5-10%. Naidoo and Adamowicz (2006) found that 
discount rates of 15-25% best represented observed data in calculating the OCs 
of land uses in Paraguay. Holden et al. (1998) found individuals had discount 
rates as high as 53% in Ethiopia and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2008), a decade later, 
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found similarly high annual discount rates with a median of 43%. In 
establishing OCs in this study, a discount rate of 10% is applied to optimistic 
scenario A and Zero-OC scenario C, whereas a higher discount rate of 20% is 
applied in Pessimistic scenario B. In all cases, non-declining discount rates are 
used in the light of the short lifespan of the project (Hepburn and Koundouri, 
2007).  
 
The details of the assumptions made in order to estimate the OCs of forest 
conservation at the case study site are addressed in-depth in Chapter 4. In order 
to model these OCs over time, it was also assumed that all deforestation 
resulted from agricultural production. This assumption was necessary as no 
data on the conversion of land to agriculture versus that lost to high-impact 
forest product harvesting was available. It is also assumed that deforested area 
would generate the same income as existing cultivated land for a given 
household and once it is converted, that land will remain under agricultural 
production. It is acknowledged that not all land will be suitable for agriculture 
and land that is not currently under production is more likely to be more 
marginal. Similarly, it is assumed that all forest land will be suitable for low-
impact forest product harvest to the level that households derive at present. The 
OCs may therefore be an overestimate. However, these scenarios represent a 
best first approximation until further information becomes available. 
 
The land area for which OCs are incurred was based on stated project goals for 
deforestation to be avoided. This equates to a reduction in the existing rate of 
4% deforestation annually to 3% in years 1-5, to 2% in years 6-10 and to 1% 
deforestation in years 11 to 20. While it is recognised that the deforestation 
counterfactual may increase over time in the absence of the intervention, the 
forest lost through conversion from forest to agriculture in the absence of the 
project was assumed to remain constant at 4%. This is a commonly made 
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assumption in light of the complications of establishing deforestation baselines 
(see Parker et al., 2008, Böttcher et al., 2009).  
 
The impacts of a growing rural population on the OCs of forest conservation 
are not considered in these scenarios. The population of Ethiopia is growing at 
2.6% annually and is approaching 74 million according to the latest census 
(CSA, 2008). In Oromia, where the BME is located, this rate of growth is higher 
at 2.9%; joint third of 11 regions in the country (CSA, 2008). The effect that 
population growth will have on the demand for agricultural land is assumed to 
be met by the deforestation that occurs even under the CFM intervention; 
deforestation is not assumed to be completely halted. Insufficient data are 
available to include the potential effect of the intervention on land-market 
dynamics, for example on commodity prices due to changing availability of 
land area (see Armsworth et al., 2006, Busch et al., 2009). The price elasticity of 
demand is, therefore, assumed to be perfectly inelastic or zero; there are 
negligible price feedback mechanisms from forest policy changes. 
 
7.2.2. Scenario calibration 
 
Scenario analysis can include indirect socio-political, economic, science and 
technological, cultural and religious, and demographic drivers (Haines-Young 
et al., 2010). This study focuses on the direct economic drivers of resource 
consumption, with simple but credible changes in income from land uses 
modelled under the proposed Bale REDD+ Project intervention. Three scenarios 
were generated. Two were explorative, or probable scenarios utilising 
subjective judgements about the drivers of land-use change to illustrate what 
may happen under the Bale REDD+ Project intervention. The third scenario is 
normative and back-casts from a goal of zero total OCs of forest conservation. In 
all three scenarios productivity is considered for only two land uses in the BME; 
agriculture and low-impact forest products. All scenarios take into account the 
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possibility of productivity decline due to degradation on these land uses as well 
as future plans for productivity, in order to analyse the net change over time:  
 
1. ‘Optimistic’ scenario A presents a storyline which assumes that existing 
production can continue into the future and is ecologically sustainable as 
well as sustaining income and material flows (Arnold, 2001). Scenario A is 
also optimistic that increases in productivity can be achieved through 
agricultural intensification and low-impact forest product market 
development and there is, therefore, growth in income and material flows.  
2. ‘Pessimistic’ scenario B presents assumes that resource use fails to become 
sustainable and continues in accordance with past trends, with efforts at 
agricultural intensification and forest product market development 
unsuccessful.  
3. ‘Zero OC’ scenario C seeks to achieve an economically viable forest situation. 
It assumes that while agricultural practices might be unsustainable and 
intensification of agriculture beyond the control and remit of the CFM 
intervention, forest management does become sustainable under CFM and 
efforts to add value to forest products, through price increases, are 
successful. This success is to such a degree that the total OCs are zero; i.e. 
the increasing income from forests per unit area is sufficient to completely 
overcome the income of agricultural production on the same land area over 
the 20-year period. Thus taking land out of agricultural production is an 
economically viable option. 
 
Following Alcamo’s (2001) criteria, the main elements of the scenarios are given 
in Table 21; these are the major driving forces, a description of step-wise 
changes, and a storyline. The base year is set at 2010, the year of the survey, and 
the time horizon is 20 years. Scenarios are calibrated with data from peer 
reviewed and grey literature, research institutions, government sources and 
NGOs. 
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Table 21. Conservation scenario storylines.  
The major driving forces of land-use change, their direction and a description is provided for 
three plausible scenarios that might occur under implementation of the proposed participatory 
forest management (↑ indicates increasing, ↓ indicates decreasing, and → indicates no change). 
 
 Scenario A: 
 Optimistic 
Scenario B: 
Pessimistic 
Scenario C: 
 Zero OC 
Driving 
force 
Δ Storyline Δ Storyline Δ Storyline 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
→ 
No land 
degradation occurs 
over the 20-year 
period. 
↓ 
Land degradation 
causes 2.2% decline 
of agricultural 
productivity per 
year. 
↓ 
Land degradation 
causes 2.2% decline of 
agricultural 
productivity per year. 
↑ 
Agricultural 
intensification is 
achieved at a rate of 
2.1% yield increase 
per year due to 
intervention and 
countrywide policy. 
→ 
Despite 
intensification 
efforts, productivity 
is not increased due 
to the intervention or 
countrywide policy. 
→ 
Despite intensification 
efforts, productivity is 
not increased due to 
the intervention or 
countrywide policy. 
Fo
re
st
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
→ 
No forest 
degradation occurs 
over the 20-year 
period. 
↓ 
Forest degradation 
leads to productivity 
declines in low-
impact forest 
products at a rate 
equivalent to area 
lost; 3% in years 1-5, 
2% in years 6 to 10 
and 1% in years 11-
20. 
→ 
No forest degradation 
occurs over the 20-year 
period. 
↑ 
Forest income 
increases due to the 
development of low-
impact forest 
products at 5% per 
year.  
→ 
Despite efforts, low-
impact forest 
product 
development has no 
impact on household 
income. 
↑? 
Forest income increase 
s through low-impact 
forest product 
development so as to 
add sufficient income 
such that the total OCs 
of forest conservation 
are zero.  
D
is
co
un
t R
at
e 
- 
A fixed ‘low’ 
discount rate of 10% 
is applied following 
Busch et al. (2009) 
and Grieg-Grann 
(2006,2008). 
- 
A fixed ‘high’ 
discount rate of 20% 
is applied following 
Naidoo and 
Adamowicz (2006). 
- 
A fixed ‘low’ discount 
rate of 10% is applied 
following Busch et al. 
(2009) and Grieg-
Grann (2006,2008). 
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7.2.2.1. Agricultural productivity  
 
Deforestation has impacts on watersheds, affecting the quantity, quality and 
regularity of the flow of water. While the relationship between forest cover and 
watershed forest cover is uncertain (see Calder et al., 2004, Bruijnzeel, 2004), it is 
commonly accepted that soil erosion will increase as a result of forest cover loss. 
The impacts of deforestation on watershed and soil quality manifest themselves 
as changes in agricultural productivity. An estimate of soil erosion-induced 
productivity decline in Ethiopia established by Shiferaw and Holden (2000) of 
2.2% a year was used in scenarios B and C.  
 
Agricultural intensification is not out of reach in Ethiopia. Byerlee et al. (2007) 
note that success will require progress in strengthening smallholder access to 
inputs, technology, information as well as incentivising their use and adoption. 
Diao and Pratt (2007) generated economy-wide simulations for Ethiopia based 
on agricultural and non-agricultural growth trends for 1995 to 2002. They 
suggest investments could raise staple yields by 3.4% annually, of which 1.3% 
would result from the expansion of crop area and 2.1% from growth in yields. 
Scenario A follows this suggestion, using a 2.1% productivity increase to 
simulate improvements in market infrastructure across the BME.  
 
Scenarios B and C, however, take a more pessimistic view. This is in line with 
the historical performance of agricultural intensification efforts in Ethiopia 
where, despite ongoing public investment and the availability of technology for 
agricultural intensification, higher or more sustainable cereal yields, reduced 
food aid dependency, improved food security or lower prices for staples  has 
not been delivered (Byerlee et al., 2007, Spielman et al., 2010). While grain 
production grew by 74% between 1989/90 and 2003/4, cultivated area increased 
by 51% (Gebreselassie, 2006). Productivity gains can largely be attributed to the 
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expansion of agriculture rather than successful agricultural intensification (Diao 
and Pratt, 2007, Byerlee et al., 2007).  
 
7.2.2.2. Forest productivity 
 
While in scenarios A and C it is assumed that forest use is sustainable as a result 
of CFM implementation, scenario B challenges this assumption. No data are 
available on the impact of forest degradation on household incomes from low-
impact forest products in the region and the best guess of lost profit as forests 
decline is equivalent to the area lost under project goals; 3% in years 1-5, 2% in 
years 6 to 10 and 1% in years 11-20 (UNIQUE, 2008). This is likely to be a 
conservative estimate; biomass in moist degraded forest was found to be 31% 
less than that in non-degraded moist forest which suggests that the availability 
of forest products is more substantially reduced in degraded forests than 
assumed in this simulation (Chapter 5). 
 
Scenario B is similarly pessimistic about the development of markets for forest 
products. In contrast, scenarios A and C allow for value to be added to forest 
products. Evaluation of the indigenous plant material in the BME has identified 
that organisational improvement and expansion of activities could result in 
value addition at the local-level for wild coffee, bee products, and other 
indigenous plant species (Wren, 2007). As such, a number of activities have 
been undertaken to promote commercialisation of forest products including 
Business Management Training for local actors and the construction of a 
Collection and Processing Learning Centre with a bamboo workshop, honey 
processing and packaging unit and retail shop. BERSMP have been actively 
seeking business development partners and a Bale Wild brand has been 
established. 
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The change in profitability of forest products as a result of CFM activities in the 
BME is, however, difficult to predict. There are few empirical or quantitative 
case studies of the outcomes of NTFP development on household incomes 
(Sheil and Wunder, 2002, Gram, 2001, Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). The level of 
benefits and sustainability of NTFP use are also site and species specific 
(Wollenberg and Ingles, 1998). A similar CFM approach was followed in 
another project in the south-west of Ethiopia. This Non-Timber Forest Product 
Research and Development Project was successful in raising the price of a 
kilogram of honey from 3-7 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) to 16-18 ETB, a 340% increase, 
through organic certification (BERSMP, 2008). The Bale Forest Enterprise has 
agreed to pay 25% above the local market price for quality coffee beans in the 
BME and specialised coffee buyers have expressed interest in paying up to 
US$10 per kg of forest coffee; considerably more than the US$2.20 per kg in 
local markets (BERSMP, 2009).  
 
Despite the uncertainty introduced by the qualitative project goals, which are 
simply to add value to forest products in the BME, scenario A represents a best-
guess at productivity increases. The forest products included in the OCs 
calculation are bamboo, climber, coffee and honey. As coffee and honey are not 
ubiquitous across the forests of the BME and it is not clear that value added will 
be obtained by all households, a conservative average estimate of a 5% price 
increase is applied in scenario A across these forest products. Scenario C instead 
assesses the level of value addition required to be added to forest products in 
order to result in zero total OCs of forest conservation. Value addition raises the 
price for products rather than yields and therefore would not increase pressure 
on the forest resource base. Both scenarios assess net productivity gains, thus 
these are gains after any additional costs of harvesting, processing, trading, 
transporting and marketing products have been deducted. 
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7.2.3. Income from REDD+ 
 
Realising the value of previously non-marketed environmental services from 
the forest can go some way to overcoming the OCs of forest conservation. 
Carbon is considered the largest of the non-market values (Pearce, 1997) and is 
included in this Chapter while other non-market values are not. These include 
environmental values such as watershed protection, biodiversity protection and 
landscape beauty (Pearce and Warford, 1993, Davies and Richards, 1999). The 
omission of these values are common in studies of the OCs of conservation (e.g. 
Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Grieg-Gran, 2008), although it is acknowledged 
that inclusion of other non-market values is likely to decrease the net OCs of 
forest conservation (Nepstad et al., 2007, Bellassen and Gitz, 2008).  
 
While CFM and REDD+ can both be undertaken as separate policy 
interventions, in the BME these are therefore considered together: the Bale 
REDD+ Project undertakes REDD+ via CFM. Thus emission reductions do not 
have to be additional to that achieved through CFM, but rather are those 
generated by CFM (see also Chapter 3 for a full description of the Bale REDD+ 
Project). Covering a total of 923,593 ha, the REDD+ project area consists of the 
dry and moist tropical forest as well as the southern woodlands. 
Documentation for the proposed Bale REDD+ Project states that emission 
reductions will be generated only from change in the tropical dry (Agarfa) and 
moist forest (Delo Mena) regions. Changes in the area of woodland (Goro) will 
be set-aside to account for emissions that may be relocated rather than reduced; 
termed ‘leakage’ (see Sohngen and Brown, 2004). Therefore, only emission 
reductions in the 576,856 ha of dry and moist forest are assumed to generate 
carbon revenues. In Chapter 5, it was determined that carbon stocks in these 
dry and moist forests of the BME had an area-weighted average of 195tC/ha. 
The proposed Bale REDD+ Project in the BME was found to be able to generate 
180,271,808 tonnes of CO2 over the 20-year project period. In assessing whether 
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carbon revenues from REDD+ are able to overcome the OCs of forest 
conservation incurred by forest users, carbon income is calculated per hectare of 
deforestation but shared over the total are of avoided deforestation. The OCs of 
forest conservation will still need to be overcome on the woodland even though 
it will not generate saleable emission reductions (see Table 22).  
 
Table 22. Deforestation rate and area of avoided deforestation according to documented 
conservation project goals.  
 
 
Deforestation 
rate 
Area of forest generating emission reductions (ha/yr) 
 dry and moist forest 
dry forest, moist forest 
and woodland 
Years 1-5 3% 5,769 9,236 
Years 6-10 3% 11,537 18,472 
Years 11-20 1% 17,306 27,708 
 
The finance available to compensate OCs will depend on the price of a tonne of 
emission reductions and the costs of getting the emission reductions to market. 
A financial analysis in Chapter 5 valued emission reductions on the voluntary 
carbon market at between US$3 and US$6/tCO2. The lower bound represented 
the interest shown by early buyers, the upper bound more optimistic about 
achieving a price premium. This premium could be achieved once the project is 
certified to voluntary standards that require third-party verification of project 
methods and due diligence for carbon as well as environmental and social 
project goals (e.g. VCS, 2007, CCBA, 2008). The voluntary carbon market price 
for REDD+ is taken here at US$3/tCO2 and US$6/tCO2e.  
 
Given no clear price trend for emission reductions on the voluntary market for 
REDD+, for emission reductions from Africa or overall, these carbon prices are 
assumed to be fixed over the project period (Hamilton et al., 2007, Hamilton et 
al., 2008, Hamilton et al., 2009, Hamilton et al., 2010, Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). 
The income from emission reductions was established by subtracting upfront 
and annual project costs from REDD+ revenue. These annual costs included 
monitoring, verification, registration, brokerage of emission reductions, and 
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CFM operating costs. Possible leakage and non-permanence risks were 
accounted for through a 65% buffer of emission reductions pre-sale (UNIQUE, 
2008). Thus far, however, the incidence of these costs of the Bale REDD+ Project 
is not clear. BERSMP has, for example, so far absorbed upfront project 
development costs. Furthermore, with national REDD+ plans underway, risks 
of leakage and non-permanence could be addressed at a national level. 
Withholding a risk buffer of emission reductions may not therefore be 
necessary (R-PP, 2011).  
 
REDD+ profit is calculated net of the costs of implementation that are not likely 
to be overcome through national mechanisms or via NGOs involved in the 
project. These costs are outlined in Chapter 5 and include, here, project 
implementation costs of CFM operation, brokerage, and monitoring, reporting 
and verification of emission reductions. The resultant REDD+ revenue per 
hectare, is compared with the cumulative OCs of a hectare of land. It is 
assumed that carbon revenues will be received in the year in which the forest is 
conserved, thus annually over the 20-year period. 
 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Estimates of the opportunity cost of forest conservation over time 
 
In Optimistic scenario A, the income from both agricultural land and forest area 
increases without land degradation. With incomes to cropland already greatly 
exceeding income from low-impact forest products per hectare, the growth in 
agricultural productivity offsets the added value to forest products, so that the 
present value of annual OCs in scenario A remain positive at US$74/ha at the 
end of the project period. Under this storyline, there remains an economic 
incentive to convert forest to agricultural land throughout the lifespan of the 
project.  
 
  218 
In Pessimistic scenario B and Zero-OC scenario C, crop income declines due to 
assumptions of unsustainable farming practices lowering yields combined with 
failure to increase agricultural productivity. Under scenario B, the income from 
forest products also declines as a result of overharvesting and the inability to 
add value to forest products. Although the annual OCs in scenario B remain 
positive over the 20-year lifespan, they decline to US$7/ha in project year 19 
suggesting that incentives to deforest, although, positive, would be weaker than 
under Scenario A.  
 
Unlike scenario B, scenario C sees forest productivity per hectare rising over 
lifespan of the intervention. The annual OC becomes negative at project year 13. 
In this year, forest income is projected to be greater than agricultural income 
per hectare due to the continued degradation of agricultural land reducing 
yields, no agricultural intensification and successful development of markets 
for forest products. At project year 19 the income from a hectare of forest is 
US$99 more than the income for the equivalent area of agricultural land (Figure 
18). 
 
Looking at the cumulative OCs and total OCs of forest conservation in the three 
scenarios clearly illustrates how small changes in the storyline substantially 
change the outcome. The cumulative OCs per hectare, for a forest area taken 
out of production in the first year of the intervention, are US$3,658/ha in 
scenario A and US$1,889 in scenario B illustrating the large differences in the 
incentives faced when agriculture is foregone for a 20-year period. This is not 
just due to the difference in discount rate that is present between scenario A 
and B. Comparing scenarios A and C with the same discount rate, the 
cumulative OCs of land taken out of agricultural production in year one is the 
same. However, in scenario C forest profits increase, despite agricultural land 
degradation, to such an extent that cumulative OCs become negative at project 
year 8. At this point, the discounted income from that hectare of land for the 
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remainder of the project period is such that forest conservation is the 
economically rational choice.  
 
The overall discrepancy in the scenarios can also be seen in the total OCs. 
Summing the cumulative OCs over the area of forest conserved, the total OCs 
in the probable scenarios A and B are substantial. The total OCs exceed US$414 
million in scenario A which is almost three times the total OCs in scenario B of 
U$115 million. In normative scenario C, increases in the price of forest products 
by 12.6% annually were able to generate zero total OCs over the entirety of the 
forest area conserved. In this economically viable forest scenario, the sum of the 
positive total OCs incurred over the full Bale REDD+ Project intervention 
lifespan, amounting to US$55,746,098, are offset completely by the sum of the 
negative total OCs (Table 23). Thus in scenario C the storyline as it stands is 
sufficient to overcome the OCs of forest conservation without REDD+ project 
development. However, it is clear that while forest conservation might become 
economically rational, this result relies on a 20-year time horizon being 
considered by local forest stakeholders.  
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Figure 18. Annual opportunity costs over time under three future scenarios.  
The annual opportunity costs (OCs)(US$/ha) are shown over the lifetime of the Bale REDD+ 
Project intervention for three future scenarios. Scenarios represent differing assumptions of 
sustainability of the resource base, efforts to intensify agricultural production and adding value 
to forest products.  
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Table 23. Annual, cumulative and total opportunity costs of forest conservation under three scenarios.  
Differing assumptions of sustainability and of the productivity gains from agricultural and forest land-uses translate to large differences in opportunity cost (OC) 
estimates of a the Bale REDD+ Project intervention over a 20-year time horizon. All OCs estimates are reported as present values (scenarios A and C with discount 
rate of 10%, and scenario B with discount rate of 20%). Annual OCs (US$/ha) refer to the difference between the discounted incomes from the alternative land uses, 
per hectare, in a given project year. Cumulative OCs (US$/ha) refer to the discounted sum of the difference in the income of the two land uses for a 20-year period. 
The total OCs (US$) refers to the cumulative OCs incurred over the total area of avoided deforestation.  
 
Project 
year 
Forest 
saved 
(ha) 
‘Pessimistic’ Scenario A ‘Optimistic’ Scenario B ‘Zero OC’ Scenario C 
Annual OC 
(US$/ha) 
Cumulative OC 
(US$/ha) 
Total OC 
(US$) 
Annual OC 
(US$/ha) 
Cumulative OC 
(US$/ha) 
Total OC 
(US$) 
Annual OC 
(US$/ha) 
Cumulative OC 
(US$/ha) 
Total OC 
(US$) 
0 9,236 356 3658 33,783,665 356 1889 17,446,610 356 1681 15,527,830 
1 9,236 329 3302 64,279,339 291 1533 31,605,229 307 1325 27,767,668 
2 9,236 303 2973 91,740,690 237 1242 43,079,703 263 1018 37,173,508 
3 9,236 280 2670 116,402,374 194 1005 52,363,013 224 755 44,151,080 
4 9,236 258 2391 138,481,431 158 811 59,857,630 188 532 49,063,257 
5 9,236 238 2133 158,178,588 129 653 65,892,119 157 343 52,234,857 
6 18,472 219 1895 193,180,340 104 524 75,577,305 129 186 55,678,970 
7 18,472 202 1676 224,132,782 85 420 83,340,188 103 58 56,746,098 
8 18,472 186 1474 251,353,251 69 335 89,537,053 80 -46 55,905,131 
9 18,472 171 1287 275,135,089 56 266 94,458,150 60 -126 53,577,763 
10 18,472 158 1116 295,749,419 46 210 98,339,934 41 -186 50,143,835 
11 27,708 145 958 322,295,481 36 164 102,892,588 25 -227 43,847,226 
12 27,708 134 813 344,813,375 30 128 106,436,014 9 -252 36,869,730 
13 27,708 123 679 363,623,926 24 98 109,159,324 -4 -261 29,632,530 
14 27,708 113 556 379,023,484 20 74 111,216,221 -17 -257 22,518,191 
15 27,708 104 443 391,285,748 16 55 112,731,630 -28 -240 15,875,130 
16 27,708 96 338 400,663,453 13 39 113,807,074 -39 -211 10,021,601 
17 27,708 88 243 407,389,939 10 26 114,525,062 -49 -172 5,249,236 
18 27,708 81 155 411,680,597 9 15 114,952,641 -58 -124 1,826,198 
19 27,708 74 74 413,734,213 7 7 115,144,294 -66 -66 0 
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7.3.2. Carbon profit as a forest product 
 
REDD+ project income per hectare is compared with the cumulative OCs of 
forest conservation modelled under the three scenarios. Applying the lower 
bound market price of emission reductions of US$3/tCO2e, net of the costs of 
REDD+ implementation, REDD+ revenues added between US$1,192/ha to 
US$39/ha to forest income depending on the year that the forest was conserved. 
In contrast, applying a market price of US$6/tCO2e that could be realised if 
third-party project standards are met, REDD+ revenues added between 
US$2,499/ha to US$80/ha (Table 24). 
 
In scenario A, at conservative carbon prices, REDD+ revenues were insufficient 
to overcome the cumulative OCs of forest conservation until the final three 
years of the project, with the discrepancy ranging from US$2,466 in year one to 
US$69/ha in year 17 of the project. In scenario B, REDD+ revenues are initially 
unable to overcome the cumulative OCs, but at project year 11 the difference is 
only US$2/ha and by year 19 REDD+ revenues are able to overcome the 
cumulative OCs by US$32/ha. Scenario C shows the same pattern as scenario B 
but greatly advanced. REDD+ revenues are able to overcome the cumulative 
OCs at project year 3 and at the end of the 20-year period exceed cumulative 
OCs by US$269 (Figure 19).  
 
Even with a more optimistic carbon market price of US$6/tCO2e, in scenario A 
REDD+ revenues were insufficient to overcome the cumulative OCs of forest 
conservation until project year 13, with a discrepancy of US$1,159/ha in the first 
year and US$2/ha at year 12. In contrast, at this higher carbon price, REDD+ 
revenues are sufficient at all time periods to overcome the OCs of forest 
conservation in scenario B (Figure 19). The revenues in excess of the OCs of 
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forest conservation amount to US$40,485,602 in scenario A, and US$79,276,050 
in scenario B. 
 
Table 24. REDD+ revenue for a hectare of avoided deforestation (US$/ha).  
The annual income per hectare over the lifetime of the Bale REDD+ Project intervention from 
carbon revenue established through two voluntary carbon market prices, minus costs, over the 
total area of avoided deforestation applying a 10% and 20% discount rate (DR). 
 
Project 
year 
Emission reduction price 
US$3/tCO2e  
Emission reduction price 
US$6/tCO2e 
10% DR 20% DR 10% DR 20% DR 
0 1,192 1,192 2,499 2,499 
1 1,084 994 2,271 2,082 
2 985 828 2,065 1,735 
3 896 690 1,877 1,446 
4 814 575 1,707 1,205 
5 762 493 1,573 1,018 
6 693 411 1,430 849 
7 630 343 1,300 707 
8 573 285 1,182 589 
9 521 238 1,075 491 
10 478 200 981 411 
11 434 167 892 343 
12 395 139 811 285 
13 359 116 737 238 
14 326 97 670 198 
15 297 80 609 165 
16 270 67 554 138 
17 245 56 504 115 
18 223 47 458 96 
19 203 39 416 80 
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Figure 19. Cumulative opportunity costs and REDD+ revenues over time.  
The cumulative opportunity costs (OCs) of forest conservation (US$/ha) for a hectare of land 
taken out of production in a given project year are presented as the bold line for the three 
scenarios representing differing assumptions of sustainability of the resource base, efforts to 
intensify agricultural production, and adding value to forest products. The potential REDD+ 
revenues receive for the hectare conserved (US$/ha) is presented by the dashed line, for the 
three future scenarios at two voluntary carbon market prices; US$3/tCO2e and US$6/tCO2e. 
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7.4. Discussion 
 
The Bale REDD+ Project intervention objectives in the BME are not quantified 
within project documents, which state only qualitative strategies to achieve 
these reductions in forest losses (BERSMP, 2006). Scenario modelling of the OCs 
of forest conservation illustrates that this linguistic uncertainty, combined with 
a lack of information on how the productivity of land use will change over time, 
leads to substantial uncertainty in annual, cumulative and total OCs of forest 
conservation. This difference is most clearly seen in the optimistic scenario A 
and pessimistic scenario B. The cumulative OCs per hectare of forest conserved 
in the first year of the intervention – but for the 20-year period – differs by 
US$1,769/ha between the scenarios, with total OCs in scenario B 28% of those in 
scenario A. These differences are a result of simple changes in the assumptions 
about intensification of agricultural production, the degradation that results 
from land use practices, the ability to increase the value of forest products and 
the discount rate applied.  
 
The highly positive annual OCs in Optimistic scenario A can be attributed the 
gains in agricultural productivity that outpace gains in forest product incomes, 
with neither land uses leading to degradation of the resource base. Agricultural 
intensification in Ethiopia, however, has persistently failed and this failure is 
attributed to a narrow focus on technology, with factors such as access to 
agricultural credit, incentive structure, institutions, governance and risk 
behaviours side-lined (Gebreselassie, 2006). Tenure insecurity, weak extension 
services and limited use of fertilisers, improved seeds and pesticides only 
exacerbate this. While the CFM project will give a form of tenure that has the 
potential to affect technology choice and utilisation within agriculture and 
influence access to long-term credit (Deininger et al., 2003), it may be that the 
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implementing agency has limited influence over agricultural intensification in 
the project area. 
 
The development of forest products, in contrast, may be more within the 
control of the conservation implementer. Forest product development has been 
set in motion by the BERSMP and is less influenced by the political economy. It 
has been successfully achieved in other regions of Ethiopia (BERSMP, 2008). In 
the explorative Zero-OC scenario C, it can be seen that a 12.6% increase in the 
prices of forest products per year can lead to zero total OCs of forest 
conservation at the end of the 20-year implementation period providing an 
economic incentive for forest conservation without carbon revenues. At year 13 
the annual OCs become negative and by project year 20, income from a hectare 
of forest exceeds that of crops by US$66/ha. Given that after this point standing 
forest becomes a more economically viable land option, it becomes more likely 
that despite the time horizon of the project coming to an end, incentives for 
forest conservation should continue. It is noted, however, that this will require 
consistent increase in the value of low-impact forest uses.  
 
Efforts are already underway to increase revenues from forested land. 
Improvements in harvesting, drying and packaging could make forest coffee 
suitable for export and specialist marketing. Improvements in the management, 
harvesting, processing, and marketing of honey is also possible. However, 
consideration is necessary of whether this annual price increase is realistic, as 
increasing at this rate to the end of project horizon requires a final price 11 
times the current prices of forest products. While this might be possible for 
forest coffee as evidenced by high international demand for premium coffees 
(Wren, 2007), it may not be possible or maintainable for other forest products 
such as honey which would rely largely on national product demand. This is 
further complicated by the differences found in forest income per hectare by 
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village location; coffee and honey are not ubiquitous across the BME (see 
Chapter 6). The production of forest coffee may also require a degree of 
excludability, and therefore a clearer understanding of the potential of areas for 
low-impact forest products is required. In some areas, the calculation of OCs of 
agricultural land, net of low-impact forest products may therefore be 
inappropriate. The Bale REDD+ Project implementers in the BME should, 
therefore, consider in more detail the extent of their influence on changes in 
productivity that impact on OCs of forest conservation.  
 
The theory of PES predicts that local stakeholders, that are the environmental 
service providers, will be willing to enter into a contract if the OCs of forest 
conservation can be overcome (Ferraro, 2008). Thus for REDD+ to be feasible at 
the case study site, REDD+ revenues should overcome the present value of 
foregone agricultural production which are the cumulative OCs of forest 
conservation estimated here. Under more conservative voluntary carbon 
market prices of US$3/tCO2e, while REDD+ revenues go some way to 
internalise the positive environmental externality of climate regulation by 
forests, they are largely insufficient in both scenario A and scenario B to 
overcome the cumulative OCs of forest conservation until the latter years of the 
project. At a higher carbon market price of US$6/tCO2e, REDD+ revenue per 
hectare is sufficient to overcome OCs at all time periods under scenario B.  
 
Scenario C is designed such that total OCs are zero over the full 20-year lifespan 
of the project. It was therefore expected that REDD+ revenues would exceed 
OCs. It should be remembered, however, that in this zero-total OCs scenario C, 
positive OCs are still incurred. Without a REDD+ project, the positive total OCs 
incurred in the initial 8 years amount to US$57 million. With a REDD+ project 
REDD+ revenues could be used to overcome these initially positive OCs. 
REDD+ revenue could be used not only to overcome the positive OCs in 
 228 
 
 
scenario C, but these revenues can also go some way to cover the upfront costs 
of the REDD+ project that were not included in the financial analysis. These 
costs include the development of project design documents, establishment of 
CFM units and certification to third-party standards and have been estimated at 
US$3,225,000 (UNIQUE, 2010). 
 
It is important to note that this financial analysis does not consider the 
mechanism by which carbon revenues could reach households. With no 
emission reductions purchase agreement made, there is no benefit sharing 
framework for REDD+ revenues in the BME. Therefore, it is unclear how much 
of the REDD+ revenue would reach the households and how much would be 
directed to other forest stakeholders such as the central or regional government. 
If large portions of REDD+ revenues are captured by governments, these will be 
less available to overcome the OCs to household. Furthermore, no information 
exists about the payment contract that would be necessary under the 
intervention which would define the timing of payments, length of contracts, 
and upfront investments required (Ferraro, 2008). The timing of REDD+ 
payments will be particularly important for the assessment of whether carbon 
revenues can overcome the OCs of forest conservation. In these scenarios the 
REDD+ revenues assumed to be realised in the year of avoided deforestation. 
However, it is likely that REDD+ payments would be received periodically, 
rather than annually. Given that most households in the BME are subsistence 
households with few saving opportunities, households may be unable or 
unwilling to take such a long-term view. A better understanding of their 
discount rates and the impact of risk on household land use decisions could 
revise these OC estimates as risk preferences have been shown to impact 
payment levels required in PES (Ferraro, 2008, Knoke et al., 2011). 
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With a focus on agricultural expansion as the primary driver of deforestation, 
the overharvest of high-impact forest products (fuelwood and timber) are 
omitted as a driver of deforestation. The Bale REDD+ Project intervention plans 
to meet the needs of households for high-impact products – such as timber and 
fuelwood – through a number of measures to produce or reduce the need for 
biomass from the natural forest. Thus these costs to households were excluded 
from scenario analysis. Further research to generate a model that assesses what 
fraction of deforestation can be attributable to each driver could also better 
estimate these costs. Grieg-Gran (2008) for example, assigns Brazilian 
deforestation to nine different land uses which account for between 1% to 63% 
of deforested area. With information on the changes in availability of 
agricultural land, the effects of forest policy on price feedbacks could also be 
included in the scenarios (see e.g. Busch et al., 2009, Fisher et al., 2011). Such 
land-market dynamics are commonly ignored in conservation planning 
(Armsworth et al., 2006). Here too it has been assumed that the price elasticity 
of demand is zero, or perfectly inelastic. More information would be required 
on area change to include an estimate of the price elasticity of demand, and to 
establish if the assumption of zero elasticity over or underestimates these OC 
estimates of forest conservation. This financial analysis of the OCs of forest 
conservation in the BME also excludes other environmental and social non-
market values of the forest including watershed protection, biodiversity 
protection, social capital, tenure security and empowerment provided by CFM. 
These non-market benefits could reduce the net OCs of forest conservation. The 
inclusion of other non-market values and the OCs of land for other drivers of 
deforestation as they become available would also be a valuable addition to 
future research and development of these scenarios. 
 
There are trade-offs in the number of simplifying assumptions made and the 
complexity of scenario modelling. Alternative methods such as general 
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equilibrium models and economic optimisation models, for example, are better 
able to consider market feedbacks (e.g. Cattaneo, 2005). In these scenarios prices 
are not modelled stochastically, with the assumption that prices for products 
will change linearly and therefore do not capture uncertainty. However, 
alternative methods are highly data and capacity intensive, thus they can be 
more difficult to use as an applied conservation tool. A further limitation of 
these scenarios is that their calibration did not rely on workshops or other 
participatory methods such as survey or Dephi methods (Höjer et al., 2008). 
Incorporating more diverse views, particularly of stakeholders and experts in 
the process would broaden the perspectives included within these scenarios. 
Despite their limitations, these scenarios serve to instigate discussion on how 
the private OCs of forest conservation can be influenced by the Bale REDD+ 
Project implementers in the BME. Scenario modelling of the private OCs of 
forest conservation is able to highlight the multiple sources of uncertainty that 
exist, and explore the implications of these uncertainties. As a form of creative 
visioning, scenarios allow stakeholders to break from established patterns of 
thinking (Wollenberg et al., 2000). Wollenberg et al. (2000) also note how 
scenarios allow stakeholders to overcome their tendency to overestimate the 
probability of desirable events.  
 
This analysis of REDD+ revenues challenges the speed and optimism with 
which many conservation practitioners have adopted REDD+ as a tool to 
finance forest conservation; REDD+ revenues on their own may not be sufficient 
to incentivise forest conservation. The expectations of REDD+ in Ethiopia and 
more globally have been high (Clements, 2010, R-PP, 2011). The aim of this 
scenario modelling is not obtain a single or ‘right’ answer. It is to highlight the 
need for further discussion of the intervention strategy and the potential impact 
of its objectives. A better understanding of conservation targets, the extent to 
which Bale REDD+ Project implementers are able to increase productivity of 
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land uses, and to internalise the non-market values of forests, will all help in 
understanding motivations for resource use and the design of appropriate 
incentives for forest conservation. Improving this scenarios analysis with more 
participatory calibration and repeating this analysis as intervention 
implementation progress is made, and more information becomes available, 
will allow the review of the progress of the intervention over time. Scenarios 
thus allow for more adaptive management. By allowing futures to be 
anticipated, planned for, and adapted to, scenario modelling of the OCs of 
forest conservation could lead to more effective conservation.  
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Chapter 8: Household intention to cooperate in forest conservation 
 
8.1. Introduction 
8.1.1. Problem statement 
 
CFM establishes a common property regime where members of a well-defined 
group of people determine collective regulations for resource use, membership, 
monitoring, and sanctioning procedures (Arnold, 2001, Baland and Platteau, 
2003). Such a shift to a common property regime from often de facto open access, 
establishes rights to the use and management of forest resources. It also 
establishes institutional arrangements that manage and enforce these rights 
both within the members of a group and for exclusion of those that are not 
members.  
 
There are growing calls for REDD+ to be delivered via CFM (Klooster and 
Masera, 2000, Murdiyarso and Skutsch, 2006, Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009, 
Hayes and Persha, 2010). Both require the bundle of rights and obligations to be 
recognised by a country’s legal system and enforced by its government. 
However, the economic incentives that underpin REDD+ would also need to 
operate in the context of the institutions and legal context established by CFM. 
There would need to be clarification of carbon rights, for example, in addition 
to forest use rights, and discussions around the role of the collective versus the 
individual if REDD+ payments were to be made and distributed according to 
the theory of REDD+, where it operates as a local-level PES mechanism 
providing economic incentives for the provision of environmental services (see 
Chapter 2 for other options to fund and implement REDD+). 
 
Historically, CFM implementation has not offered communities payments. 
Instead, it is assumed that the change in property rights regime leading to 
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increased empowerment and improved governance mechanisms, as well as 
improved forest resource management, will shift incentives sufficiently to 
deliver the resource management outcomes (Agrawal, 2003). The behavioural 
theory of collective action also indicates that the cooperative management of a 
common pool resource is not only influenced by the income from direct 
extraction, but by the impact of reputation, trust and reciprocity on households’ 
payoffs, which can be considered as their costs and benefits (Ostrom, 2000, 
Castillo and Saysel, 2005). There is, therefore, a divergence between dominantly 
economic incentives for PES and the incentives to engage in CFM.  
 
Few studies have noted that the OC approach to payment incentives in PES 
ignores the logic of collective action (Kosoy et al., 2008, Muradian et al., 2010). 
Estimates of the OCs of REDD+ commonly assume that household’s act as self-
interested profit maximisers thus acting independently of their impacts on 
others. It is clear, however, that individuals are often influenced by their 
adherence to social and cultural norms (Baland and Platteau, 1996). These are 
their preferences for altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformity 
with the wider community rather than purely their selfish motivation. This, for 
example, has been demonstrated by Velez et al. (2009) for extraction from a 
common pool fishery in Colombia.  
 
The incentives for households to engage in REDD+ via CFM are not only 
potential carbon payments and improvements in forest management regime, 
but the devolution of use rights, the institutions and social capital established 
through CFM; therefore, the empowerment to take more control over resource 
management. These incentives can impact on households’ willingness to incur 
costs of collective action, such as use restrictions, monitoring, patrolling and 
attending community meetings, so long as others reciprocate and adhere to the 
institutions put in place (Vatn, 2010).  
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As well as the omission of the logic of collective action in incentives for 
cooperation in REDD+, estimates of the OCs of REDD+ have also commonly 
omitted the non-market environmental values of forest conservation. These 
include watershed protection, biodiversity protection and conservation of 
landscape beauty (Pearce and Warford, 1993, Davies and Richards, 1999). The 
omission of non-market environmental values is largely due to complexity in 
their measurement and subsequent valuation, with methods varying in 
theoretical validity and acceptance, data requirements and ease of application 
(see OECD, 2002, Pagiola et al., 2005b). Their omission is acknowledged by 
studies as having the potential to overestimate the payment to incentivise forest 
conservation behaviours (e.g. Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006, Grieg-Gran, 2008).  
 
The omission of the logic of collective action as well as non-market 
environmental values could help explain findings where local stakeholders 
participate in PES where the estimated OCs are not met (Wunder, 2005, Corbera 
et al., 2007b, Kosoy et al., 2007). Of course, participation despite negative OCs 
could also result where stakeholders lack information on the market value of 
services they supply or the experience to truly evaluate the contracts they are 
offered (Peskett and Harkin, 2007, Kosoy et al., 2008). In order to opt out of PES, 
stakeholders must also be free from external pressure and coercion which is not 
always the case (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005, Robertson and Wunder, 2005, Pagiola 
et al., 2005a, Bennett, 2008). However, the omission of economic values of 
environmental goods and services provided by forest conservation, and the 
logic of collective action, both existing and generated by CFM incentives and 
sanctions, could lead to inappropriately designed REDD+ incentives.  
 
The literature on participation in PES has focused on a locals stakeholder’s 
ability and eligibility to enter into a scheme, rather than on their desire to 
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participate (Pagiola et al., 2005a, Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Wunder, 2008, Pascual 
et al., 2010, Sommerville et al., 2010). The literature for participation, or 
cooperation, on a common pool resource is more substantial. Consensus on an 
enabling environment for sustained collective action is summarised by Agrawal 
(2001) as small, interdependent groups that are relatively well off, with 
adequate underlying technical and institutional capacity and high dependence 
on forests for their livelihoods (see also Baland and Platteau, 1996). Studies have 
explored determinants of CFM success with regards to forest condition 
(Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006, Andersson and Agrawal, 2011); resource 
appropriators access to forest (Adhikari et al., 2004, Naidu, 2011); and 
participatory processes (Adhikari and Di Falco, 2009). The literature focuses on 
the impact of heterogeneity in wealth, interest, and social factors, although the 
outcome of these factors remain debated (see Poteete and Ostrom, 2004, Naidu, 
2009).  
 
Studies of cooperation in CFM, however, rarely consider how households’ 
perceive the resource system or intervention. Matta and Alavalapati (2006) is an 
exception that considers participants perceptions of a CFM intervention in 
India. They find that those who believe environmental problems to be of high 
concern in their village and those with greater levels of education rate the 
overall perceived performance of the intervention more highly; where rated on 
a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 is the highest. It is noted that in this study the 
perceptions of the overall performance of the CFM intervention depended on 
individuals’ initial perceptions of environmental problems and what they 
perceived the benefits of CFM were and so each person has a different baseline. 
Therefore, overall success and sustained participation in the studied CFM 
intervention will be a function of the perceptions of participants who vary in 
knowledge, understanding and beliefs. As with other studies of cooperation in 
CFM, however, Matta and Alavalapati (2006) is an ex-post assessment and not 
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applied for intervention design or planning. However, if the factors which 
improve cooperation in an intervention are known, they could be actively 
promoted (Cavalcanti et al., 2010). 
 
The attitudes and perceptions of those local to interventions has been 
recognised as important for success in the conservation literature (Zanetell and 
Knuth, 2004, Davies and Hodge, 2006, Nkonya et al., 2008). Zanetell and Knuth 
(2004) in their analysis of participation in community-based fishery 
management, find an unwillingness of respondents to participate where 
insurmountable problems were perceived, whereby villagers did not believe 
that anything they could do would alleviate the decline of the fishery in 
Venezuela. Communities have also been found less willing to support 
community based management where they believe the capacity of community 
institutions to undertake these challenges to be weak (Masozera et al., 2006). In 
Uganda, a survey of attitudes to a community conservation programme seven 
years after the intervention began, found communities to be critical of the 
conservation intervention with largely unchanged behaviour and high level of 
illegal activities (Infield and Namara, 2001).  
 
The PES literature, more recently, has also called for more attention to be paid 
to stakeholders’ attitudes and perceptions in PES schemes (Corbera et al., 2007a, 
Kosoy et al., 2008, Petheram and Campbell, 2010). An understanding of a 
stakeholder’s attitude towards forest management and the use of the resource 
base will allow more consideration of socio-cultural factors for cooperation that 
go beyond payment incentives that PES theory highlights (Ferraro, 2008, 
Wünscher et al., 2008).  
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8.1.2. Aims and objectives 
 
The Bale REDD+ Project has been proposed and initiated by the Government of 
Ethiopia (Oromia Regional Government, Bureau of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, and the Food Security and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Commission) and NGOs FARM-Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia: the Bale REDD+ 
Project implementers. The project area covers 900,000 ha including dry and 
moist tropical forest which is currently being lost at 4% annually. In order to 
reduce deforestation over a 20 year period, CFM will be implemented alongside 
promotion of fuel-efficient stoves and biomass briquettes and plans are 
underway to plant woodlots and manage fire outbreaks. Increasing agricultural 
production and the value of NTFP will also occur as part of the project. While 
CFM and REDD+ can both be undertaken as separate policy interventions, in 
the BME these are considered together: the Bale REDD+ Project undertakes 
REDD+ via CFM. Thus emission reductions do not have to be additional to that 
achieved through CFM, but rather are those generated by CFM (see Chapter 3 
for a full description of the Bale REDD+ Project).  
 
Chapter 5 indicates that, while uncertain, emission reductions and positive 
REDD+ revenues are feasible at the case-study site. The 20-year project could 
generate 180ktCO2e, even when accounting for only above-ground tree 
biomass. In Chapter 6, high positive OCs of forest conservation are found from 
foregone agricultural production, net of low-impact forest product harvesting. 
Average OCs of agricultural production US$334/ha in the survey year and 
Chapter 7 indicated that REDD+ revenues may be insufficient to overcome 
these OCs. 
 
This Chapter investigates the local attitudes to resource management and 
conservation at the case-study site in order to complement the empirical 
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estimates of households’ OCs of REDD+ via CFM. In addition, the cooperative 
intention of a household is also assessed using a voluntary contribution to 
secure forest resource benefits into the future through CFM. Multivariate 
regression is used to investigate households’ strength of intention to cooperate 
under a proposed CFM regime. I add to knowledge by considering how ex-ante 
information on attitudes and perceptions can be used in intervention design to 
encourage cooperation between households. I then outline the implications of 
these findings for REDD+ via CFM at the case-study site.  
 
8.2. Methods 
8.2.1. The REDD+ via CFM, Bale REDD+ Project 
 
Although the extraction fuelwood for sale and timber extraction is illegal, in the 
status quo, the forest resource is a de facto open access regime. This is due to a 
lack of enforcement of forest laws. Each user is capable of subtracting welfare 
from other users and forest use is presently reported to be unsustainable with 
deforestation rates at 4% annually (BERSMP, 2006, BMNP, 2007). In order to 
tackle nationwide forest losses, Ethiopia is supporting the roll-out of CFM; the 
policy and legal framework of which is driven by the 2007 proclamation for 
Forest Development, Conservation and Utilisation. The state retains the rights 
to land, but use rights for forests are agreed with communities.  
 
A proposed Bale REDD+ Project in the south-east of Ethiopia will devolve 
management responsibilities to communities through CFM while generating 
emission reductions through avoided deforestation. It is therefore a REDD+ via 
CFM project. By implementing the CFM regime, communities will not have 
property rights to the land but rights of access, withdrawal, management and 
exclusion of certain forest products. They legally have claim to the benefit 
streams from low-impact forest products (climber, coffee, honey and bamboo), 
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and must restrict their extraction of high-impact forest products, namely, 
fuelwood and timber (see Section 4.3.2.2.). The expansion of agricultural land 
will also be strictly controlled. These rights will be transferred through forest 
management agreements made with the Bale Forest Enterprise and CBOs, 
groups of about 30 households, and will come with duties such as attending 
meetings, monitoring and patrolling of a defined forest area. Thus the 
establishment of CFM is not a complete transfer for rights, but a partial transfer 
where the state retains the ownership of land. Although yet to be confirmed, the 
Bale Forest Enterprise is likely to retain the carbon rights for emission 
reductions generated and benefit-sharing mechanisms have yet to be discussed 
and negotiated (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.4). 
 
Historically in the BME, forests were under traditional management systems 
and elders were responsible for the introduction locally agreed rules and norms 
of resource us (Wakijira et al., in press). While these traditional forest 
management systems have been eroded by central government over time, some 
do exist to manage other communal resources in the region such as mineral 
springs for livestock and for the harvest of forest coffee (Chiodi and Pinard, 
2011). The existence of traditional councils exist can prove conduits for 
organised local level forest management (Wily, 2010), which is promising for 
the implementation of the Bale REDD+ Project as REDD+ via CFM. 
 
The Bale REDD+ Project is still in a design phase, however. With the 
intervention yet to be implemented in survey villages, the description of CFM 
in the BME relies on predicted rules of the intervention. During implementation 
forest use rules will be established by user groups including; what to extract, to 
what level, and how to distribute that extraction and sanctions if rules are 
broken. The exact conditions placed on households will, therefore, be 
negotiated with CBOs and households through the process of CFM 
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establishment. The description as given to survey respondents was, therefore, 
based on the available information on the intervention at the time. It is assumed 
that high-impact forest product harvest and expansion of agricultural land will 
not be allowed, while low-impact forest product harvest will be allowed under 
the proposed Bale REDD+ Project. The negotiation of forest management 
agreements will also clarify the transaction costs that households would need to 
incur under the new forest management regime. These include negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcement costs (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). It is likely that 
in reality, some households will make greater contributions to cooperative 
efforts through monitoring and enforcement, or administrative duties for CBO 
groups (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006; Meshack et al. 2006). However, these 
transaction costs of CFM on households cannot be established at present and 
these costs were not estimated for any households in this study (see Section 
4.3.2.2). 
 
8.2.2. Households’ environmental and forest management attitudes 
 
The environmental attitudes held by individuals derive from their underlying 
values and beliefs, thus qualitative study of opinions and perceptions of 
conservation interventions allows unobservable values to be better understood 
(Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). At the case study site, environmental attitudes to 
forest management were elicited in agree/disagree statements. This included 
anthropocentric motivation for resource use and non-market values, including 
option value for future direct and indirect use, and non-use values that capture 
the value of the forest existence and bequest for future generations (Davies and 
Richards, 1999). In addition, statements explored the general context and trade-
offs households make between environmental concerns and with other 
concerns of wellbeing and competing livelihood priorities (see Table 25). A 
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series of open-ended questions then explored opinions of past, present and 
proposed forest management regimes in the survey villages.  
 
A description of the Bale REDD+ Project intervention was then read out to 
survey respondents. This included CFM and the potential for emission 
reductions to be generated for which international payments might be available 
(see Appendix 1). Following this, respondents were asked if they would take 
part if the project came to their village. In agreeing to take part it is assumed 
that households undertake a calculus of the costs and benefits they perceive 
they will incur (Lubell, 2002). In order to assess their perceived net benefits of 
the scheme, households were then asked if their welfare and their income 
expectations would change in the year following the implementation of the 
intervention if it was to take place. This would include an internal calculation of 
the costs and benefits of restrictions on their use of land and forests in addition 
to what they perceive they might receive through REDD+ payments.  
 
While households received a description of how community cooperatives could 
receive money for keeping the carbon in the trees through REDD+, no anchor of 
the scale of the revenues that would be available through REDD+ was provided 
as this is not yet determined by the project and there was a fear of raising 
expectations by the Bale REDD+ Project implementers. This makes the 
interpretation of the perceived income expectations complex, thus it is not taken 
here to be a welfare measure or analysed purely on its own. Households were 
also asked, however, what they would spend carbon revenues on if payments 
were made. Household responses were coded for community, private or a 
combination of community and private goods. Community goods are defined 
as those that benefit the community at large, for example using the money for 
roads, bridges, and clinics, whereas private goods are those that benefit the 
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household, for example using the money for trade, to school children, or to 
purchase livestock.  
 
Respondents were also asked if they believed other households would 
participate and follow the rules as outlined in the description of the Bale 
REDD+ Project. This question was intended to determine if respondents would 
trust other households and to assess if they believed other households would 
reciprocate in cooperating in the communally used forest area.  
 
Table 25. Attitudinal statements towards environmental values and livelihoods.  
Agree/disagree statements to which households responded in the semi-structured survey and a 
description of the values they relate to. 
 
Value elicited Statement  Description 
anthropocentric 
“If an area of forest is not being used 
by people it is not a problem if the 
forest area gets smaller” 
The anthropocentric statement 
considers the instrumental nature 
of household environmental values 
selfish 
“Even if my household does not use a 
part of the forest, I would participate in 
this forest management” 
The selfish statement highlights 
whether households consider the 
wider community or are motivated 
purely by private returns 
option 
“I do not think about my household's 
use of forest in the future, it is enough 
to think only about my households use 
of the forest now” 
Option value concerns goods and 
services that are not used at 
present, but have the potential to be 
used directly or indirectly, in the 
future 
bequest and 
altruistic 
“There is a responsibility for me to 
manage the forest well now so that my 
children and future generations can 
benefit from forest in the future” 
The availability of goods and 
services to be used by future 
generations is referred to as bequest 
value and by current generations as 
altruistic value 
existence 
“One management objective for forests 
in the Bale Mountains should be to 
support wildlife that lives there” 
The satisfaction in knowledge that 
services merely exist is classified as 
existence value 
trade-offs 
“Forests should be managed only if this 
does not negatively affect people's 
livelihoods” Trade-off and general context 
statements highlight the 
prioritisation of forest conservation 
against other livelihood needs and 
well-being concerns 
(a) general 
context 
“People have more important things to 
worry about than good management to 
maintain the forest” 
(b) general 
context 
“People only cut down the forest 
because they have no other way of 
supplementing their livelihoods” 
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8.2.3. Households’ intention to cooperate with the Bale REDD+ Project 
 
Cooperation in this study is defined as not only entry into the CFM scheme, but 
also abiding by the intervention rules and undertaking pro-conservation 
behaviours. Within a household’s cooperative intention, it is assumed that 
households will consider their OCs in addition to the value that households 
place on the devolution of use rights, on the institutions and social capital 
established, or on empowerment provided under a new CFM regime, and any 
transaction costs that CFM will impose on a household.  
 
A proxy of the strength of a household’s intention to cooperate was elicited 
with the question: ‘to secure benefits into the future, would you be willing to give up 
some of your yearly income to your CFM cooperative so that they could better manage 
the forest?’ and a follow-up question that elicited the voluntary contribution 
amount. This question is relates to a contribution towards sustainable forest 
management as defined in interviews as; maintaining the forest area and 
quality so as to provide benefits and income into the future. It was elaborated 
that high-impact forest products would need to be harvested without 
detriment, as would any grazing of livestock in the forest, but low-impact forest 
products would not be affected under the proposed sustainable forest 
management regime. It was also made clear that this would entail the creation 
of a community based group with full responsibility for the outcome agreed 
with the authorities. As traditional forest management used to be commonplace 
in the Bale Mountains (see Chapter 3), this is a management regime that the 
respondents were able to relate to and understand.  
 
The voluntary contribution is a hypothetical question, but where respondents 
reported future behaviour is assumed to illustrate their preferences or values. 
The hypothetical nature of the question means that no real economic 
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commitment of the individual is required and this may lead to hypothetical bias 
in the response through warm glow effects (Andreoni, 1989). The voluntary 
contribution is also not incentive compatible and therefore is not used to 
estimate a welfare measure in this study (Champ et al., 1997). A result of the 
hypothetical and ex-ante question, individuals may also lack familiarity with 
the operation of the proposed community based organisations (CBOs); the 
small groups of households that sign forest use agreements. In light of the Bale 
REDD+ Project being implemented through CFM and the possible, but 
uncertain, nature of payments to communities from REDD+, it is clear that there 
respondents will be confounding a multitude of incentives. These include 
potential monetary and in-kind incentives from REDD+ as well as the 
aforementioned benefits from cooperation under CFM. It is therefore, not 
possible to distinguish respondents attitudes towards REDD+ separately from 
those towards CFM. The value is also not considered a measure of willingness-
to-accept. The question was made as real as possible, however, with a 
description of the intervention and by indicating a clear form and frequency of 
payment. The CFM cooperative was also described to respondents as an honest, 
credible and reliable organisation with committees, rules and responsibilities 
(see Appendix 1). 
 
Acknowledging the limitations of the voluntary contributions approach, it is 
assumed that a household’s responses will reflect their future behaviour. The 
magnitude of the contribution elicited is assumed a quantitative indicator of 
behavioural intention to cooperate in the conservation intervention. Where a 
positive contribution exists, it indicates that the household is willing to move 
from the status-quo to the CFM regime (as outlined in Section 8.2.1) and it 
demonstrates a willingness to adhere to the rules as explained.  
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8.2.4. Econometric analysis 
 
The determinants of cooperative intention, using a respondent’s willingness to 
pay into the cooperative CFM group in order to contribute towards sustainable 
forest management as a proxy, were analysed using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression (see Chapter 4). Explanatory variables were selected based on 
a priori assumptions of their impact (Table 26). These variables include socio-
economic factors that might influence the voluntary contribution including 
income from agriculture, low-impact forest products (coffee, honey, climber 
and bamboo), and high-impact forest products (fuelwood and timber); and the 
households income expectations under the Bale REDD+ Project intervention. 
Demographic factors included were household size, years in village and the 
education of the household head.  
 
The voluntary contribution, high-impact forest product income and crop 
income were log transformed. This log transformation allows for a non-linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. It also 
normalises the residuals and reduces potential outliers with the dependent 
variable more likely to be normally distributed. Two zero values for the 
voluntary contribution were assigned the next smallest value of US$0.15 before 
log transformation. A dummy variable was generated for the presence or 
absence of low-impact forest product income, as 58 households had zero values. 
No strong colinearity between and of the independent regressors was observed 
(Table 27). 
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Table 26. Explanatory variables of intention to cooperate in the proposed Bale REDD+ Project 
intervention.  
Description, hypothesised impact and justifications for explanatory variables used to explore a 
proxy for a household’s intention to cooperate in the Bale REDD+ Project intervention through 
their willingness to give up a proportion of their income.  
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Explanation 
Hyp. 
impact 
Justification 
lifp_yn 
Dummy variable for income 
from low-impact forest 
products (bamboo, climber, 
coffee and honey); 1= income 
greater than US$0, 0= no 
income in the survey year 
+ 
It is predicted that if HH derive income 
from high-impact forest products, their 
contribution towards continuing to 
receive these benefits into the future will 
be higher (Baland and Platteau, 1999, 
Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006).  
log_hifp 
The log of the income a 
household derived from high-
impact forest production 
(timber and fuelwood) in the 
survey year 
- 
It is predicted that households would be 
less willing to contribute towards forest 
conservation given that they will have to 
undergo restrictions in their use.  
log_crop 
The log of the net income a 
household derived from 
cultivated land in the survey 
year 
- 
With higher income from agriculture, an 
alternative source of income to forests, 
HH are expected to have a lower 
contribution.  
income_expe
ctation 
The amount by which the HH 
thinks their income will 
change under the CFM 
intervention 
+ 
The higher the expected income change 
in the first year following the 
intervention, the higher a household’s 
contribution is hypothesised to be. It is 
recognised that more research is 
required to understand the 
determinants of this variable, however. 
HH_size The total number of people in 
the household 
- 
With more mouths to feed, it is 
predicted that the contribution will 
decline as other needs dominate use of 
income. 
education 
The number of years of 
education of the HH head 
ranging from 0 to 13 years 
+ 
Education is expected to increase pro-
conservation behaviours as well as 
improving knowledge and skills to 
extract forest products more sustainably 
and cultivate land more intensively 
(Godoy and Contreras, 2001, Adhikari et 
al., 2004). 
village_years The number of years the HH 
head has lived in the village 
+ 
Experience through age and knowledge 
during length of residence is also 
expected to increase pro-conservation 
behaviour and thus the contribution. 
Agarfa Location dummy variable; 1= 
Agarfa, 0= not Agarfa Dummy variables for location were included in 
the model to control for village and forest fixed 
effects. Goro Location dummy variable; 1= 
Goro, 0= not Goro 
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Table 27. Correlation matrix of independent variables.  
Correlation between right hand side variables used to predict household intention to cooperate 
in CFM used to assess the risk of colinearity. 
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lifp 1       
log_hifp -0.13 1      
log_crop 0.01 0.09 1     
income_expectation -0.05 0.10 0.21 1    
HH_size -0.06 0.15 0.22 0.10 1   
Education 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.23 -0.09 1  
village_years -0.25 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 0.07 -0.31 1 
 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Exploring attitudes to forest conservation 
 
Perceived changes in the forest resource base 
Of 237 household surveys, seven households were dropped where crop 
production was absent or failed in the survey year. A further two households 
were dropped due to apparent misreporting of yields leaving 228 surveys. 
Households reported travelling on average 6km to gather forest products, with 
two households travelling as far as 16km. 90% of households reported that the 
distance they travelled this year was more than last year by an average of 
0.78km, but ranging up to 2km. 98% of households reported that they are likely 
to need to travel further next year with only two households reporting they 
would travel the same distance next year.  
 
Given these results, it is unsurprising that 87% of respondents do not believe 
that the current level of forest use by their household and others in their village 
is able to continue into the future; 1% report that they do not know, while only 
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11% believe current levels of forest use are sustainable. These changes were 
attributed to the decline in the forest area as well as forest clearing without any 
planning, replanting or conservation measures. Underlying causes are reported 
as increasing family sizes, immigration and lack of alternatives, while the 
proximate drivers of deforestation are identified by the respondents as clearing 
for agricultural land, increasing fuelwood demands, an increase in grazing in 
the forest and an increase in the number of landless people. It is also mentioned 
that more people are gathering forest products to sell as well as to use within 
their households in recent years. Box 1 presents some quotes from the 
respondents when asked about the sustainability of the forest resource base. 
Overall, it is clear that the forest is declining and those that do think forest use 
is sustainable, largely do so on the proviso that the government intervene. 
 
Box 1. Survey responses to the question “Do you think that the current level of forest use by your 
household and others in this kebele can continue into the future? Why?” 
 
Selected quotes from those who think forest use is not sustainable: 
− I can say forests will last for two years here after as it is badly being cut down for different 
uses. 
− As it is extremely deforested it will not last for two years. 
− If this situation continues it will not pass to the next generation because the cutting of forest 
is increasing. Forest conservation is not known in this area. There is even not enough forest 
for this generation. 
− Because most people are cutting down the forest without thinking about the next 
generation. If the government controls the forest and teaches the community about the 
forest benefit the forest management will be changed for the next generation. 
− Because the number of families are increasing and so the landless people increase. Even the 
students stop their education and start cutting down the forest for selling. For fuelwood 
other people are coming from other kebeles and for these reasons the forest will not pass to 
the next generation. 
 
Selected quotes from those who think forest use is sustainable: 
− If the government control the forest from time to time, if the community get education 
about using the forest sustainably and if the community gets a payment, the forest will pass 
to the next generation. 
− If the forest conservation is continuing, there will be forest for the next generation because 
the forest conservation in this kebele is good at the moment. 
− Because we are going to conserve the forest so that it can be passed to the next generation. 
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Attitudes to the environment and other values derived from the forest 
There was very little variation observed in the attitudinal survey data, which 
illustrated that respondents generally disagreed with anthropocentric 
motivations of forest use and with selfish motivations for forest use. 
Households also held a strong desire for forest to be available for future use 
(bequest, existence and option value). The general disagreement with the trade-
offs statement implies that households are willing to accept a reduction in 
private benefits in aid of forest conservation. It is also clear from the general 
context statement responses that livelihood and income security were high on 
the household agenda, with households believing that forests are a way of 
supporting livelihoods when other livelihood generating activities are not 
available (Figure 20).  
 
 
Figure 20. Responses to attitudinal statements of environmental values and livelihoods.  
Agree/disagree and don’t know responses of survey respondents relating to underlying values 
(see Table 25 for a description of the statements).  
  
anthropocentric
selfish
option
bequest
existence
trade-offs
(a) general
context
(b) general
context
agree don't know disagree
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Opinions on past and current forest management 
Many respondents reported a much stricter forest management regime under 
the Derg regime (before 1991). Permission from village authorities was required 
for timber for house construction and the gathering only of deadwood for 
fuelwood was permitted. Most report that this strict management was ‘better’ 
due to a combination of government control and traditional management by 
village elders. A number of respondents, for example, reported that they were 
required to plant fast growing eucalyptus under the Derg regime and sale of 
forest products were restricted. Elders reportedly taught people about tree 
growth and how to harvesting biomass but conserving the whole tree. 
However, there are also reports that restrictions were not always adhered to, 
although forests were able to meet livelihood needs as, before 1991, there were 
fewer forest users and fewer forest uses; deadwood was much more abundant, 
young men were recruited for national military service, and livestock 
ownership was more prevalent. 
 
Responses to questions on the current forest management in the area that the 
household uses reflect a decline in adherence to restrictions on use, advice from 
village committee members, and a loss of forest area. It is widely acknowledged 
amongst respondents that prohibitions exist for clearing forest and collecting 
some forest products for sale, but many respondents report the need of use for 
survival and therefore disregard of these rules. There are reports of competition 
between communities as well as within communities as a result of increasing 
family size, increasing number of families and increasing number of landless. 
Households report that they now gather forest products for sale, rather than 
predominantly for use within the household. However, a small number of 
respondents reported that current forest management is improving as a result 
of initiatives, by the government, to teach and implement CFM (Box 2).  
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Opinions of community forest management 
Responses to an open-ended question of how forest management might change 
if communities were given legal rights to use the forest and forest products, 
gave overall support for the devolution of management and REDD+ via CFM. A 
number of households, however, stated that forest management would improve 
only if education, awareness, advice and supervision are also provided by the 
authorities. Some noted that the village could provide greater control and 
management as the committee and people in the village are more aware of who 
is deforesting and who is not. In contrast, some respondents were less 
enthusiastic about the transfer of rights, believing that handing over rights 
could result in worsening forest management, particularly mentioning that 
changes could not occur unless the landless and the poor who rely on the forest 
are provided with alternative opportunities (Box 2).  
 
Following a description of the CFM scenario, respondents were asked if they 
and households in their village would join a CFM cooperative. The respondents 
showed high support for the proposed CFM intervention with 100% of 
respondents reporting that their household would join CFM. Furthermore, 79% 
of respondents believed that other households in the village would also join a 
CFM cooperative; the remaining 21% did not know if other members of the 
village would join a CFM group. When asked how certain they were that other 
members of a cooperative would follow the rules to maintain the forest area 
under CFM, 83% were certain, while 10% were uncertain and less than 7% of 
households did not know.  
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Box 2. Survey responses to questions on past, current and future forest management regimes 
 
Selected quotes on opinions of past forest management: 
− There was strict protection of forest in the past. We used only the deadwood for fuelwood 
and we had to have permission from the kebele authorities for house construction. 
− Past forest management was much better than the current management. Protection of the 
forest was much stricter and communities were forced to plant eucalyptus around their 
home. The number of forest and forest product sellers was also much less than currently.  
− Even if there was protection of forested we used to cut it for fuelwood and construction. In 
the past, however, there was more forest and less forest users. Most young men were 
recruited for national military service then, now it is being deforested by young men. 
− The situation under the Derg was very good. At that time elders taught people how to keep 
the forest according to the traditional culture. 
− In the past the forest was protected very well. During the Derg government the person who 
was cutting down the forest was punished. Even the person cutting down climber without 
permission was punished. For this conservation the weather condition was good during 
this time. 
Selected quotes on opinions of current forest management: 
− The current forest management is not good because of the increasing deforestation. Now 
we used the forest products for home and for selling, for everything! 
− Now we have to cut down forest for fuelwood and timber as there is shortage of deadwood 
and fallen wood. By law it is forbidden but most communities do not obey it.  
− We collect deadwood for firewood. For construction we are forced to cut down forest. But 
we do not openly cut down trees, we hide ourselves. Forest are being extremely 
unsustainably cut down. 
− The past forest management was better than the current one because forest protection was 
respected and the communities used to obey the management. 
− Currently, people are using forests for house building, fuelwood and selling forest 
products. Other people also come from other kebeles to cut down the forest.  
− The government are now teaching us about the forest benefits because the climate change 
affects the crop product and brings about famine. 
Selected quotes on opinions of giving community rights to the forest:  
− If the community gets the legal rights and they are taught how to conserve and how to use 
and save the forest the management will change. 
− The legal rights and education should be given in how to conserve or protect the forest. 
Representatives should be selected from the associations, and there should be checks and 
controls on how they are organised and how the forest is being conserved from time to 
time.  
− If the forest is given to communities, the communities will control their resources and the 
management will be better. This is because people know each other and they control each 
other very well.  
− There will be a big change because the committee and the people in the kebele recognise 
who is deforesting and who is not.  
− There will not be any change. Because if we get the right, we will just cut it down. 
− I don't think the forest management will change as most of communities in the kebele get 
benefits from forest and forest products and they only think for themselves. 
− Unless landless and the poor who live on and rely on forest get a solution to their problem 
there will be no change.  
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8.3.2. Perceived welfare and income expectations under CFM 
 
84 households had to be dropped from the sample due to enumerator 
misunderstanding of the perceived income change and voluntary contribution 
question. This reduced the sample size, but as the enumerator was employed 
over all survey villages, this did not lead to geographical bias. Nine further 
households were dropped where contribution data were missing from the 
enumerators’ data books. Of the remaining 135 surveys, 99% of households 
reported that their welfare would increase as a result of CFM, 1% (two 
households) reported a perceived decline in welfare; where welfare is defined 
without time delimitation and not restricted to a household’s change in income. 
The households that thought that their welfare would decline under CFM 
reported that they felt that restrictions would mean they would not be allowed 
to sell and use as many forest products as they needed. Only one stated that 
there would be too many interests under the cooperative so that he could not 
do as he pleased and would be influenced by other group members. 
 
Households that thought their welfare would improve largely attributed this to 
increasing incomes from the forest through products such as coffee and honey. 
A number of survey respondents also noted that in cooperatives, members are 
able to generate more income working together than they would on their own, 
benefiting from cooperation as well as more experienced individuals, or indeed 
any job activities that might arise through the cooperative. One household 
believed that the formation of a cooperative would allow work to begin on a 
road and bridge such that their well-being would be increased in the future. 
Another noted that improving the forest condition will attract wild animals and 
therefore tourists, to the area. 
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Improved crop production, as a result of improved local climate regulation, and 
income from possible carbon payments were mentioned by respondents when 
explaining improvement in welfare. This raises concerns over high expectations 
under forest conservation, particularly for the return of good rainfall for crop 
growth in the immediate term. However, when asked to think five years into 
the future, as well as similar mentions of the climate returning to normal, 
respondents talked much more broadly about the benefits from forest 
conservation including; improved seedling survival, increasing forest quality 
and flowering leading to improved honey yields, watershed benefits, and the 
persistence of forests for the next generation to use. These speculative 
expectations of the short-run benefits of forest conservation will need to be 
managed from a policy intervention perspective.  
 
Perceived income expectations of CFM were high in the period of one year after 
the implementation of the Bale REDD+ Project intervention. 99% of households 
perceived that their income would increase under CFM, and again two 
households believed their income would decline. These findings align with the 
above perceived welfare changes of households, which suggest households 
consider income very important to their welfare. The average income increase 
expected was US$286 ± 38. There was a large variation in the expected changes; 
households income expectations ranged from a loss of US$449 to a maximum 
increase of US$1,498 (Table 29).  
 
When asked what money from payments for carbon storage could be used for 
51% of respondents suggested only community goods. The most popular 
community good being the construction of a mill, followed by that of a school. 
29% of respondents reported only private uses with most popular response 
being trading followed by livestock. 20% of respondents suggested a 
combination of private and community benefits could be funded. While the 
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highest frequency response of trading appears an environmentally benign use 
of payments, the second most frequently reported private use of payment is 
livestock (Table 28). Where payments are designed, this indicates that 
secondary issues may well emerge. 40 respondents also suggested that the 
money should be reinvested in forest conservation.  
 
Table 28. Survey respondents’ reported desired use of carbon revenues by community and 
private goods.  
The suggested uses of REDD+ revenues that could be received under the proposed REDD+ via 
CFM intervention, divided into community goods that benefit multiple households and private 
goods that benefit only the survey household, with frequency of response reported in brackets.  
 
Community use of REDD+ revenue Private use of REDD+ revenue 
Mill (water and electric)(67) 
School (52) 
Irrigation (42) 
Bridge (41) 
Forest Conservation (40) 
Track (17) 
Transport (car/bus/lorry)(13) 
Road (13) 
Waterpipe (9) 
Clinic (8) 
Electricity (5) 
Industry (4) 
Welfare for elderly (3) 
Conserve wild animals (1) 
Trading (106) 
Livestock (cattle, oxen and 
sheep)(58) 
Fertiliser (24) 
Harvest machine (farming 
equipment)(19) 
Family improvement (e.g. teaching 
children)(17) 
House building (11) 
Seeds (6) 
Plantation (4) 
Saving (2) 
Coffee for trade (1) 
Farmland (1) 
Modern beehive (1) 
 
8.3.3. Households’ intention to cooperate in CFM 
8.3.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
In response to the question ‘to secure benefits into the future, would you be willing to 
give up some of your yearly income to your CFM cooperative so that they could better 
manage the forest?’, 99% of households were willing to contribute some of their 
yearly income. Only two households were not willing, stating reasons of not 
being able to afford it with one household stating that their income would 
decrease under the intervention, thus they would need support to pay into the 
scheme. The mean of the voluntary contribution into the cooperative CFM 
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group was US$11± 4/year. The distribution of the contribution is highly skewed 
with median voluntary contribution of US$4.49 per year (Table 29; Figure 21). A 
significant difference by location is found at the 5% level (Kruskall-Wallis, 
K=8.140, df=2, p=0.0171**). The trend between survey locations followed that 
found for forest incomes and was opposite to that found for households’ 
income expectations under the intervention: voluntary contributions were 
highest in the moist forest of Delo Mena where high value coffee grows and 
honey is a forest product option. The voluntary contribution was lowest in the 
woodland of Goro, where neither coffee nor timber, are viable forest products 
(see also Chapter 6). 
 
Table 29. (a) Mean household income expectation under proposed CFM regime and (b) 
willingness to pay into the cooperative CFM group by location.  
(a) The mean and median household income expectations (US$) in the first year of 
implementation of the Bale REDD+ Project intervention reported by survey village location with 
95% confidence interval as well as median and range. No significant differences were found 
between villages: Kruskall-Wallis, K=0.931, df=2, p=0.6279; (b) The mean and median voluntary 
contribution in order to contribute towards sustainable forest management, a proxy for a 
household’s intention to cooperation in CFM, is reported by survey village location with 95% 
confidence interval as well as median and range of values elicited. 
 
Location Mean Median Min Max 
(a) Income expectation under proposed CFM regime 
Agarfa (n=35) 280 ± 99 225 -449 1,124 
Goro (n=23) 323 ± 120 225 15 1,498 
Delo Mena (n=77) 278 ± 36 225 11 749 
All (n=135) 286 ± 38 225 -449 1,498 
(b) Voluntary contribution to the community cooperative for sustainable forest management 
Agarfa (n=35) 8.65 ± 3.79 7.49 0.00 52.43 
Goro (n=23) 3.78 ± 1.60 2.25 0.15 14.98 
Delo Mena (n=77) 14.42 ± 6.28 5.99 0.30 149.80 
All (n=135) 11.11 ± 3.78 4.49 0 149.80 
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Figure 21. Histogram of household’s willingness-to-pay into the into the cooperative CFM 
group. 
 
8.3.3.2. Econometric analysis 
 
An ordinary least squares regression model was employed to investigate the 
determinants of the voluntary contribution to the cooperative CFM group, a 
proxy for cooperative intention. Comparing the results to hypothesised impacts 
on the contribution level, many of the independent variables show the expected 
direction of the coefficient (Table 26; Table 30). The R2 value indicates that the 
model explains 29% of the variation, thus there are other factors not observed 
here which impact on the contribution amount. A Ramsey RESET test was used 
to assess the functional form of the model to detect omitted variables, 
suggesting that the model was not miss-specified (Ramsey RESET, F(3, 
121)=1.06, p=0.3673). 
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Table 30. Determinants of household voluntary contribution into the cooperative CFM 
group.  
OLS regression results for predictors of household voluntary contribution towards sustainable 
forest management, a proxy for a household’s intention to cooperation in CFM. Showing beta 
coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses and significance where; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
Determinants 
OLS dependent variable: 
log_voluntary contribution  
lifp_yn 
0.538*** 
(0.0971) 
log_hifp 
0.374** 
(0.177) 
log_crop 
0.278** 
(0.140) 
income_expectation 
0.00109*** 
(0.000367) 
income_expectation2 
-0.000000629*** 
(0.000000233) 
HH_size 
-0.0583*** 
(0.0175) 
education 
0.00840 
(0.0190) 
village_years 
-0.00300 
(0.00428) 
agarfa 
0.463*** 
(0.114) 
goro 
-0.0840 
(0.158) 
constant -1.215** 
(0.557) 
N 
R2 
135 
0.286 
 
Forest income and crop income 
Households that derive more income from the forest contributed more of their 
income for sustainable use of the forest into the future. This was true for low-
impact forest products of honey and coffee, as hypothesised, as well as high-
impact forest products that will be limited under the intervention. Given that 
the positive relationship between the voluntary contribution and high-impact 
forest product income exists despite of the proposed limitations of the 
intervention for high-impact forest product extraction, it could mean that 
forests are being significantly degraded that individuals believe that forests 
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cannot continue to be used in the present way. This would agree with the 
qualitative statements of many respondents. Crop income was predicted to 
negatively impact the contribution amount, however, no such relationship was 
found. In fact, a 10% increase in crop income predicts a 2.7% increase in the 
voluntary contribution. This may be due to the small variation in agricultural 
incomes found at the case study site (Chapter 6). It may also be due to higher 
ability to pay due to the alternative income source. With no instrument 
available, it is not possible to disentangle these effects further without further 
research. 
  
Income expectations 
The income change that households expect in the first year of the Bale REDD+ 
Project intervention was found to be a non-linear inverse U-shape. It is first a 
positive determinant of the voluntary contribution, then after a point, a 
negative determinant. This relationship with cooperative intention shows a 
diminishing impact of expected income on the contribution amount after a 
turning point at US$833, which falls within the range of income expectations 
between US$ -449 and US$1498. Interpretation of the coefficient shows that 
while significant, the marginal effect of income expectations are small; a US$1 
increase in income expectation increases the voluntary contribution by 0.07%. It 
is interesting to observe this finding even when the village level effects are 
controlled for, thus income expectations are not limited to locations where 
forest returns are highest. The findings of perceived income expectations are 
interpreted with caution as there are many factors that, themselves, will 
influence these perceived income expectations and in the absence of a clear 
instrument, this analysis is limited. 
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Demographic variables 
As predicted household size is a negative determinant of the voluntary 
contribution, likely due to competing demands for a large household’s income. 
An additional member of the household is predicted to reduce the voluntary 
contribution by close to 6%. It was predicted that the contribution amount 
would increase as a result of education as well as age and experience on pro-
conservation behaviours as predicted in Chapter 6. However, no such 
relationships were found.  
 
Location 
The impact of location on the voluntary contribution amount illustrates that 
households in the dry forests of Agarfa have higher intention to cooperate 
through the voluntary contribution proxy. This is interesting given that 
descriptive statistics indicate highest contributions occur in the moist forests of 
Delo Mena. However, as income from forest sources have been controlled for, 
the locational differences may also capture village level differences in social 
factors such as trust, reciprocity and reputation known to impact on 
cooperation on a common pool resource (Ostrom, 2000, Castillo and Saysel, 
2005). It may also represent different perceptions of the decline of forests in 
survey locations; households in Agarfa may be willing to contribute more if 
they perceive the decline of forest area to be of greater concern than at other 
survey locations.  
 
8.4. Discussion 
 
Households in the BME hold strong pro-conservation attitudes. It is clear, 
however, from general context statements that other livelihood concerns 
compete with those of forest conservation, for example food security, health 
and education. However, households appear willing to accept proposed Bale 
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REDD+ Project restrictions in return for improved forest management. On the 
whole, households are largely aware that forest use is unsustainable and some 
believe that current levels of forest use will result in complete forest loss in their 
village after only two years. Travelling further each year to collect forest 
products, households attribute forest losses to agricultural expansion and 
fuelwood collection, the reported drivers of deforestation in the region and 
country (BERSMP, 2006, R-PP, 2011). They also note that grazing in forests is 
increasing and inhibiting tree re-growth. Population growth in the BME is also 
seen as a clear driver of deforestation by survey respondents.  
 
The pro-conservation attitudes and values held by households, in combination 
with the observed rapid decline in forest resource, could explain the fact that 
100% of households were willing to enter into the CFM scheme as it was 
described to them. The overall disenchantment with the current status-quo 
forest resource management may also be driving the desire for change. 
Respondents reported much stricter forest management regimes in the past 
under the Derg military government and a decline in adherence to rules of 
forest use in the more recent past. Some respondents even noted that conflict is 
arising both within and between communities as a result of declining forest 
areas and breakdown of rules both traditional and otherwise. The potential for 
conflict supports the calls, by respondents, that education, awareness, advice 
and supervision are continuously provided by the authorities. The broad call 
from respondents for good regulatory oversight is also useful for the Bale 
REDD+ Project implementers. For CFM to be successful, communities need not 
only values, but the institutions to put these in place which implementers will 
be able to mediate and ensure persist over time (Gibson and Koontz, 1998). 
 
The high positive response indicating that households’ would take part in the 
intervention is an encouraging finding for the Bale REDD+ Project 
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implementers. Individuals have been shown to be conditionally cooperative on 
the cooperation of others (Baland and Platteau, 1996, Fischbacher et al., 2001, 
Castillo and Saysel, 2005). Greater cooperation may well deliver more emission 
reductions. It is also promising to see that close to 80% of respondents believe 
that other households will cooperate in CFM and that they will reciprocate by 
following the rules of CFM. This could indicate high levels of social capital in 
the BME which can increase cooperation on a common pool resource and 
therefore longevity of the intervention (Ostrom, 2000, Castillo and Saysel, 2005).  
These could remain from systems of traditional forest management that existed 
in the Bale Mountains historically, but also representative of other cooperative 
natural resource management strategies that currently exist, in mineral licks for 
livestock, for example (Wakijira et al., in press). The intention of households to 
take part in the CFM intervention is also based on their calculation of the costs 
and benefits of doing so (Lubell, 2002). Of interest is that a high proportion of 
households expected both their welfare and income to increase as a result of the 
intervention.  
 
The income expectations as a result of the intervention were high, however, and 
there are dangers of such high perceived expectations from a conservation 
intervention. Matta and Alvapatti (2006), exploring joint forest management in 
India, find less than 50% of surveyed households perceived any benefit of the 
forest conservation intervention five years after implementation and were 
unclear why they joined. Such disenchantment with a conservation intervention 
is likely to erode its success and longevity.  
 
Many values are contained within a household’s perceived payoffs of 
cooperating in the CFM intervention. In the BME, survey respondents 
attributed perceived changes in income to increases in agricultural yields due to 
improvements in the micro-climate, to increases in forest honey and coffee 
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incomes, and the ability to organise into cooperatives increasing business 
opportunities and the likelihood of group led infrastructure improvements. 
Carbon payments were also mentioned by a number of respondents as 
contributing to increasing income. Particularly in light of the perceptions that 
local climate will change so rapidly, the inability of the CFM intervention to 
meet expectations in the BME could undermine its persistence. Withdrawal of 
cooperation will challenge the success and functioning of the CFM, but for 
REDD+ also threatens the permanence of emission reductions and may well 
lead to no overall climate change mitigation benefits. 
 
A proxy for strength of cooperative intention, a household’s voluntary 
contribution to the forest management cooperative for more sustainable forest 
management, was also impacted by a respondent’s perceived income benefits 
from forests, greater income potential through being part of a cooperative and 
carbon payments. This finding is consistent with the literature that shows that 
perceived benefits of conservation interventions are important for both 
participation and cooperation (Matta and Alavalapati, 2006, Sommerville et al., 
2010). The effect found here, although significant, has a small marginal effect on 
the voluntary contribution. It is noted also however, that there may be an 
element of circularity between households perceived benefits and their 
intention to cooperate that needs to be investigated further. The household 
incomes estimated from low-impact and high-impact forest products in Chapter 
6, were also found to positively determine the strength of cooperative intent. 
This reinforces the prediction that cooperation is driven by the salience of the 
forest resource to households in the BME as found in the wider literature on 
cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1999, Lise, 2000, Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006).  
 
Larger households have significantly lower cooperative intention, but this may 
be due to the competing cash needs within the household. Education and age 
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were both found to not be significant determinants of a household’s voluntary 
contribution. This is surprising compared to other literature that recognises the 
positive impact of education and experience in pro-conservation behaviour 
(Godoy and Contreras, 2001, Adhikari et al., 2004). It is possible the impact of 
education has a more complex relationship than modelled here. For example, 
Lise (2000) finds that participation in CFM is enhanced by low average family 
education, but high survey respondent education. Similarly, the predicted 
effects of age and experience may be obscured by the fact that younger 
household heads may be more willing to adopt a new livelihood option and 
older household heads are more risk averse (Ellis, 2000).  
 
As noted in Section 8.1.1., no anchor of carbon payments was provided to 
respondents. It was also not possible to determine the portion of perceived 
income to carbon finance as opposed to increase forest or other incomes. The 
differing perceptions between households mean that the results do need to be 
interpreted with caution. This is particularly so given the early nature of carbon 
finance in the Bale Mountains REDD+ project and the lack of benefit sharing 
discussions and negotiations which means it is unclear if payments will reach 
households or will distributed at community level. Despite this, it is interesting 
that over half of the respondents suggested that carbon revenues should be 
spent on common goods such as a mill and clinic. Such preferences for common 
goods have been found in Mexico by Kosoy et al. (2008) where communities 
received payments for biodiversity conservation and carbon on watersheds. 
This, however, complicates REDD+ payments making them less conditional on 
delivery of the emission reductions, largely irreversible and harder for 
households to assess if the benefits of the common good will overcome the costs 
of their cooperation (Gong et al., 2010, Pascual et al., 2010, Sommerville et al., 
2010).  
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Households also stated that livestock might be purchased with carbon 
revenues. There is therefore a danger of reinvestment in environmentally 
degrading activities, which highlights the need to include rules for livestock 
grazing and to assess the impact of livestock on the forest resource base. This 
could prevent secondary issues from arising after intervention at the case study 
site. In Zimbabwe, for example, it was found that part of the revenues 
communities of the CAMPFIRE programme derived from wildlife conservation 
were invested in agricultural expansion and animal husbandry (Infield and 
Namara, 2001). 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the data, surveys were unable to elicit total household 
wealth. The impact of wealth on cooperation in common pool resource 
management is known although consensus on the direction of the impact does 
not exist (see Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Income from forests and agriculture, 
two of the three main livelihood sources in the region were included in the 
model and some wealth effects are captured within these variables. However, 
further research could better account for wealth effects on the voluntary 
contribution for example through household assets as proxies for wealth, or 
through expenditure data. It could also be assessed if households would make 
voluntary contributions in labour rather than cash given that two households 
could were unable to contribute a cash portion of their income and larger 
households are likely to have competing demands for cash. The household 
survey elicited respondents’ thoughts on whether others would join the 
intervention and if others would follow the rules in order to indicate levels of 
trust and reciprocity. However, in light of low variation in responses to these 
questions, they were omitted from the regression model. Further research could 
go into more depth in capturing factors of social capital, including; relations of 
trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common rules, norms and sanctions; and, 
connectedness in networks and groups (Pretty, 2003). More attention to 
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behavioural and social aspects could improve the application of these findings 
for on-the-ground policy design, and draw out village level differences beyond 
hypothesised ecological forest characteristics. 
 
The limitations of the voluntary contribution approach to households’ intention 
to cooperate in the Bale REDD+ Project intervention mean that the value itself is 
not interpreted here, but the determinants of the contribution are. Future 
research could elicit a more incentive compatible value with more effort 
dedicated to removing hypothetical and strategic biases. A further issue in 
interpreting households’ intention to cooperate in the proposed intervention is 
that the description of the intervention was necessarily short. A full list of the 
costs and the benefits of the scheme were not provided to respondents such as 
transaction costs, or allowable limits for forest product harvesting as these were 
not yet available. It is possible therefore, that incomplete information results in 
the high levels of willingness to take part in the intervention. As Adam’s et al. 
(2003) note that the calculus of costs and benefits will be dependent on an 
individual members knowledge and understanding of the collective action at 
hand. Furthermore, successful collective action is also linked to perceptions of 
fairness and cost sharing (Bardhan, 2000). This is, therefore, recognised as a 
major limitation of this Chapter’s quantitative measure of intention to cooperate 
in REDD+ via CFM.  
 
PES is based on a payment incentive changing the behaviour of land use 
managers to more conservation oriented behaviours. Chapters 6 and 7 indicated 
that REDD+ revenues in the BME may be insufficient to offset the estimated 
OCs of forest conservation. An integrated study of REDD+ via CFM in the BME, 
this exploration of households’ attitudes and perceptions of the forest 
management intervention indicate, however, that 100% of households would 
enter into the proposed CFM arrangements. With clear concerns that the 
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current levels of forest use cannot continue into the future, households may 
well be willing to incur a cost to move to a common property regime. This may 
also reflect a history of traditionally managed forests in the Bale Mountains that 
was reported to work more effectively at controlling forest product harvesting 
than central or regional government has been. It may also indicate that non-
market benefits to the household are large. These non-market values could 
include the value that households place on the devolution of use rights, on the 
institutions and social capital established, or on empowerment provided under 
the new forest management regime. In both cases this would infer that OCs 
measures may overestimate the payment incentives required to generate the 
desired level of forest conservation.  
 
It is also found, however, that instead of incurring costs of the intervention as 
Chapter 6 would predict, households are almost all expecting income gains as a 
result of CFM implementation. Although more research is required to 
disentangle the factors influencing perceived income changes and cooperative 
intention at the case study site, it can be seen that qualitative attitudinal data 
complements empirical cost estimates and can contribute towards intervention 
design and implementation. The high expectations for REDD+ mechanisms, by 
a number of forest stakeholders, have been noted elsewhere in the literature 
(Clements, 2010). Ethiopia’s national REDD+ strategy clearly indicates that high 
expectations for the mechanism exist in-country (R-PP, 2011). REDD+ project 
development in the BME remains ‘in the pipeline’ despite four years of 
discussions. Eliciting households’ perceived benefits of the proposed 
intervention provides an early indicator that expectations are high and 
improvements in information could ensure that these expectations are not 
unreasonable.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusions 
9.  
9.1. Context 
 
The potential for REDD+ to deliver climate mitigation benefits, to deliver 
finance to developing countries, and to contribute to meagre forest conservation 
budgets has resulted in a lot of excitement and discourse from academics, 
NGOs, government organisations, and civil society. Substantial finance has 
been pledged and transferred to build countries’ readiness for REDD+. This 
flows despite uncertainty about the future financing mechanism for an 
international REDD+ mechanism. However, successful local-level forest 
management is required regardless of the financing mechanism and the scale at 
which REDD+ is implemented.  
 
REDD+ can operate as a PES scheme, which can aid the delivery of direct, 
output based payments that are strongly addition to the business-as-usual 
baseline and conditional on continued service provision. One way to generate 
emission reductions from REDD+ is via CFM. Support for such approaches is 
growing in forested countries, but there has been little consideration of how 
REDD+ via CFM can be implemented on the ground if it is to operate as a PES 
scheme. The literature on PES, and limited studies of REDD+ via CFM, appear 
more ‘PES-like’. This results in low conditionality of payments on 
environmental service delivery and uncertainties in whether carbon incentives 
overcome the OCs of land for ongoing provision of climate change mitigation 
services. The logic of collective action is also often ignored in PES, whereas it is 
central to incentivising CFM. 
 
The proposed Bale REDD+ Project in the Bale Mountains of Ethiopia is been 
used to increase the understanding of how REDD+ can be implemented 
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through CFM as a local-level PES scheme. This chapter first presents a 
discussion of the contributions to knowledge of this thesis, followed by policy 
recommendations and limitations to these findings.  
 
9.2. Contribution to knowledge 
 
Forest carbon accounting 
The uncertainty in estimates of forest carbon stocks are understudied despite 
their challenge to the environmental effectiveness of a REDD+ mechanism. If 
estimated emission reductions result from a choice of methodology rather than 
changes in actual carbon stock, the integrity of REDD+ could be called into 
question. This thesis contributes to forest carbon accounting literature by 
illustrating that forest carbon stocks in the BME are insufficiently captured in 
biome averaged data, often applied where data on key forest variables and 
parameters, resources or capacity is scarce (Brown et al., 1989, Smith and Heath, 
2001, Andersson et al., 2009). Such secondary data would underestimate forest 
carbon density in the BME by as much as 63% in the moist forest and 58% in the 
dry forest area. 
 
It is recognised that numerous advances in GIS technology are being made to 
improve forest area estimates, and the discourse on how to establish the BAU 
baseline of deforestation from which avoided deforestation is assessed is active 
(Achard et al., 2004, DeFries et al., 2007, Olander et al., 2008). Forested countries 
are also undertaking reinvigorated forest inventory and accounting. The thesis 
demonstrates that in the case of the Bale Mountains REDD+ project, the 
financial implications of using secondary instead of primary data on forest 
carbon stocks could lead to a two-fold difference in emission reductions; 
equating to close to US$39 million over the 20-year project lifespan. 
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More accurate accounting of emissions reductions can ensure that REDD+ 
delivers real climate change mitigation benefits and countries are adequately 
rewarded for the emission reductions generated. This thesis also highlights, 
however, that even where more complex carbon accounting is undertaken, 
forest carbon stock estimates still contain high levels of uncertainty arising from 
the complexity in the ecosystems themselves and through sampling, 
measurement and estimation error. The costs of increasing the precision of 
forest carbon stock estimates could, therefore, be high.  Despite this, this thesis 
finds clear economic incentives for the investment of resources to reduce 
uncertainty in forest carbon stock estimates.  
 
The opportunity costs of REDD+ via CFM 
The OCs of land are proposed to be one of the largest costs of REDD+ and can 
be used to anchor the level of payment needed to achieve the desired level of 
forest conservation, and so emission reductions (Pirard, 2008, Wertz-
Kanounnikoff, 2008, Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009, White and Minang, 2011). The 
assessment of the OCs of REDD+ are often undertaken at a scale inappropriate 
for the design of on-the-ground incentives for local-level PES, however, and 
there has also been little attention paid to the OCs of REDD+ via CFM where 
there are community property rights and community groups legally become 
environmental service providers.  
 
The OCs from a hectare of agricultural land in the survey year was estimated at 
US$417/ha. If low-impact forest products - including bamboo, climber, coffee 
and honey – offset the OCs of agricultural land, net OCs are estimated at 
US$375/ha. Not all forest, however, is likely to have ended up as agricultural 
land. The OCs of land from which high-impact forest products are harvested – 
including timber and fuelwood – is estimated at US$28/ha. If low-impact forest 
products can offset the OCs of high-impact forest products, the net OCs are 
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estimated at US$ -12/ha. In assessing the local OCs of land for a proposed 
REDD+ via CFM project this thesis adds to the growing body of evidence that 
shows how incorporating cost information in conservation planning can aid 
interventions design (Polasky et al., 2001, Polasky et al., 2005, Naidoo et al., 
2006, Naidoo and Iwamura, 2007, Carwardine et al., 2008). 
 
While the OCs of agriculture show the clear economic incentive to clear forest, 
the headline OCs of forest products, obscure forest product use heterogeneity 
across the Bale Mountains Eco-Region. The income from forest products was 
found to be largely determined by survey location which dictated the 
availability of forest products. In the dry forest and woodland survey locations, 
forest coffee does not grow and incomes from high-impact forest products 
exceed that of low-impact forest products. In the moist forest where forest 
coffee and forest honey is available, income from low-impact forest products 
exceeded that from high-impact forest products. The high value of forest coffee 
is responsible for the finding that the net OCs of high-impact forest products, 
offset by low-impact forest products for the whole Bale REDD+ Project region 
appears negative. This implies that economic incentives do exist to conserve 
moist forest as opposed to fuelwood and timber harvest, but it is likely that 
other barriers relating to the current open access regime and lack of law 
enforcement that prevent the realisation of these values leading to continued 
forest decline. These research findings clearly demonstrate that a payment 
incentive differentiated by location would be more efficient than one based on 
the average OCs of forest products for the Bale REDD+ Project. This is further 
exemplified by the fact that only 50% of the surveyed households were found to 
gather low-impact forest products and therefore OCs of land would not be 
offset by such forest products.  
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In addition to location, this research identified that more educated households 
derive higher income from low-impact forest products and younger households 
derived higher incomes from high-impact forest products. These findings 
suggest that heterogeneity in OCs of land go beyond location. In the first 
instance, the Bale REDD+ Project implementers could capitalise on the impact 
of education through outreach and awareness programmes funded either 
through core Project funds that current arise through donor support, or through 
carbon revenues. Secondly, supplementary payment mechanisms could be 
designed in the implementation of the REDD+ via CFM to protect the welfare of 
younger households. This might be implemented following eroded traditional 
forest management systems, for example, that redistributed forest coffee beans 
to families unable to collect their own as a result of old age, physical disability 
or illness under the pre-existing Gada systems of traditional forest management 
(Wakijira et al., in press). Or, it could provide preferential access to alternative 
fuel sources and fuel-efficient stoves to such households.  
 
These findings also bring attention to the fact that all households rely on the 
forest resource for fuelwood. High-impact forest products were mostly 
consumed within the home whereas low-impact forest products were largely 
sold by households. The Bale REDD+ Project intends to establish woodlots, 
distribute fuel-efficient stoves, and to introduce systems to make biomass 
briquettes to reduce the demand for fuelwood from the standing forest. These 
would initially be funded or subsidised through the donors of the overall 
BERSM Programme, but over time, could be supported with REDD+ revenues. 
Payments to households may well even be made indirectly through fuelwood 
allocation, rather than direct cash incentives.  
 
Depending on how access to the woodlots is established under the Bale REDD+ 
Project, and on the success in uptake of more fuel-efficient stoves and biomass 
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briquettes, the OCs of high-impact forest products could decline over time. 
Payments to overcome these OCs may therefore be considered a hurdle 
payment to a more sustainable path of use after which the payment is no longer 
necessary. On the other hand, if the demand for products such as fuelwood 
cannot be met by woodlots - the establishment of which has been delayed – 
then households might return to high-impact activities due to lack of 
alternatives, thus eroding the REDD+ mechanism. Of course, both alternatives 
will need to bear in mind rising demand for such forest products through 
population growth.  
 
Other studies of REDD+ via CFM have proposed more ‘PES-like’ interventions 
(Nepstad et al., 2007, Peskett et al., 2008, Skutsch et al., 2011). The inability to 
attribute land-change in the status quo and so service provision to a single 
individual highlights the complexity of implementing PES under a common 
property regime. With common property rights to many forest products, 
households will have overlapping access and therefore costs and benefits on a 
given unit of forest land. PES incentive payments are, therefore, hard to link to 
a certain hectare of land enrolled or a given individual. Furthermore, given the 
lack of land-use change models for the Bale Mountains Eco-region, it cannot be 
predicted if land would be converted to agriculture or deforested through high-
impact forest product harvesting. If all households were to receive payments for 
their potential OCs of land, therefore, it would impact on the effectiveness and 
additionality of emission reductions and payments would be made without 
emission reductions being generated. The conditionality and the efficiency that 
PES was initially proposed to deliver would be challenged (Ferraro and Kiss, 
2002, Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). Similarly, the conditionality of the payment 
would be eroded and efficiency reduced. Possibly so much so that REDD+ no 
longer becomes a cost-effective climate change mitigation option. 
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CFM approaches to REDD+, therefore, can break the pure economic models 
required by PES in theory. This thesis suggests, however, that the attribution of 
the OCs REDD+, particularly of agricultural production, could be improved 
through benefit sharing mechanisms designed by the forest Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) themselves. In this way, REDD+ via CFM could still be 
efficiently implemented with the conditionality and the efficiency that PES was 
initially proposed to deliver. It is noted, however, that this thesis goes some 
way in considering only one way to implement REDD+. By focussing on 
REDD+ as a PES scheme, it does not consider alternative policy options that 
include, for example, the imposition of private property rights, or 
improvements in central government control and law-enforcement of forest 
regulations, although these have so far proven ineffective in the BME. As 
Ethiopia is pursuing a national REDD+ strategy it is likely that in the longer-run 
a suite of measures will be employed to achieve emission reductions from 
forestry activities.  
 
In the Bale Mountains Eco-Region, CFM could build on the traditional forest 
management practices than are reported to have eroded since the 20th Century. 
Village elders used to be responsible for both the day-to-day jurisdiction of 
forests, as well as the introduction of rules and norms of resource use (Wakijira 
et al., in press). Groups of village elders still exist at kebele level and are still 
called upon and respected for dispute settlement; all permissions to undertake 
the surveys in this thesis, for example, went through the village elders in 
addition to the local government authorities.  
 
The implementation of REDD+ via CFM in the BME will require the 
establishment of institutions to enable cooperation to occur. It is so far planned 
that a subset of identifiable forest users will be formed as a CBO group which is 
envisaged to be no more than 30 households. The forest group will be allocated 
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between 300 and 500 hectares and formalised in contracts signed between the 
CBO and local government forest agency that will also formalise their duties 
and responsibilities: including maintaining forest area, excluding those not 
within the group and regulation of use from those within the group. The local 
forest agency will undertake assessments of forest cover, and are expected to 
enforce sanctions for non-compliance to both CBO and non-CBO members. 
However, where rules are broken, individuals will first appear in front of 
village elders to be sanctioned and it is likely that only repeat offenders will be 
referred to the government authorities.  
 
Given the strong history of traditional forest management within the Bale 
Mountains Eco-Region, it is possible to envisage the REDD+ via CFM system 
working. It is recognised, however, that new functions will be added to such 
institutions. For example, more stringent monitoring and reporting of emission 
reductions are likely to be required, and there may need to be greater oversight 
from the local government agencies to ensure leakage does not occur from one 
forest area to another and that emission reductions are permanent. The 
potential revenues from carbon may also require the consideration of the 
capacities of CBOs to manage finance, and the local government may act as an 
intermediary to also absorb some of the risk and liability of non-permanence of 
emission reductions. Additional support to develop such new functions will be 
necessary, but with confidence in appropriate benefit-sharing mechanisms at 
the community level and oversight from implementing agencies to avoid 
possible social risks such as the capture of benefits by village elders or powerful 
members of society and marginalisation of poorer social groups, local-level 
knowledge could allocate payments in line with costs.  
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Scenarios of the OCs of forest conservation over time 
The Bale REDD+ Project is typical of conservation interventions that lack 
explicit goals and targets (Margules and Pressey, 2000). While the Bale REDD+ 
Project proposes the commercialisation of forest products, the promotion of 
agricultural intensification, for example, there are no quantitative estimates of 
impacts that can help understand how the OCs of land will change over time. 
The scenario modelling of the OCs of land over the 20-year REDD+ project 
period, using different assumptions, shows that small changes in the 
assumptions of productivity of land uses significantly impact on the annual 
OCs, cumulative OCs and the total OCs of the intervention. Although the 
scenario storylines differ as a result of paucity of data on productivity trends 
and degradation of land and forest, the scenarios show that the Bale REDD+ 
Project implementers should consider more carefully their conservation goals 
and targets. 
 
The total OCs of agriculture as a result of the Bale REDD+ Project were 
estimated as the discounted revenues of agriculture, net of low-impact forest 
products, for the total area of forest conserved during the 20-year project. The 
three scenarios generated from small changes in assumptions, saw the OCs 
range from US$121 million in an optimistic scenario to US$441 million in a 
more pessimistic scenario. It is also clear from the scenarios analysis that while 
the Bale REDD+ Project implementer’s sphere of influence might extend to the 
proximate drivers of deforestation, such as agricultural expansion and wood 
extraction, they are likely to be less influential to the underlying drivers of 
deforestation such as population growth, wider market factors, demographic 
trends, and/or institutions. 
 
The consideration of economic incentives for conservation behaviours and 
efforts to alter them have been established in many conservation interventions 
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(Brandon and Wells, 1992). However, quantifying these targets and assessing if 
they are feasible is rare. The scenario backcasting from zero total OCs illustrates 
that the prices of low-impact forest products would need to be multiplied by 11 
times their current value to be sufficient to generate a situation where forest 
conservation becomes an economically viable land use option. It seems 
unrealistic, however, to expect the current price of bamboo, climber, coffee, and 
honey to reach such highs. This appears unlikely even given the high demand 
for specialist coffee in international markets (Wren, 2007); between 1993 and 
2013 coffee Arabica has risen in value from just over US$1.50 per kg to over 
US$4 per kg, it doesn’t match the required price rise in the scenario modelling 
in the Bale Mountains Eco-Region (World Bank, 2013). Given also earlier 
findings that show household incomes from forest products are highly spatially 
explicit, such a price increase may not be feasible across the BME.  
 
The scenario analysis also illustrates that REDD+ revenues may be insufficient 
to overcome the OCs of agricultural land at the case study site. Of the market 
mechanisms that could be used in conservation, carbon trading is thought to 
have the greatest potential to capture positive externalities to the degree 
required to make forest conservation economically viable (Richards, 1999). 
Carbon is also often found to be the largest of the non-marketed environmental 
service values of forests (Pearce, 1997). However, the scenarios illustrate that 
the OCs of agriculture can be prohibitively high if carbon prices are relatively 
low and efforts to increase agricultural productivity and add value to forest 
products achieve little success. This depends on the scenario parameters, of 
course, but may challenges the speed and optimism with which many 
conservation practitioners are adopting REDD+ as a tool to finance forest 
conservation, including in Ethiopia.  
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Overall, the findings demonstrate that the application of scenarios can be a 
useful tool in conservation planning. Scenario modelling is not highly data 
intensive and allows conservation implementers to break from established 
patterns of thinking and critically evaluate their plans. The scenario modelling 
undertaken does not provide a single answer for the OCs of REDD+ over time, 
but highlights the need for further discussion of the intervention strategy and 
the potential impact of its objectives.  
 
Attitudes and intention to cooperate in REDD+ via CFM 
This thesis also demonstrates that implementing REDD+ via CFM can defy the 
purely economic logic of PES. All surveyed households stated a willingness to 
take part in the proposed REDD+ via CFM intervention accepting the forest use 
restrictions that this places upon them; modelled here as limitations on 
expansion of agricultural land, high-impact forest product harvesting, and 
duties and responsibilities resulting from the cooperative forest management 
agreement. The thesis, therefore demonstrates how an understanding of local 
environmental attitudes, perceptions of forest management and cooperative 
intention could aid the identification of household incentives to provide 
collective action beyond the analysis of the OCs of a hectare of forest 
conservation. 
 
Households in the BME were very aware of the declining forest area and 
condition, as well as both the proximate and underlying drivers of deforestation 
at the case study site. Their concerns about the resource base were held 
alongside a general disenchantment regarding current forest management and, 
overall, a preference for the traditional forest management arrangements that 
had existed previously in the region. The complete willingness of survey 
respondents to enter into the Bale REDD+ Project might be interpreted as the 
perceived benefits of cooperation overcoming any perceived OC of foregone 
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land use and transaction costs due to time spent in meetings. This may include, 
for example, the benefits of non-market values of water-shed protection, 
cultural forest values, or recreational value, in addition to any value households 
place on empowerment, the use rights to the forest, or the value of being part of 
a cooperative. 
 
While this research was unable to further deconstruct the perceived benefits 
into their component parts, it is clear that households perceived that their 
incomes would increase under the Bale REDD+ Project intervention. This 
increase was attributed to higher production of low-impact forest products and 
as a result of the ability to trade as a cooperative group, which may be 
reasonable. However, perceptions of future incomes were also high due to 
expectations of higher crop yields due to improved rainfall and local climate 
regime. Additional uncertainty was added by the potential for carbon 
payments, for which no anchor value was provided. Despite these limitations, 
this finding highlights a possible danger of households’ high income 
expectations of the Bale REDD+ Project intervention.  
 
The need to manage expectations of the Bale REDD+ Project is particularly 
acute given the uncertain nature of if, and how, carbon finance will reach the 
community. The lack of an emission reductions purchase agreement and 
adequate assessment of benefit-sharing mechanisms, it remains unclear how 
much of carbon revenues will be absorbed by central or regional government, 
and how much will reach households. This is exacerbated by uncertainty in 
carbon rights and experience of handling carbon revenues from forestry in 
Ethiopia. This will have impacts on the longevity of an intervention, and the 
permanence of emission reductions as it may be less likely that household 
expectations are met by the proposed intervention if less than the modelled 
carbon revenues are available to communities. Furthermore, discussions on 
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who bears the liability for the non-permanence of emission reductions, and how 
a risk buffer would be managed must be worked out by the Bale REDD+ 
Project. Although in Chapter 5 it is estimated that a 65% buffer for these risks is 
set aside, the implications for the CBOs if emission reductions are not generated 
for either natural or anthropogenic reasons must be further discussed.  
 
This ex-ante study of attitudes and perceptions towards a conservation 
intervention is rare. It demonstrates the potential importance of the logic of 
collective action and how they might impact on the economic incentives 
required for PES to operate in theory. It also demonstrates that ex-ante studies 
can inform conservation planning and may well lead to better implementation 
and longevity of the Project intervention in the BME in the longer-run.  
 
9.3. Policy recommendations 
 
With strong pro-conservation attitudes, the barriers to households undertaking 
forest conservation measures in the BME appears to be their reliance on forest 
products for subsistence use, particularly on fuelwood, and the de facto open 
access regime. The additionality of emission reductions in the BME can, 
therefore, be justified on the basis of clear policy barriers to more sustainable 
forest management if the status-quo was to continue. The proposed 
implementation of REDD+ via CFM can be considered a realistic intervention 
given that resource appropriators are dependent on the forest resource for a 
large portion of their livelihoods and share a common understanding of how 
resource use affects others. The details of implementation of the intervention, 
however, are vague and the findings of this thesis suggest three major policy 
recommendations that will aid in the implementation of REDD+ via CFM at the 
case study site. 
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Recommendation 1: Undertake a detailed forest inventory 
The economic implications of forest carbon accounting methods were shown to 
be substantial for the BME REDD+ project. The investment of resources in a 
detailed forest inventory is therefore justified in the BME. This will increase the 
environmental integrity of a REDD+ project but will also improve investor 
confidence in the emission reductions generated. The development of land-use 
and land use change models will also help to understand where deforestation is 
taking place and to what forest land is converted too; agriculture, pasture or for 
timber and fuelwood that can better model carbon losses and, therefore, 
emission reductions, under the Bale REDD+ Project. 
 
Recommendation 2: Develop quantitative objectives for the Bale REDD+ Project and 
repeat scenario analysis 
The scenario analysis highlights that the qualitative goals of the Bale REDD+ 
Project intervention and the lack of data on trends in land-use change result in 
uncertainty over whether REDD+ revenues will overcome the OCs of forest 
conservation. The Project implementers should work to quantify better their 
objectives to intensify agriculture, efforts at which have persistently failed 
across Ethiopia. Similarly, while adding value to low-impact forest products is 
likely to be more within the influence of Project implementers, considerations of 
the scale at which this can be achieved both by product and by location is 
necessary.  
 
In the BME, there is currently an adaptive management approach to the Project 
intervention. For the Forest Management Agreements signed with 
communities, two or three years may be required before changes in the forest 
condition can really be observed. The implementers expect ex-post adjustments 
of policy to be required. Repeating the scenario modelling exercise as the 
intervention progresses will allow the review of the intervention in accordance 
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with this adaptive management approach. These scenarios should also be built 
further through participatory approaches to incorporate more diverse views 
from a variety of forest stakeholders. Breaking the mould and also undertaking 
further ex-ante assessments of policy objectives at the case study site could 
allow proactive steps can be taken to influence OCs of forest conservation and 
to predict and plan for future eventualities.  
 
Recommendation 3: Build and use OC information in REDD+ via CFM incentive 
design 
Forests are an important part of household’s livelihood strategies in the BME. 
The Project intervention should be working to both minimise and overcome the 
OCs of forest conservation through the options available to them and their 
sphere of influence. The OCs of high-impact forest products are experienced by 
all households at the case study site as modelled here. The conservation 
implementers’ plans to develop woodlots and to expand the distribution of 
more fuel-efficient stoves, may mean these are temporary OCs of REDD+. 
However, with 99% of households gathering fuelwood and woodlot 
establishment delayed, plans to meet household’s biomass needs should be 
advanced rapidly if leakage of emission reductions is to be prevented and 
avoided deforestation targets are to be met.  
 
Considerations on how REDD+ revenue is to be shared also need to be made 
with consideration of the project’s ability to attribute costs at fine-scales. The 
Bale REDD+ Project implementers should consider the promotion of CBO and 
kebele-level engagement in benefit sharing mechanism design. Regulatory 
oversight, however, will be necessary to assess possible risks of elite capture 
and for equity and conflict resolution. Such oversight was requested by 
households in survey findings.  
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Bale REDD+ Project implementers should also consider that where payments 
are made, differentiation by forest type can improve the efficiency of payments. 
With lower OCs of high-impact forest products and lower net OCs of 
agriculture, the redistribution of REDD+ revenues from moist forest areas to 
dry forest or woodland areas may also be possible. With younger households 
found to derive higher income from high-impact forest products, and anecdotal 
evidence that younger households have limited access to agricultural land, 
particular attention to the costs incurred by this demographic group should be 
made in the intervention design. Bale REDD+ Project implementers could 
consider how the intermediary organisation that will receive carbon finance, 
might operate and make such allocation and redistribution decisions. In doing 
so, it is clear that the expectations that households hold for the proposed Bale 
REDD+ Project intervention are mediated and managed appropriately. 
 
A caveat of these recommendations is that the use of estimates of the OCs of in 
REDD+ via CFM design must be complemented with an understanding of the 
attitudes and perceptions of communities local to the intervention. The logic of 
collective action is commonly omitted in designing PES scheme incentives. 
However, the urgency of the situation recognised by the survey respondents 
and faith in restoration of traditional community forest management structures, 
suggest that they will play a role in incentivising REDD+ via CFM in the BME.  
 
These research findings also have wider implications for REDD+ via CFM:  
 
• At present there is no standardised method to assess or communicate 
uncertainty in emission reductions accounting and the principle of 
conservativeness remains the dominant approach (Mollicone et al., 2007, 
Grassi et al., 2008). Although this enables REDD+ to deliver real and 
permanent emission reductions, adopting the principle of 
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conservativeness with zero uncertainty leaves policy makers without a 
confidence interval. The implication could be lost opportunities for 
climate change mitigation.  
 
The uncertainty in forest carbon accounting should therefore be 
quantified, reduced and communicated more appropriately. Tools such 
as sensitivity analysis could be employed to identify which components 
impact the most on total uncertainty which can then be prioritised for 
further research. Decision-makers need to initiate discourse on the level 
of uncertainty that is acceptable for a performance-based mechanism 
such as REDD+. With many national forest inventories in developing 
countries non-comprehensive and limited resources for new field 
measurements, a portion of REDD+ readiness finance should be 
earmarked for improving national forest inventories so that emission 
reductions are credible.  
 
• The implications of the apparent shift towards ‘PES-like’ implementation 
of REDD+ via CFM needs to be considered in view of the need for 
REDD+ to deliver real, permanent, and verifiable emission reductions 
that are additional to the status-quo and conditional on service delivery. 
Given the complexities of REDD+ via CFM with regards to attribution of 
costs, more community-level benefit-sharing mechanisms might be 
explored in both theory and through demonstration and pilot REDD+ 
activities. 
 
A shift away from assessments of the OCs of agricultural land, towards 
consideration of other OCs of land, such as subsistence forest products, is 
also necessary. There are growing calls for REDD+ to ‘do no harm’ to 
forest communities (CCBA, 2008, Griffiths, 2009). These are embodied in 
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the UNFCCC text safeguards that are intended to avoid negative impacts 
on the poor, on biodiversity, on food security and national sovereignty. 
This can be interpreted as going beyond ensuring that households’ costs 
of forest conservation are to be overcome, but more consideration of how 
such safeguards can be operationalised is needed. 
 
• Moving to common property regimes, households may be willing to 
incur costs of a property regime change. The logic of collective action 
implies that estimates of the OC of land can overestimate the payment 
incentives required to generate the desired level of forest conservation. 
Opportunities for climate change mitigation may be lost if schemes are 
not implemented due to apparently prohibitive OCs of REDD+. More 
research is required on how collective action influences households’ 
incentives to cooperate in REDD+ via CFM. 
 
9.4. Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 
This research has emphasised the uncertainty that exists in forest carbon stock 
accounting for REDD+ projects. The focus of the discussion is on uncertainty 
from sampling error and in market variables. It is acknowledged, however, that 
there are other sources of uncertainty arising in carbon stock estimation, 
including measurement and estimation error. The complex forest carbon stock 
assessment undertaken here relies on allometric equations that arise from Asian 
and Latin American tree datasets. Destructive sampling to generate allometric 
equations specific to Ethiopia or East Africa could be generated through further 
research. Furthermore, the primary data estimate of forest carbon stock omits 
other carbon pools which will also contain uncertainty in their measurement 
and need to be further investigated. 
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In estimating the potential emission reductions and revenues of a REDD+ 
project in the BME, a fixed historical deforestation baseline of 4% is applied and 
it is assumed that the conservation objective meets its stated avoided 
deforestation targets. Further research into developing a BAU baseline of 
deforestation could provide an improved estimate for emission reductions and, 
therefore, REDD+ revenues. The emission reductions accounting also ignores 
emission reductions that may be generated from reduced degradation, forest 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks; all included within the definition of REDD+. Avoided forest 
degradation, in particular, may be relevant for CFM (e.g. Chhatre and Agrawal, 
2009). Further research into the causes of degradation and consequences of 
CFM on forest quality could lead to better emission reductions accounting in 
the proposed BME REDD+ intervention.  
 
As a result of the logistical and permission constraints encountered during data 
collection, a major limitation of this research is that the number of survey 
locations was limited. With three survey locations with three different forest 
types the effects due to forest and the effects due to village characteristics 
cannot be separated. Expanding this research into other survey locations could 
reinforce these findings and provide a better understanding of what is driving 
the differences observed between survey locations. Future household surveys 
could also increase the sample size, and address the seasonality of forest 
product harvesting and of market prices. The omission of female headed 
households in this study is also an important area where further investigation 
should be pursued. Cultural barriers in the BME prevented enumerators 
approaching females within their households. Per capita income of female 
headed households in Ethiopia can be as low as 60% of the per capita income of 
male-headed households (Yemiru et al., 2010). This indicates that possible 
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welfare risks to female headed households as a result of REDD+ via CFM in the 
BME need to be further investigated. 
 
This thesis is predominantly a financial analysis of REDD+ via CFM with a 
focus on the environmental service of climate change mitigation. A number of 
other non-market values that households derive from the forest ecosystem are 
not assessed. Given the focus in the international REDD+ debate on the need to 
secure such co-benefits, further investigation on how these impact on costs is 
necessary. Although these values are complex to calculate at a household level 
and ecosystem services can be complex to quantify, methods are available that 
could investigate further how non-market benefits impact on the incentives 
required to generated the desired level of service provision for REDD+ (e.g. 
OECD, 2002, Pagiola et al., 2005b).  
 
The financial analysis undertaken here was also not able to consider the impact 
of the intervention on household’s income from livestock. Grazing is currently 
allowed and occurs both in and outside of the forest. Under the proposed 
Project intervention, this may change through measures such as rotational 
grazing agreements which prevent forest re-growth being destroyed by 
livestock. Research in the BME is underway to assess the deforestation impact 
of livestock. The development of this research could include the OCs of the 
Project intervention resulting from grazing land restrictions. 
 
In order to model OCs of REDD+ in the BME, land uses were simplified into 
agriculture, low-impact forest production and high-impact forest production. 
More research could develop these land categories to explore how OCs may be 
affected by land characteristics such as soil fertility, altitude and/or land use 
practices. The assumptions of the non-rival nature of low-impact forest 
products with the intervention and the rival nature high-impact forest products 
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with the intervention require more attention. There is anecdotal evidence that 
honey yields are declining in the highland regions, with flowering species 
suffering from degradation. Forest coffee although a natural plant is 
encouraged through thinning of the forest canopy and harvest of forest coffee 
may be excludable. A better consideration of the sustainability and 
excludability of these low-impact forest products, with a view to understanding 
if household production can feasibly be extended outside of the current 
production boundary, is necessary.  
 
Similarly, the harvest of timber and fuelwood – both high-impact forest 
products – may be allowed within sustainable limits; defined as a level of 
extraction below the mean annual increment of biomass. An ex-ante study of 
REDD+ via CFM in the BME, the by-laws of CBOs that will define the use and 
management of forests are yet to be established. Designed through 
participatory processes, early experience in the BME shows that CBOs are 
limiting the harvest of fuelwood through restrictions on the number of days 
that households have access to the forest. As by-laws emerge and measures to 
reduce and remove the fuelwood and timber demands on natural forest areas 
are put in place, the estimate of the OCs of high-impact forest products could be 
adjusted appropriately.  
 
The transaction costs that households may incur as a result of the 
implementation will also become more obvious as REDD+ via CFM is rolled out 
across the BME. Such information as it emerges could also be included in the 
analysis of the impacts of REDD+ on households. It is noted in Chapter 4 that 
transaction costs will also be incurred by household participating in the scheme 
including negotiation, monitoring and enforcement costs and that these costs 
may not be evenly distributed over socio-demographic groups (Meshack et al., 
2006, Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). In the BME, these transaction costs are likely 
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to entail weekly meetings and the patrolling of forest in critical harvest times. 
While emerging by-laws state that all members should contribute to patrolling, 
the committee members appear to be taking on this burden in the few 
established groups. The time burdens that this places on households may well 
influence their payoffs and therefore cooperation in the intervention. Analysis 
of these costs are important, as while this thesis assumes the OCs of land to be 
the highest costs incurred by households, this assumption has not been tested.  
 
An improvement to this thesis would be to estimate the shadow prices of 
products for both subsistence and sale on markets, instead of applying market 
prices that are likely to have led to the overestimation of OCs of land. Rural 
households will operate within market imperfections and constraints and will 
have differing transaction costs to access and participate in markets (Sadoulet 
and de Janvry, 1995). Utilisation of non-separable household models where 
production and consumption behaviour is linked, would improve this research. 
Investing resources in estimating the shadow prices of products for each 
household would also give a better estimate of OCs of land. This is particularly 
true as many products were consumed at home and shadow prices are 
generally lower than market prices. 
 
The scenario analysis required further assumptions to be made in order to 
model the OCs of REDD+ over time. This included the assumptions that: all 
deforestation results from conversion to agricultural land use; once transformed 
land remains under that use; and, that households will generate income on this 
land to the same level of a household’s existing income from that use. These 
assumptions resulted from a lack of data on deforestation dynamics at the case 
study site. NGOs in the BME are using GIS imagery to analyse land use and 
trends in land-use change. As more data become available on the proportion of 
deforestation from each land use, models of deforestation risk could be 
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developed. A better understanding of which households are expanding 
agricultural land, where, and on what type of land this occurs could explore 
whether newly converted land is more marginal, or if one-off benefits and costs 
of land conversion exist. Scenarios could be improved through the inclusion of 
price feedbacks from the changing availability of land (e.g. Busch et al., 2009, 
Fisher et al., 2011). Data on population growth and its impact on land-use 
change may also focus attention on emerging families and their access to CFM 
that are largely unacknowledged in the intervention as it stands.  
 
While Chapter 8 highlights the importance of an understanding of the attitudes 
and perceptions of local stakeholders, there are clear limitations to the 
quantitative measure of behavioural intention, the voluntary contribution, and 
in disentangling the willingness of households to take part in the proposed 
intervention. Further research could explore this further, assessing in more 
detail how and why households believe their incomes will increase under the 
intervention. Factors such as social capital at survey locations including: 
relations of trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common rules, norms and 
sanctions; and, connectedness in networks and groups can also be explored in 
much greater detail as social capital is known to impact on cooperation (Pretty, 
2003).  
 
This thesis does not consider in various mechanism by which revenues could 
reach households due to time restrictions on material to be covered. 
Throughout, it is assumed that the revenues will be able to reach households 
after the costs of implementation are met. With no Emission Reductions 
Purchase Agreement for the BME REDD+ project, no agreements have been 
made on the benefit-sharing mechanism or the amount of revenues that will be 
absorbed by other stakeholders, such as central or regional government. 
Furthermore, the impact that risk and time preferences will play in the design 
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of PES incentives and contract design are not considered here (Ferraro, 2008, 
Knoke et al., 2011). While the scenario analysis indicates that forest 
conservation could become an economically rational land use option, this could 
only hold if a household can take a 20-year view. The subsistence households of 
the BME may be unable or unwilling to take such a long term view. Time and 
risk preferences factors of households in the BME warrant further research as 
the REDD+ project progresses. 
 
Finally, it is acknowledged that this thesis considers only forest stakeholders 
that live locally to the forest at the case-study site. These are considered here to 
be the most affected party from REDD+ development in the BME. However, 
REDD+ planning and implementation will need due consideration of other 
forest stakeholders including the private sector (e.g. small-scale wood 
enterprises and non-wood forest enterprises), urban dwellers that are 
dependent on forest products brought to markets, and local and central 
governments. A variety of forest stakeholders will incur OCs of REDD+ and 
should be considered in REDD+ via CFM intervention design.  
 
9.5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis is a rare ex-ante analysis of the incentives to deliver REDD+ via CFM 
and exploration of how such a mechanism might be implemented on-the-
ground. I demonstrate that forest carbon stock accounting uncertainties are 
being overlooked, but have substantial implications for the environmental 
integrity of a REDD+ mechanism. I demonstrate that the focus on the OCs of 
agriculture in studies of REDD+ omit important OCs of subsistence forest 
products. This research highlights a drift towards more PES-like 
implementation of REDD+ via CFM that at first glance can appear better fitting 
with local realities. However, I suggest that the efficiency and conditionality of 
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PES can be maintained through placing more trust in community-level 
institutions to attribute costs and engage in incentive design and benefit-
sharing. The application of scenarios to model the OCs of forest conservation 
over time illustrates that REDD+ revenues may not be sufficient to overcome 
the OCs of forest conservation if carbon prices are low and efforts to intensify 
agriculture and add value to forest products are limited in their success. 
Proactive measures can be undertaken by the Bale REDD+ Project 
implementers, however, towards overcoming and reduce these OCs. Finally, I 
show that generating an understanding of stakeholders’ attitudes towards 
forest management and the use of the resource base will allow better 
consideration of socio-cultural factors for cooperation in conservation that will 
go beyond payment incentives that PES theory highlights. These themselves 
could help tip the balance for forest conservation even if the OCs of land appear 
prohibitive.  
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Appendix 1: Household survey  
 
[Record: enumerator initials, date and location] 
[Read out] “My name is (name of enumerator). I am here on behalf of Charlene 
Watson who is collecting information for her PhD studies in London, 
England. 
 
We are collecting information on the income that forests and cultivated land 
provide to your household and other households in the Bale area. This 
income includes products sold and consumed at home. This information will 
allow a better understanding of the land use in your kebele and the role that 
forests and forest products have in people’s lives. The information and 
comments you provide in this questionnaire will also contribute to 
investigations into the opportunities and possibilities for future forest 
management in the Bale area. In particular, a scheme for communities to 
manage forest called participatory forest management which is supported by 
the government and by Farm Africa-SOS Sahel. 
 
If you chose to take part in this questionnaire, your answers will not be 
shared with other members of the community or the authorities. Would you 
like to continue with the questions, it will take about 60 minutes?” 
[If no, move on to the next household] 
[If yes, write down time interview started] 
 
Part 1 – Your thoughts about the forest management around your kebele 
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1. What did you think about the management of the forests that your 
household used in the past under the Derg regime (before 1991)? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
2. What do you think about the current management of the forests that your 
household uses? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
3.  
a. Do you think that the current level of forest use by your household and 
others in this kebele can continue into the future?                                                    
yes/ no/ don’t know 
b. Why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
4. How might forest management change if communities were given legal 
rights to use the forest and forest products? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….………………… 
5. We will read a statement out to you and would like you to decide if you 
agree, don’t know, or disagree. 
a. If an area of forest is not being used by people it is not a problem if the 
forest area gets smaller. 
b. Even if my household does not use a part of the forest, I would 
participate in this forests management. 
c. I do not think about my household’s use of forest in the future, it is 
enough to think only about my household’s use of the forest now. 
d. There is a responsibility for me to manage the forest well now so that my 
children and future generations can benefit from the forest in the future. 
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e. One management objective for forests in the Bale Mountains should be to 
support wildlife that lives there. 
f. Forests should be managed only if this does not negatively affect 
people’s livelihoods. 
g. People have more important things to worry about than good 
management to maintain the forest. 
h. People only cut down the forest because they have no other ways of 
supplementing their livelihoods. 
 
 
 
Part 2 – Forest use and land cultivated by your household 
The next few questions help us compare the income that you get from forests 
and cultivated land. This includes forest products and crops that your 
household collected, used at home and sold. If you cannot recall for the last 
year (or 12 months), please give answers for a period of time that you can 
remember. 
 
6. Which of the following products did your household collect? 
Product 
Amount collected last 
year 
(units) 
Maximum time travelled from 
your house (hours) 
Amount sold 
(units) 
Timber    
Fuelwood    
Bamboo    
Honey    
Coffee    
Other.......    
 
7.  
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a. On average, is the time you travel from your house to collect these forest 
products more/ the same/ less than the year before this? 
b. On average, how much more or less than the year before this?                              
............hours 
c. Why do you think the time to collect changing? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….………………… 
d. Do you think the time you travel to collect forest products will change 
next year?                                                                                                                       
more/ the same / less 
8.  
a. Please list the crops that your household harvested last year (or 12 
months). 
 
Crop type 
Yield from first crop 
(Qt) 
Yield from second 
crop (Qt) 
Total amount sold 
each year (Qt) 
    
    
    
 
b. Estimate your costs of inputs to crop production in one year? 
Item Cost (Ethiopian Birr) 
Fertiliser  
Seed  
Equipment  
Paid Labour  
Other .....  
9.  
a. What area of land did your household cultivate last year?         
……….hectares 
b. Is this more/ the same/ less than the year before this? 
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c. How much more or less the year before this?                         ........ hectares 
d. For what reason? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
e. Will you cultivate more/ the same/ less land next year? 
 
10. I would like you to take these 100 beans and to share them between the 
sources of income that your household receives. For example, if you receive 
no income from that source put zero beans on it. If you receive half of your 
income from crops, put 50 of your beans on it. 
Forest Products Crops Livestock Trading 
Paid 
Labour 
Money from 
Overseas 
Other 
       
 
Part 3 – A community based Participatory Forest Management system 
 
Recent research in the Bale Mountains has shown that the forest area is 
decreasing very quickly. Forest is being cut down to make space for settlements, 
agriculture, grazing of livestock and to use the timber and fuelwood. If nothing 
is done the forest area will continue to get smaller. This means the benefits that 
forests provide to households over time will decrease. 
 
One way to maintain the benefits that forests in Bale provide is to ensure that 
the forest is used sustainably. This means maintaining the forest area and 
quality through community-based forest management and by diversifying the 
ways that households can earn an income. This is similar to what is being 
proposed by FARM Africa-SOS Sahel. This has been carried out successfully in 
other areas of Ethiopia and it is called Participatory Forest Management. 
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Under Participatory Forest Management your household would become a 
member of a community cooperative. It would be an honest, credible and 
reliable organisation with committees, rules and responsibilities. The 
cooperative would have a legal agreement with the Oromia Forest and Wildlife 
Enterprise. It gives your cooperative the rights to use the forest and to use and 
sell forest products. Under this agreement, your cooperative is responsible to 
manage the forest according to a forest management plan agreed with the 
Oromia Regional State Forest Enterprise. 
 
Under Participatory Forest Management, in order to meet household needs for 
fuelwood and timber your cooperative will have to sustainably manage the 
harvest from the forest and utilise woodlots. Livestock grazing will have to be 
managed so that it does not degrade the forest. The collection of forest products 
such as honey, climbers, coffee, and medicinal plants would not be affected as 
the tree cover is maintained and forest destruction is minimised. 
 
It is possible that community cooperatives might also be able to receive 
payments if they are able to protect the forest from being cut down and 
maintain the area for 20 years. This is because trees store carbon and when they 
are cut down this is released into the atmosphere and the global climate 
changes. Governments, companies and households in places like England, are 
willing-to-pay to keep the carbon in the trees to slow down climate change. It is 
possible that payments could be made for carbon each year, only where the 
forest area has been maintained. The cooperative could then choose what the 
money is spent on. A community group that cut down forest would not receive 
any payment for carbon. 
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11. Do you understand Participatory Forest Management that was explained to 
you?      yes, all of it/ some of it/ no, none of 
it 
[Explain again if they understand none of it] 
12. Do you understand why your cooperative might be paid money to keep 
carbon in the trees?                  yes, all of it/ some of it/ no, none of 
it 
[Explain again if they understand none of it] 
13. Do you have any comments about the forest management just described to 
you, its advantages and disadvantages to your household and community if 
it were to be organised within your kebele? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….…………………… 
14. Do you think the Participatory Forest Management will affect some people 
or social groups in your kebele more than others? In what way and why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………..…………………… 
15. Do you think that the households in your kebele would join a Participatory 
Forest Management Cooperative?    yes/ don’t know/ no 
16. Would your household be willing to join a Participatory Forest Management 
cooperative (remember that this is not a binding agreement to join)? 
yes/ don’t know/ no 
17. How certain are you that other members of a cooperative would follow the 
rules to maintain the forest area under Participatory Forest Management?
         certain/ don’t know/ 
uncertain 
18. If your cooperative received payments from carbon, how should the money 
be used? 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….………………………… 
19.  
a. Under the rules of the Participatory Forest Management described to you 
do you think your household would be better off / just as well off as you are 
now / worse off? 
b. Why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….………………………… 
20. Do you think that the rules of the Participatory Forest Management 
described to you would lead to a change in the income that your household 
gets from forest products next year (this includes products used at home as 
well as sold)?                                                  increase/decrease/no change 
 
[If they say ‘no’, move to section 4] 
[If they say ‘yes’ or ‘don’t know’ continue with this section] 
 
21. If Participatory Forest Management were to be carried out in your kebele, 
what change in amount of income would your household experience if it 
had to follow the rules of Participatory Forest Management? Before you 
answer, please think carefully about the impact of the scheme for your 
household.                                                                                   
……………………….. Ethiopian Birr 
 
22. If the respondent was not willing to give an amount of money, why was 
this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….………………………… 
23.  
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a. Under Participatory Forest Management the forests will be sustainably 
managed so that they will provide benefits and income into the future. 
These benefits include climate regulation and the protection of the 
watershed. It also means that forests will be available for future 
generations to use. To secure these benefits, would you be willing to give 
up some of your yearly income to your Participatory Forest Management 
Cooperative so that they could better manage the forest? 
yes/ no 
b. If yes, how much money each year would you be willing to give to the 
cooperative so that forest use will continue into the future?                                                                        
...............………… Ethiopian Birr 
 
24. If the respondent was not willing to give an amount of money, why was 
this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
25. You stated that the income your household gets from forests next year might 
change under Participatory Forest Management. Thinking five years into the 
future, how do you think that Participatory Forest Management might affect 
this income? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
 
[Read out] “Please remember at this point that carbon payments are not 
definitely going to be made to cooperatives under Participatory Forest 
Management and if it was, it may not be organised as described above.” 
 
Part 4 – Household Information 
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This is the last few questions which are about the people in your household. 
Please remember, information will not be shared with the authorities. 
26.  
a. Are you the head of the household?      yes/ 
no 
b. What is your level of education?    ......... grade 
27. How many years has your household lived in this kebele? ......... years 
28.  
a. Is this household polygamous?      yes/ no 
b. When you answered questions on forest products and crops, how many 
houses did you report for?      ..….. houses 
c. How many people live in this household?   ......... people 
 
[Read out] “Thank you for giving your time to complete this questionnaire. 
Your answers will help use compare the value that forests and cultivated land 
provide to the households in the Bale area. They will also contribute to 
investigations into the opportunities and possibilities for future forest 
management in the Bale area. Charlene will report the overall results of this 
questionnaire when she next returns to the Bale Mountains”. 
[Write down time of completion] 
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Appendix 2: Market price survey  
Product Unit 
Average 
price across 
six market 
survey sites 
(ETB/unit) 
 
Product Unit 
Average 
price 
across six 
market 
survey 
sites 
(ETB/unit) 
Bamboo Donkey 49  Carrot Quintile 158 
Climber Donkey 13 
 Sweet 
Potato Quintile 198 
Fence 1 piece 9  Mango 1 piece 1 
Firewood Donkey 26  Avocado 1 piece 1 
Grass Sack 8  Banana kg 7 
Timber 1 piece 40  Beetroot Quintile 129 
Honey Kg 31  Pepper  kg 35 
Oils Kg 21  Chat bundle 23 
Sorghum Quintile 341  Coffee kg 30 
Barley Quintile 284  Pineapple kg 7 
Bean Quintile 526  Butter kg 77 
Peas Quintile 724  Ginger kg 5 
Maize 
Quintile 
379 
 Absuda 
(black 
cumin) Quintile 2454 
Teff Quintile 632  Abish Quintile 1475 
Wheat Quintile 444  Dinblata Quintile 525 
Lentil kg 15  Shimbura Quintile 533 
Oats Quintile 304  Salt kg 3 
Onion kg 6  Gayyo Quintile 435 
Spring 
Onion 
Quintile 
180 
 
Lemon 1 piece 1 
Potato 
Quintile 
176 
 Green 
pepper kg 15 
Garlic 
(White 
onion) 
Quintile 
617 
 
Orange 1 piece 2 
Cabbage 
(round) 
Quintile 
108 
 
Dog tooth Quintile 422 
 
